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FOREWORD
Even before the Bush administration in Washington
began its defense reviews, the topic of transforming
America’s armed forces to meet the security demands of the
post-Cold War era and beyond was receiving much
attention. The sharp debates about the direction and impact
of President George W. Bush’s and Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld’s plans for defense reform have magnified that
trend. For that reason, the theme of the Twelfth Annual
Strategy Conference conducted by the U.S. Army War
College in April 2001, “Transforming Defense in an Era of
Peace and Prosperity,” was especially timely. The ideas and
issues presented in this collection of papers from that
gathering will educate and inform anyone interested in the
past and future course of American defense reform.
Though conference attendees had many differing
opinions about the barriers to defense transformation and
how to overcome them, a broad consensus formed that some
change is essential to meet future security requirements.
They observed at the time that it is ironic that the peace
which creates the prosperity and wealth to fund
transformation and permits a window of time to achieve it,
also decreases public interest and urgency to accomplish it.
The terrible events of September 11, 2001, appear to have
dispelled public disinterest in the nation’s military
capabilities, and may provide increased impetus for the
drive for defense reform. If the opportunity is squandered,
or the wrong choices are made, the costs to the nation
someday could be catastrophic.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
v

PREFACE
From April 17-20, 2001, the U.S. Army War College
sponsored a major conference to examine the many issues
and questions surrounding the transformation of the U.S.
Armed Forces from a Cold War paradigm into a defense
establishment ready to meet the complex challenges of the
future. The conference brought together at Carlisle
Barracks over 230 American and foreign academic,
business, government, media, and military representatives.
A series of enlightening—and sometimes troubling—
discussions highlighted the many opportunities and
challenges involved in executing long-term and extensive
defense reform. The conference focused on five general
themes: an historical overview of defense transformation,
change and organizational dynamics, global perspectives on
American defense reform, financing the process, and service
plans to execute it.
This collection regroups papers and presentations from
the conference into three categories: Historical Overviews of
Transforming Defense, Transformation Plans and Barriers,
and External Views of Transformation. Each section
contains an introduction describing the essays that follow,
as well as summarizing other relevant conference
presentations and discussions bearing on the topic. If
presenters did not produce a formal article for publication,
their key arguments are still described in the introduction.
The conference concluded while the outlines of the Bush
administration’s national security strategy and defense
budget were still very vague. Details that emerged shortly
thereafter, including the passage of a large tax cut,
highlighted some of the specific directions—and
difficulties—near-term defense reform would feature. The
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have altered
some of those parameters, but have also highlighted anew
the evolving nature of future threats and the need for
vii

expanded military capabilities. The issues and arguments
covered in this collection look backward into the past and
forward into the future to illuminate views of the process
and problems of American defense transformation for
affected decisionmakers. The road ahead is still unclear, but
it must be traveled if the United States is to retain its
dominant military power. This collection will provide some
guideposts and warnings that will be useful along the way.

CONRAD C. CRANE
Editor
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PART I:
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN DEFENSE
American history is replete with examples of eras and
circumstances requiring military change, and they were
often cited by conference panelists and commentators to
illustrate points of discussion. The three essays in this
section are a product of the first session of the conference,
intended to provide some broad perspectives on this
historical basis for defense transformation. Dr. Brian Linn
from Texas A&M University opens with an analysis of a
century of peacetime change for the Army. Focusing on
contemporary and modern issues and problems, he
concludes that real “peacetime transformation occurs when
there is substantial public and political support and a clear
and present danger to the continental United States.” He
also notes that there is danger in imposing military change
without thinking through all the consequences. Dr. Frank
Schubert, Chief of Joint Operational History in the Joint
History Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
compares the employment of American military forces since
the end of the Cold War with the traditional roles they have
served for the nation. He finds that although there are some
differences, the Armed Forces’ disparate missions in the
1990s fit the historical pattern of the nation’s military
experience. Dr. David Jablonsky of the Army War College
ends this section with a further examination of the 1990s.
He explains how the juxtaposition of the so-called “Powell
and Clinton Doctrines” have created a demanding list of
requirements for the Army that has energized the drive for
service transformation, while producing an “essentially
conservative approach to a revolutionary process.”

1

As a follow-up to the presentation of these papers, Dr.
Richard Betts from Columbia University gave a provocative
address entitled “Looking Forward by Looking Backward.”
He used the period between the World Wars to illustrate the
limited utility of historical comparisons, and highlighted
the uncertainties that the future holds. Though wary of too
much peacekeeping, he predicted that similar missions will
predominate. Consequently, the Army as well as the other
services will have to simultaneously develop new
warfighting technologies while improving their capability
to conduct peace operations. If history provides any useful
lesson to guide transformation, it is that there is great risk
in establishing military forces too specialized for specific
contingencies. They must be able to perform a myriad of
missions, and will assuredly also eventually have to fight an
unexpected major war in an unexpected place.

2

CHAPTER 1
PEACETIME TRANSFORMATION
IN THE U.S. ARMY, 1865-1965
Brian McAllister Linn
Today’s officers may not appreciate just how great a
transformation the Cold War imposed on the U.S. Army. As
they struggle to articulate an Army Vision for the 21st
century, they continue to define the Army’s “traditional”
strategic purposes as support for the nation’s allies, land
dominance, promoting regional stability, meeting small
scale contingencies, deterring aggression, and, if necessary,
fighting a major theater war anywhere in the world.
Virtually no one can remember that until just 60 years ago,
the Army’s missions were interpreted far more narrowly as
the protection of the continental United States and,
secondarily, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and
the guarding of overseas interests. Not until the Cold War
did the U.S. military adopt a looser construction of its
mission, one that incorporated the protection of the “Free
World” and the fighting and winning of the nation’s wars.
Now that the Cold War has ended, the Army’s next
transformation may be a return to its historic role of
homeland defense.
In order to understand the complexity of transforming
defense in an era of peace and prosperity in the United
States, it is essential to have some context, some
understanding of past efforts at military change. Anyone
who has sat through briefings in which senior officials
dramatically flash PowerPoint slides detailing the lessons
of the past, is aware of the shallowness of much of today’s
3

historical analyses. To escape such superficialities, it is
necessary to avoid some of the common weaknesses in the
current discussion of historical transformation. All too
many start at a point from which the “correct solution” has
been revealed, and then work backward to determine the
precise moment when the institution succeeded or failed.
This approach produces studies in which blitzkrieg, or
strategic bombing, or Air-Land Battle is portrayed as the
unfolding of a divine plan. But the benefits of case-studies
which minutely retrace a preordained path are of little use
to those grappling with the problems of the present; much
less are they suitable guides for the future. A second failing
is to study change by focusing on the ideas, institutions, or
technologies which proved of most importance in the
following war. But to truly explore military transformation
it is necessary to examine how the armed forces prepared, or
did not prepare, to fulfill their nation’s strategy and their
service’s mission. This, in turn, means that at least as much
attention must be paid to contemporary peacetime needs as
to anticipated wartime ones. This last point is of particular
importance when the nation’s armed forces are tasked with
executing a strategy of deterrence. A final, and frequent,
error is to rely on a few examples, usually taken out of
context, which have been repeated so often that their
“lessons” are accepted without question. Rarely is there
sufficient effort to go beyond the cliché and question—to cite
one of the more popular contemporary analogies—whether
comparing the blitzkrieg and the Maginot Line is actually
relevant to American defense needs in the 21st century.
This chapter takes a linear, chronological approach and
focuses specifically on peacetime transformation in the U.S.
Army over a relatively long period, the century between
1865 and 1965. It will describe the circumstances
encountered by military reformers in four historic periods of
peace, and will try to show their perception of the task of
defending the nation’s interests in successive eras of
dramatic change and innovation. It will seek to identify not
only the problems that later scholars have noted, but the
4

problems and issues that the officers at the time saw as
crucial. Through this, there may emerge a more balanced
appraisal of the U.S. Army’s successes and failures in its
recurrent attempts to adapt better to the changing needs of
the nation’s defense. Such an overview may not produce
ready references and convenient lessons, but it will provide
a far better appreciation of the transformation process itself
and the difficulties inherent in radical change.
To some, this period between 1865 and 1965 is a
rags-to-riches story in which the Army, through its
professionalism and effectiveness, transformed itself from a
small frontier constabulary to the military arm of a
superpower. But what is less clear is how this process was
achieved, and whether it can be replicated so that the Army
can now transform itself for the challenges of a new century.
For our purposes, it may be useful to divide the century
between the end of the Civil War and the commitment of
ground forces to Vietnam into four distinct periods of
prolonged peace: from 1865 to the Spanish-American War of
1898; the period from 1899 to the American entry in World
War I; the 1919-41 interwar era; and the Cold War era of
1953 to 1965, the period between Korea and Vietnam. Each
of these was a period of peace, but also of profound changes
in the international strategic environment, in the Army’s
operational capabilities, and in military organization and
technology.1
The four decades between the end of the Civil War and
the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 have
been termed by one military historian “the Army’s Dark
Ages,” and by military analyst Samuel Huntington as the
“years of isolation.”2 Even though marked by early fiscal
retrenchment, sectional violence, and periodic panics, this
was a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity. The
Army, however, benefited but little from the nation’s good
fortune. The Civil War demobilization was rapid and brutal:
within 11 years the million-man Union Army had been
reduced to some 28,000. The mobile commands—infantry,
cavalry, and field artillery—were scattered across the
5

Western frontier in company posts, engaged in unremitting
company drill, fatigue duty, and little more. When these
units took to the field, it was on difficult and sensitive
operations such as the pacification of Native American
tribes or strike breaking. Dominated by Washington
bureaucrats and aging Civil War veterans, the Army was
badly equipped, poorly paid, demoralized, and held in low
public esteem.
Historians have traditionally taken as their starting
point the reforming agenda of Emory Upton and his
supporters which took form in the late 1870s. Inspired by
Prussia’s example, Upton advocated the creation of a
general staff, lifetime professional education for officers,
and the concentration of mobile forces into large tactical
units. Most controversial was his proposal to forsake the
nation’s traditional military organization of the small
peacetime R eg u lar Ar my and a l ar ge war ti me
citizen-soldier volunteer force, and replace it with a
cadre-reserve system capable of mobilizing 150,000
soldiers. According to the standard account, public apathy
and congressional obstruction eventually drove Upton to
suicide, and only the persistence of his admirers kept his
ideas alive, to triumph 3 decades later under Secretary of
War Elihu Root. And in the meantime, a series of
incremental changes—the adaptation of a modern rifle, the
closing of redundant and isolated posts, the development of
officer education—all helped prepare the ground for later,
more substantial, reforms.3
This emphasis on Upton and on organizational reform
obscures the reality that in the period 1865 to 1898 some of
the Army’s most effective spokesmen were those who
focused on its role in homeland security. These officers were
not necessarily opposed to Upton’s agenda—some were
enthusiastic supporters—but they concentrated on their
service’s role in the national defense. In a series of articles
and reports, they argued that steam transportation, new
weapons, and the advent of the mass army had created a
new threat to American security. The risk of invasion might
6

be, in the words of General William T. Sherman, “simply
preposterous,” but there was an increased danger that a
rival Great Power might stage a sudden raid on a port city to
extract political or financial concessions.4 To overcome this
peril, these reformers offered a technological solution based
on improving both the construction and weaponry of harbor
fortifications, and on increasing the technical skills of the
coast defense garrisons. They adapted their view of future
war to the parameters of the nation’s traditional national
security policy—envisioning the Army’s task primarily in
terms of deterrence and repulse, not the destruction of rival
military forces or the conquest of territory. Rather than
disdaining civilian interference, as Upton did, officers
worked closely with Secretary of War William C. Endicott
and with Congress on a special Board on Fortifications or
Other Defenses, often referred to as the Endicott Board. The
Board effectively harmonized three crucial components:
new military technology, the Army’s primary mission, and
the traditional defense policy. It alerted citizens to the
change in the strategic environment and the emergence of a
new threat to the nation’s security, and it outlined a clear
solution. Moreover, unlike Upton’s, their views were
actually accepted: the 1885 Report of the Board on Fortifications
or other Defenses led to Congressional authorization for the
revamping of major coastal fortifications.5
The 2 decades following the Spanish-American War are
often portrayed as the most successful peacetime change
the Army has ever experienced. Aided by progressive Army
reformers, between 1899 and 1903 Secretary of War Elihu
Root created an Army Chief of Staff and a General Staff,
almost tripled manpower, reorganized the military
education system, founded the Army War College, began
turning the National Guard into the primary federal
reserve force, and made many other, if less important,
improvements. These “Root Reforms” have been seen by
many as signaling an almost revolutionary transformation
of the Army from a constabulary to a modern military.
Indeed, in a recent address to the Army War College, Army
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Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki drew a direct historical parallel
between the current situation and that faced by Root and
his military advisors a hundred years ago.6
The era of the Root reforms may still be a powerful
symbol to today’s high command as they seek to rally for
tomorrow’s challenges, but it is important to keep the
military reforms of 1899-1903 within their historical
context. Root’s 1899 declaration that the real object of an
army is to prepare for war has been quoted approvingly by
generations of military writers, who have then
claimed—post hoc—that it marked a primary shift in the
U.S. Army’s mission from constabulary duties to fighting
the nation’s wars. However great the progress since Root, it
is important for the historical record, if not the popular one,
to note that this was not a transformation that the
Secretary or his military allies intended. A closer reading of
Root’s 1899 report makes it clear why he thought reform
was necessary: to improve the nation’s continental defenses
and to provide troops for the newly acquired overseas
possessions.7 He had no intention of engaging in Great
Power conflicts overseas; rather he wanted a balanced
mixture of mobile forces and fortifications that could more
effectively protect the homeland and the territories. Root’s
successor, William H. Taft, showed a clear appreciation of
Root’s priorities when he secured funding for a new coast
defense construction program. In other words, Root’s
reforms were inherently conservative and proposed no
radical alteration of the Army’s traditional mission. As in
the case of the Endicott Board, successful change was linked
with powerful political support, but only for very specific,
and limited, objectives. When reformers moved too far away
from their service’s traditional mission, they were
unsuccessful.
A second, and related point, is that the Root era of
accelerated reform was of rather short duration—perhaps
no more than 4 years. Taft slowed the pace dramatically, in
part because he had to clarify much of the confusion created
by Root. The rest of the decade witnessed bitter resistance to
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change from entrenched interests and a rapid diminution of
political support for military reorganization. It was not until
2 decades after Root’s first report that the Army was able to
implement fully the reformers’ program, and then only
because of the demands of sending millions of soldiers to
fight in Europe—-a scenario neither Root nor his military
assistants envisioned in 1899.
Root’s legacy was less impressive in other areas. Some of
his institutional reforms, most notably joining the coast and
field components into the Artillery Corps, created a great
deal of organizational and personnel turbulence. He, or his
military advisors, failed to appreciate either the impact of
new military technology or the need to integrate weapons
system and doctrine. The Army did produce excellent small
arms and a very good field gun, but, as numerous critics
have noted, it remained unaware of the revolutionary
implications of such military technologies as the airplane,
the internal combustion engine, and the machine gun.
Although a great improvement on earlier tactics, the 1905
Field Service Regulations and its successors still championed
an anachronistic belief in the power of the individual
rifleman and the tactical assault. 8 As one analyst
recognized in the years prior to World War I, the Regular
Army saw its mission as “to fight at the drop of a hat,” but
only if such fighting was limited to “some minor
disturbance” in Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean.9 The
deadly insularity of this viewpoint became apparent in
1917, when the absence of both a training system and a
reserve force led to a chaotic mobilization and a 1-year delay
before the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) could
undertake combat operations.
Historians have also failed to appreciate the unforeseen
consequences of the Root transformation, particularly in
the areas of morale, manpower, and readiness—all issues of
vital importance to today’s officers. Far from reforming and
professionalizing the officer corps, the decade after Root’s
appointment was characterized by widespread accusations
of favoritism and careerism. This was especially true of the
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higher command, which was widely criticized for its
distance from the needs of the field army. The selection of
Leonard Wood, a medical officer with very limited command
experience but impressive political connections, to Army
Chief of Staff may have marked the nadir of faith in the
promotion system and the senior leadership. Root and his
successors also failed to solve the Army’s persistent
manpower problems. The Philippines alone needed a
garrison roughly half the size of the pre-1898 Regular Army,
and to this was added the requirements for garrisons in
China, Panama, and Hawaii, for deployments into Cuba,
and, after 1910, for duty on the Mexican border. Indeed, for
most of the early 1900s roughly a third of the army was
assigned overseas, and in 1 year the figure was closer to
half. The demands of overseas service, recruiting, working
with the reserves, and education took so many officers from
their commands that in 1905 the Secretary of War warned
absenteeism was “a menace to the discipline of the Army
and its effectiveness as a fighting machine.”10 Coupled to
this were the terrible, and often overlooked, effects of
prolonged service in unhealthy climates. Not until 1908 did
the rates for disability discharges and admission to hospital
for sickness return to the levels they were prior to the
Spanish-American War. Living conditions were often
appalling, as officers and their families were shuttled from
one set of dilapidated, vermin-infested quarters to another
thousands of miles away. Small wonder that there was a
marked increase in resignations, and that in 1907 the Army
could fill less than two-thirds of its authorized vacancies for
second lieutenant positions.11
The turbulence was perhaps even worse in the enlisted
ranks—so much so that in 1906 Taft told Congress that “the
army we have now is nothing but a skeleton army.”12 The
desertion rate rose by 5 percent between 1898 and 1905.
Reenlistments plummeted as veteran soldiers and
noncomissioned officers (NCOs) left the service—because of
disease, disgust, or jobs in the civilian sector that paid ten
times as much as their military benefits. Not surprisingly,
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the outflow was greatest among the long-service, highly
skilled specialists most able to transfer their skills to the
market. These experienced personnel were replaced by
recruits who often failed to meet the minimum admission
standards. For their part, soldiers complained bitterly that
instead of training to defend the nation, they served as
common laborers, garbage men, farm hands, kitchen help,
and domestic servants. A series of investigations into the
causes of soldiers leaving the service—legally and
illegally—revealed the same complaints: low pay, overwork,
limited or nonexistent recreational facilities, confusing or
misleading enlistment contracts, frequent changes of
officers and stations, inexperienced or incapable NCOs, and
recruits of low intelligence and morals.13
So wh at can be l ear ned f r om the p eac eti me
transformation in the Root era? The first insight is the
historical truism that those who seek to learn lessons from
history all too often disregard information which
contradicts the “lessons” they want to extract. This is
especially true of those who hail the Root reforms as a model
for change without studying their immediate consequences.
Second, it is important to appreciate the Root reforms for
what they were—an effort to prepare the army to execute
better its traditional mission of continental defense. Third,
transformation had many side-effects far beyond the
reformers’ intent. Although it is unfair to blame Root for
Army woes in the 1900s, he shares some responsibility for
an overall decline in morale and for increased personnel
turbulence. Fourth, transformation needs to be followed
through and its effects are gradual, not immediate. Fifth,
the benefits of Root’s improvements were uneven and were
chiefly shared by a very small group: influential reformers,
general staff officers, political generals such as Leonard
Wood and John J. Pershing, and the students at the
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth
and the Army War College who rose to command in World
War I. But if you look to the field army—to the thousands
exiled overseas in unhealthy and hostile climates, to the
11

demoralized recruits, to the companies stripped of their
officers, to the torrents leaving the service—then
transformation assumes an entirely different, and far less
positive, meaning.
If the Root era is too often uncritically perceived as one of
successful organizational change, the period between World
War I and World War II is often derided as the time when
the U.S. Army failed to adjust to new developments in land
warfare—particularly in mechanized warfare, operational
doctrine, communications, and combined arms warfare.
The Army’s delinquency appears especially egregious when
contrasted with such innovations as blitzkrieg, amphibious
assault, and strategic bombardment. 14 Because the
interwar era has assumed such importance in the current
military transformation debate, it is worth exploring the
Army’s experience at some length. To do so, it is necessary to
ask questions which are too often ignored. What were the
nation’s military needs? What was the Army’s mission? In
what areas did the Army successfully adapt? What factors
inhibited transformation?
In their efforts to expose the failures in preparation for
World War II, critics tend to overlook the national strategic
context in which the interwar U.S. Army operated. Unlike
that of its later adversaries, American policy was not based
on disrupting the global balance of power and carving out a
new empire. Accordingly, there was no need for military
organizations to wage aggressive wars of conquest. Rather,
for most of the interwar period the Army’s mission was the
protection of the homeland and, trailing considerably
behind in priorities and allocations, the defense of overseas
territories. It is also important to recognize that the
“interwar period” actually consists of two distinct eras,
divided roughly by decades. In the 1920s the United States
was internally prosperous, its government placed much
faith in the international security framework established by
the Washington Naval Treaties of 1921, and the world was
at (relative) peace. In the 1930s the United States was
struggling with economic depression, faced an aggressive
12

Japan and an increasingly hostile Germany, and wars and
rumors of wars were common. Not surprisingly, over these 2
decades the Army’s prescriptions for reform shifted along
with the changing domestic and international situation.
The primary threats to the nation’s security in the
immediate post-war period were a major war with a
British-Japanese coalition and policing the ever-turbulent
Mexican border. As is the case today, achieving such widely
disparate missions required correspondingly different
capabilities, weapons systems, and organizations. To
counter the first danger, the Army had to develop a strategy
and force structure to defend the Atlantic coast and the
Pacific territories. To counter the second, it needed light,
mobile combat units capable of operating in the Southwest’s
rugged terrain. This, in turn, suggested the Army continue
to improve the coast defenses, maintain a horse cavalry
component on the border, and develop plans to mobilize a
large field force in the event of a major conflict. Only by the
most fanciful stretch of imagination would the nation or the
Army require a combined arms force built around air and
armored spearheads.15
In the immediate aftermath of the Great War, both the
United States and its armed forces had a number of
successes in adapting to the changes in the strategic
situation. The 1921 Washington Naval Treaties dissolved
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, greatly lessening the danger
of a two-ocean war and greatly enhancing continental
security. The 1920 National Defense Act appeared to
demonstrate that both the army and the nation had drawn
the correct conclusions from the war. Designed to create a
new military organization for the post-war security
situation, it abolished previous distinctions—and
rivalries—and created a unified “Army of the United
States” built around a 298,000-man Regular Army, a
435,000-man National Guard, and a potentially larger
federal organized Reserves. Army service journals lauded
the Act as the first real declaration of a national security
policy in American history.16
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Within the Army itself, there were many indications of a
rapid and successful assimilation of the lessons of the
Western Front. The Army’s post-war operational doctrine,
the 1923 Field Service Regulations, embodied an effective
combined-arms system. Equally impressive was Brigadier
General William G. Haan’s “Positive System of Coast
Defense.” Issued in 1920, it addressed the long-recognized
problem of protecting the coastal areas between the
fortresses. Haan recognized the similarity between crossing
No Man’s Land and an amphibious assault, and he created a
flexible defense in depth that would have channeled the
attackers into killing zones, pinned them on the beaches,
and then struck them with overwhelming firepower. It was
a doctrine well-suited to the Army’s core missions of
protecting the continental United States and the Pacific
possessions.17
These early successes were, unfortunately, not
continued for the rest of the interwar era. Under Republican
administrations determined to practice fiscal restraint,
encourage business, and avoid foreign entanglements—
policies enthusiastically accepted by the voting public—the
United States put its trust in diplomacy, tariffs, arms
treaties, and isolationism. No sooner had the National
Defense Act been passed than Congress all but abrogated it.
In the years between 1923 and 1936, it was not unusual for
the Regular Army and National Guard to be manned at less
than half their authorization, and the Reserves remained a
hollow force. For most of this period, the Army fielded only
one active division—and that was the half-strength force
stationed in Hawaii. Successive chiefs of staff and
secretaries of war drew both White House and Congressional attention to the rapid decline of the nation’s defenses,
but to virtually no effect.
Although the major inhibitions on transformation
during the interwar period were political and popular
indifference and a complete lack of financial, materiel, or
manpower resources, the Army bore some responsibility for
its problems. The Army leadership failed to recognize that
14

transformation is a continual process—what was progressive in the early 1920s too often became a major brake on
innovation within a decade. This is especially true in the
crucial field of developing technology. With some
justification, Congressmen such as Ross Collins could
complain that the Army’s own leadership was its most
effective barrier to modernization. Chief of Staff Douglas
MacArthur’s 1934 report bemoaned the fact that the army
could field only a dozen tanks built after World War I, but he
himself had dissolved his predecessor’s experimental armor
force on the parochial, even reactionary, argument that the
mechanized force violated the mission boundaries between
the combat branches. Army conservatism and lethargy was
apparent as well in the long delay to develop and distribute
even the most basic of weapons. Despite the widespread
belief that mortars and rifles—not tanks—would provide
infantry sufficient firepower to fight through enemy
defenses, the Army took over 2 decades to issue the
semiautomatic M-1 rifle, and soldiers were issued the
obsolete Stokes mortar right up to the outbreak of war.18
On the face of it, the Army’s institutional conservatism
and resistance to change is nowhere more apparent than in
the interwar Coast Artillery and the Cavalry—two
branches poles apart in their traditions and missions. Coast
Artillery officers remained fixated on their weapons and
technical skills, apparently oblivious to the fact that their
marvelous long-range guns were helpless against
airplanes.19 The case of the interwar cavalry is even more
revealing. From the Cavalry Journal one can cull numerous
examples of anachronistic thinking and an almost bizarre
resistance to innovation and change. Major George S.
Patton, for example, in a 1922 article explaining the
cavalry’s poor showing in World War I, declared that
mechanized warfare and firepower were highly overrated:
“The bayonet charge and the saber charge are the highest
physical demonstration of moral victory. The fierce frenzy of
hate and determination flashing from the bloodshot eyes
squinting behind the glittering steel is what wins.”20 It
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would be comforting to follow the path of some military
commentators and hold up the Cavalry and Coast Artillery
as cautionary examples of military institutions that refused
to change, and thus doomed themselves to irrelevance and
extinction. But this is ultimately unsatisfactory as an
explanation of the difficulty of peacetime reform.21
Rather than seeking to assign blame, it is better to
recognize the historical context in which these two branches
operated, and not to allow our knowledge of World War II to
obscure the reality these officers faced in the 1920s. Coast
Artillery officers such as Johnson Hagood and Stanley
Embick were among the interwar army’s most original and
innovative strategic thinkers. Far more than most, they
tried to tie the army’s force structure to its assigned
mission—that of protecting the continental United States.
Veterans of Soissons or the Meuse Argonne might laugh at
Patton’s romantic call for a return to the saber, but they
could find little to refute his assertion that Western Europe
was the only region in the world where both resources and
transportation networks allowed for the efficient use of
tanks. Since neither Patton nor any other officer envisioned
another American expeditionary force to Europe, it made
far more sense to structure the post-war U.S. Army to fight
in the jungles of the Philippines, the deserts of Mexico and
Texas, and the mountains and forests of Canada. For such
locations there appeared little need for armor but a great
need for cavalry.22 Ultimately the Cavalry and the Coast
Artillery were of little importance in World War II, but
throughout the 1920s, both branches were fulfilling
missions that were an essential part of the nation’s defense
policy.
In retrospect, it appears that much of the criticism
directed against the interwar Army for its conservatism and
failure to innovate is not particularly useful as a guide for
current issues. At least in the years immediately following
World War I, the Army and the nation appeared to have
made a successful transformation for the challenges of the
post-war world. The heart of the interwar Army’s problem
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reinforces the lesson of earlier examples: that peacetime
transformation is most likely when both public and political
opinion supports it. Given that for most of this period the
nation was secure from attack, the Army could not argue
that it was incapable of fulfilling its primary mission.
Equally importantly, throughout the 1930s the nation was
in a state of economic depression, isolationism was
rampant, and Army needs had a very low priority. In such
circumstances, criticizing military leaders for their inability
to anticipate future dangers or recognize the significance of
specific technological and doctrinal developments is both
intellectually unrewarding and mean-spirited. More
importantly, it does very little to help today’s officers
anticipate future dangers.
The peacetime Army that served in the era between the
Korean and Vietnam conflicts, roughly from 1953 to 1965,
may have faced greater challenges to the nation’s security
than any of its predecessors. The onset of the Cold War led to
the appearance, for the first time, of an opponent with the
ability to strike deep into the continental United States. The
nation’s commitment to foreign governments and NATO
insured not only that large military forces would be
permanently deployed overseas, but that the United States
would now fight as a member of a coalition. The new
emphasis on coalition warfare also applied within the U.S.
armed forces—for any war would require all the services to
work together. Yet at the same time, there were a number of
similarities to the U.S. Army’s traditional priorities:
continental defense was a cornerstone of Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s New Look, and the inheritors of this
mission—the gunners in the HAWK and NIKE batteries—
received a disproportionate amount of funding and
resources.23
As in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the
United States moved rapidly to transform its defense
establishment towards the challenge of the post-war world.
The National Defense Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments
radically restructured the nation’s armed forces, creating a
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unified National Military Establishment, a Secretary and a
Department of Defense, and, to provide the President with
the corporate wisdom of the armed forces, a Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS). The president, in turn, could expect the Chiefs
to implement the federal government’s policies, ensure a
coordinated and rational approach to national defense, and
oversee their respective services’ adherence to the national
security policy. In practice, the results of this transformation were less than impressive. According to his
biographer, President Eisenhower “was nearly driven to
distraction” by the service chiefs’ resistance to his New
Look, their constant bickering and in-fighting, their
recurrent challenges to his budgets, and their refusal to
accept any decision as final.24 The Army was particularly
recalcitrant, as witnessed by the “revolt of the colonels,” by
the controversy surrounding General James M. Gavin’s
retirement, and by two books from former Army Chiefs of
Staff criticizing Eisenhower’s military policies.25
Much of the reason for the Army’s prominent role in the
1950s interservice battles was that its historic mission, and
its entire relevance as a combat service, appeared at stake.
The smoke had barely cleared from Hiroshima before
aviation enthusiasts were claiming that the U.S. Air Force
was the only service capable of winning a war with the
Soviet Union. One general informed students of the 1956
class of the Army War College that as long as it had a
superiority in air power, the United States required only an
army big enough to guard the tomb of the Unknown
Soldier. 2 6 Even more disturbing, both President
Eisenhower and Congress appeared to agree. Eisenhower’s
New Look stressed the primacy of nuclear weapons and air
power, and throughout the 1950s the Air Force received
almost twice as much money as the Army.
In their efforts to revive their service’s place in the
national defense, army planners had to adjust to the
transformation in warfare wrought by the atomic bomb.
Nuclear weapons appeared to negate a major challenge to
what had emerged as the U.S. Army’s major strength in
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World War II—the accumulation, distribution, and
coordination of massive amounts of resources and
manpower across time and space. Nevertheless, Gavin was
not alone in his recognition that a few tactical nuclear
weapons would have made the massive concentration of
men and resources on the Normandy beachhead a death
trap. The Korean War sent an even stronger message that
the Army had to change. In the early fighting of 1950 the
power of Russian armor and the sophistication of Soviet
tactics proved a rude shock. Even more discouraging was
the recurrence of complaints similar to those of 1944—that
American combat units were fighting with inferior weapons
and equipment, and that their combat organizations were
inefficient and weak. In response, the army greatly
increased the firepower and endurance of its tactical
units—but such reforms were achieved at such a cost in
mobility that they were of debatable use on any battlefield
but Korea.27
Thus, by the mid-1950s, the army high command was in
a distinct quandary. The rival services were doing so much
better in the annual budgets that the Army was threatened
with the equivalent of the NCAA “death penalty” for
recruiting violations—it would fall so far behind in
research, development, training, and transportation that it
would never catch up. The atmosphere in Eisenhower’s
administration was, according to one officer who served
there, “brutal. . . it seemed obvious that the Army was going
down” and could expect no support for its “traditional”
missions.28 Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense, “Engine
Charlie” Wilson, despised Chief of Staff General Matthew
B. Ridgway and the Army. The JCS Chairman Admiral
Arthur Radford championed “more bang for the buck”
nuclear weapons and refused to pass on Army objections to
the policy of massive retaliation.
Faced with what many officers interpreted as a threat to
the existence of their service, the Army undertook
comprehensive, total—and in retrospect often poorly
executed—effort to create an atomic-era military force. Both
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the need for institutional survival and Eisenhower’s New
Look policy drove the army towards creating the Atomic
Field Army [ATFA] which would allow the army to stake its
claim on the nuclear battlefield. Determined to break the
Air Force’s monopoly and provide its own units with a
nuclear capability, the Army rushed into production a
massive 280-mm artillery piece. Amid great publicity, on
May 25, 1953, “Atomic Annie” fired an 800-pound atomic
warhead at a target over six miles away. Unfortunately, this
great photo op was about as good as it got: the 280-mm gun
soon proved to be all but unusable in any foreseeable combat
scenario. Weighing 85 tons, it required two tractors to move
it and was so unwieldy that it could take an hour of careful
maneuvering to get it under a bridge. Its instability and
propensity to slide or tip when maneuvered on anything but
firm and level ground earned it the nickname the “Widow
Maker.” To complicate the Army’s problems further, the gun
was very unpopular among Europeans. Within 2 years it
had been surpassed by other weapons, and was taken out of
service within a decade.29 The Redstone Missile project
offered the Army a chance to develop its own long-range
tactical and theater-level nuclear threat, but at the cost of a
bitter, and ultimately unsuccessful battle with the Air Force
which lasted throughout the 1950s. The Army also explored
the possibility of short-range tactical missiles which could
be used by smaller and smaller units. The logical extreme of
this was the infamous Davy Crockett—a light, portable
rocket that could lob a tactical nuclear warhead slightly
over a mile, vaporizing enemy tanks and its own crew in one
mini-mushroom cloud.30
Having staked its claim, the Army soon found
unforeseen problems in transforming to fight on the nuclear
battlefield. At the Infantry School, the Combat
Developments Office tried to turn the Army’s vision of
small, highly mobile, and well-armed forces into a practical
plan for a series of combat vehicles immune to nuclear
blasts and radiation. Such vehicles needed to be easily
transportable by air to rough and primitive airfields, so they
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needed to be light and compact. They also had to have great
range, because the contaminated area might extend for
hundreds of miles and fuel might be unavailable. Finally,
these vehicles needed powerful weapons systems to allow
them to take on the heavier and more numerous Soviet
armor. Unfortunately, a vehicle which combined all these
attributes did not exist. Ultimately, the only solution they
could come up with was for the Army to build a vehicle of
some as yet undiscovered substance, which would use an as
yet undiscovered fuel source, and would fire an as yet
undiscovered weapon.31
An even more famous, or infamous, example of the
Army’s effort to transform itself was the pentomic
experiment of 1956 to 1961. Although much ridiculed, in its
original incarnation it was an innovative concept of
considerable merit when the specific circumstances for
which it was designed are considered. The pentomic
organization grew out of the army vision of the atomic
battlefield: “battle groups” would be speedily transported to
the target from widely separated locations; they would
concentrate to seize the objective; then rapidly depart before
the enemy could launch a nuclear counterstrike. The
pentomic era was inaugurated with much fanfare in 1956,
when Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor’s World War II unit,
the famous 101st Airborne Division, was reactivated. As
described by one of the division’s first battle group
commanders, the 101st was a “light, lean, and mean”
force—the forerunner of today’s air assault and air mobile
divisions—that could also deliver devastating firepower,
including its own organic tactical nuclear weapons.32
Within 5 years, the Army repudiated the pentomic
experiment. There were a variety of problems, some of them
more reflective of the Army’s convoluted bureaucratic needs
than of inherent weakness in the pentomic organization.
Officers protested that the battle group structure cut out all
combat commands between captain and colonel. The key
technologies that would have allowed the divisions to
maneuver on the nuclear battlefield—not least the infantry
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combat vehicle mentioned above—were never developed.
The Air Force dragged its feet in developing the air
transportation necessary to deploy the battle groups
overseas. Perhaps the most serious problem was that the
pentomic organization was unsuited to anything but the
nuclear battlefield. In the post mortem, virtually everyone
denied responsibility for the experiment. The 101st’s
commander, then Major General William Westmoreland,
although a protégé of the Chief of Staff, placed the blame
elsewhere: “I was never enthusiastic about the [pentomic]
organization, and General Taylor knew it at the time.”33 For
his part, Taylor intimated he was only the executor of
policies that his predecessor, Ridgway, had committed to
long before. The Army’s official history branch in turn
blamed Eisenhower’s New Look. In its origin, development,
brief history, and termination, the pentomic experiment has
much to teach today’s Army about the dynamics and pitfalls
of top-down transformation.
In assessing the Army’s effort to transform itself after
the atomic revolution, one would have to judge it a failure.
There were some successes—particularly in the areas of
strengthening the NATO alliance, in logistics and aviation,
and in airmobile warfare. Nevertheless, a fair assessment
would be that, especially in relation to other services, the
period between Korea and Kennedy was not a happy one for
the Army. At times it seemed willing to embrace any fad or
fancy that would show that it was still useful. In a revealing
aside, Chief of Staff Taylor admitted that he chose the term
“pentomic” because it had the ring of a Madison Avenue
advertising campaign. Similarly, Taylor’s Vice Chief of Staff
General Clyde D. Eddleman recalled admiringly that
among the Chief’s accomplishments were that he “dressed
the Army up a great deal” with a flag, an official song, and
new green uniforms.34 It was not until the 1960s, with
presidential and popular acceptance of “Flexible Response,”
that the Army once more emerged as an equal partner in the
defense establishment.
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This overview of a century reveals some general rules
which may serve as guides for the current discussion on
military change. First of all, the success of a military force’s
ability to reform itself must be considered within the context
of the service’s primary purpose. For most of the century
covered in this chapter, the U.S. Army’s mission was
homeland defense, and it is by that criterion that its success
or failure should be judged.
A second rule is that for the American Army, radical
change occurs only in certain circumstances, most
particularly when it is supported by the political
establishment and when it is perceived as allowing the
Army to execute better a well-recognized and accepted
mission. The Endicott Board, the Root reforms, and even the
1920 National Defense Act are all examples of this. When
political or popular support is lacking—as in the case of
Upton’s proposals, the post-World War I era, or the
1950s—then reform is either minimal or stillborn.
A third rule is that successful change often spawns a
host of unforeseen problems. The Root era witnessed a
decline in Army manpower, readiness, and morale.
Although it is fashionable to hail change and damn
conservatism, there are great dangers in imposing change
without thinking through the consequences.
Fourth, the success of Army transformation must be
assessed against the specific challenge soldiers at the time
faced. The 1920 Defense Act, for example, in conjunction
with the Washington Naval Treaties, appeared to provide
Americans with a rational military policy and an Army
suitable for all foreseeable contingencies. Only from the
perspective of the late 1930s does it appear inadequate.
Finally, the forces which are most necessary to
transform in peacetime may not be the ones who bear the
burden in war. If history is to be of any use in studying
peacetime change, it is necessary to study not only the
combat arms that were used in later wars, but the agencies
responsible for enforcing strategy in peace. Under this
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criterion, for most of the Army’s history, the Coast
Artillery—a branch that with a few minor exceptions did
not fire a shot in anger in 130 years—was one of the most
effective agents of the nation’s strategic interests.
Thus, to sum it up at its most basic: historically,
peacetime transformation occurs when there is substantial
public and political support and a clear and present danger
to the continental United States. Anything beyond the
realization of this objective may generate a great deal of
rhetoric, but rarely does it result in long-lasting political or
financial investment.
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CHAPTER 2
THE AMERICAN MILITARY TRADITION
AND POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONS1
Frank N. Schubert
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War, the United States has been the world’s
preeminent military power. Despite the lack of a
substantial conventional threat to this status and no major
war to fight, U.S. armed forces were extremely busy in the
1990s, with diverse missions that frequently sent American
military personnel far from their homes and families. The
assignments included stability operations,2 humanitarian
missions, responses to disasters and political crises, and
enforcement of American law and policy concerning illegal
drugs and immigration. Some duties, such as operations
focused on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and missions
in the Balkans, have been long and costly. Others, such as
the evacuation of Americans from troubled capitals of
sub-Saharan Africa, were quick and relatively cheap.
Overall, literally hundreds of operational names were
applied to a bewildering array of deployments.3
There have been other similar periods. In the 1920s and
1930s, U.S. armed forces also lacked a big war to fight. Still,
the period was very busy for the services, with a wide range
of operations in and increasingly outside of the country, in
the western hemisphere and in coastal zones of east Asia.
These ranged from long-term stability operations in the
Caribbean to managing water resource programs that
provided work for thousands during the Depression.
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Earlier still, between the Civil War and the war with
Spain in 1898, the United States also faced no major
external threat. Despite the absence of a big war to fight,
U.S. armed forces were very busy, especially the Army in
the transMississippi West. Numerous campaigns against
Indians—small, grueling conflicts that punctuated long
periods of what might be called “interpositional
peacekeeping”—put the Army between growing numbers of
civilian settlements and the outraged natives whose lives
were being disrupted and irrevocably changed.
As these summaries suggest, in 2 centuries the United
States has experienced long periods with no major threat to
its security, periods in which the armed forces conducted
large numbers of small, diverse operations. Overall the
American military tradition has evolved as a duality that
reflected this experience. On one side has been defense
against foreign enemies and preparation for such
employment. This mission is widely considered to be the
raison d’etre of our armed forces. Procurement programs,
training, doctrine, and organization focus on this mission,
and in the year 2000, this view extended beyond the military
to senior officials of both major political parties.4 The other
side has involved law enforcement, disaster relief, and
nation-building. This category, sometimes called
gendarmerie or constabulary work, also includes what were
once called pacification and “small wars,” and later became
known as counterinsurgency or contingency operations.5
The U.S. Army, “the child of the frontier,” as historian
Robert M. Utley put it, had two parents. One was the
operational requirement that emerged from conflict
between westering settlers and the native peoples who
resisted their encroachment.6 The other was the inability of
short-term local volunteer organizations to cope with the
problem, shown in expeditions in Ohio during 1790 and
1791.7 The Army’s major pre-Civil War operations against
Indians extended from Florida to the Great Lakes.8 There
were conventional wars against Britain in 1812-15 and
Mexico in 1846-48, but the army—“overworked, under32

funded, and dispersed among many small posts”—“spent
the bulk of its time policing the nation’s ever-changing
western boundary.” Soldiers enforced laws and treaties,
explored and policed new territories, punished hostile
aggression, and regulated contact between settlers and
Indians.9
Meanwhile, the Navy protected Americans and their
commerce, with landings in Latin America and in the
Pacific.10 At least 24 times between the War of 1812 and the
Civil War, sailors and Marines landed to protect Americans
and their property far from American shores or to punish
those who had abused American citizens. Sometimes, they
also shielded third-country nationals and their property.11
Other Naval operations of this period enforced American
law as well as asserted the freedom of navigation. Between
the U.S. ban on the slave trade in 1808 and the 1861 onset of
the Civil War, American vessels operated against slavers
along West African coasts. As the secession crisis
approached, operational tempo increased. In 1859, the
Navy captured five carriers of human cargo, including one
at the mouth of the Congo River. In 1860, the last full year of
peace at home, 13 slave ships were seized. Meanwhile,
operations against pirates also included landings on Greek
islands in 1827 and actions near Hong Kong in the 1850s.12
Maritime and land operations shared certain traits. The
opposition usually amounted to irregular or semi-irregular
forces. Also, these operations tended to be diverse, diffuse,
and complex, and to lack decisive results. They came in
times of no apparent foreign threat and occurred in places
many Americans might have considered to be on the
margins, in Indian country, in the Caribbean, and along
Asian coasts across the Pacific: Siberia, China, Korea, the
Philippines, and islands in the south Pacific. 13 The
statement of General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the summer of 2000, that “Today
the United States strives to keep its military forces
combat-ready while, at the same time, engaging in missions
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that do not routinely involve combat,”14 could just as well
have applied to the 19th century as to the onset of the 21st.
As historian John M. Gates noted, “Much of the Army’s
work on the frontier was that of a frontier constabulary.”
The Army “served eviction notices on Indians and then
forcibly removed them when required.” If tribes left their
reservations, the Army “found them and coerced them
back,” or fought them until they again surrendered. There
were seldom large battles that looked like war. “Most of the
time,” according to Gates, “it was routine though difficult
police work.”15
Soldiers then, like soldiers now, disliked such work and
thought it kept them from their proper business, preparing
for and fighting real wars against foreign enemies.16
Brigadier General John Pope, who commanded the
Department of the Missouri, complained in 1881 that
fighting Indians was not “conducive to the proper discharge
of military duty or the acquirement, either in theory or
practice, by officers or soldiers, of professional knowledge or
even of the ordinary tactics of a battalion.”17 Talking about
the 1990s, Richard Shultz noted the persistence of such
views: “The military defines itself, almost exclusively, as
either deterring wars or fighting and winning them.
Civil-military operations and those elements of the force
structure that engage in them are not judged as being very
important—and this has been an enduring aspect of U.S.
military culture.”18
John Pope’s generation found ample ground for
complaint. New operational requirements that resembled
gendarme work surfaced as the federal role in society
expanded. There were major responsibilities to be fulfilled
for millions of Civil War veterans. The Freedmen’s Bureau,
designed to ease the transition to freedom for ex-slaves,
moved into relief work in a big way, and military units
garrisoned southern communities during Reconstruction.19
All the while, Indian wars represented the main form of
combat, and humanitarian operations that rarely required
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a shot to be fired in anger became more prevalent. The
frontier Army responded to calls for relief from communities
beset by floods, blizzards, drought, and even grasshoppers,
and quelled the labor disputes that grew in number, size,
and scope as industrialization progressed.
Soldiers hated strikebreaking. Accustomed to seeing
themselves as spearheads of a civilization sweeping across
North America, they found it hard to confront working-class
Americans striving for better wages and working
conditions. Such duty also tarnished popular respect for the
Army. Nevertheless, the job got done. As Michael Tate
wrote, the “century ended not with images of universally
respected cavalrymen dashing across the West in search of
renegade Indians and outlaws, but with a growing public
dissatisfaction with the Army’s continued service as a
domestic constabulary.”20
When not responding to calls for help, the Army
surveyed and built roads, protected telegraph lines, laid out
river crossings, and protected commerce—essential
nation-building activities. Meanwhile, military leaders
tried to look past Indian conflicts, plan for conventional
warfare, and create an Army “designed for the next
conventional war rather than the present unconventional
war.”21
The operational pendulum swung between gendarme
assignments and an occasional foreign war. Big
conventional conflicts were rare. After the war against
Spain in 1898, which saw American forces in action in the
Caribbean and the Pacific, the United States entered
another period with no apparent conventional threat but
with ample points of instability and conflict on the margins
of American interests. In the first half of the 20th century,
these edges again tended to be in the Caribbean, along the
Mexican border, and along Asian coasts, with China
increasingly the focus of maritime operations. Compared to
the years between the Civil War and 1898, naval operations
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in Latin America almost tripled to 37 between 1899 and
1933.
Naval operations of this period, especially in the
Caribbean, tended to be much longer in duration than
previously. Marines occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934. They
also were in the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. And
for 5 years, 1926-30, Marines actively supported the
government of Nicaragua against the Sandinista
revolution. General Smedley Butler, a double Medal of
Honor recipient, served in China, Honduras, Panama,
Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti. Brigadier General Lewis
“Chesty” Puller was in Haiti from 1919 to 1924 and twice in
Nicaragua.22
Like the Army, the Navy moved into humanitarian and
rescue work. In 1904 the Navy evacuated Americans
endangered by the Russo-Japanese War from Korea, a very
early noncombatant evacuation. Sailors rescued a
kidnapped American from Morocco in 1904, fought fires and
helped victims of the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, and
assisted Greek nationals forced out of Asia Minor by Turkey
in 1921-1922. The aircraft carrier USS Lexington even
generated almost 4.3 million kilowatt-hours of electricity
for Tacoma, Washington, during a month-long emergency
in 1930.23
Also like the Army, the Navy and the Marines moved
into nation-building. Going beyond building infrastructure,
such as the Army did in the West,24 this involved creation
and nurture of sound public institutions, which became
important during the occupations of Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. There the Navy and the Marines
managed government offices and sought to create police
forces that were free of corruption. Involvement in this type
of nation-building peaked in post-World War II Japan and
Germany, where efforts aimed at reform of entire governing
structures and underlying attitudes. They constituted
state-building in the fullest sense—concerted externallyled efforts to build stable democratic governments. This side
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of gendarme operations did not involve deployment for
combat, even against irregular opponents. Instead, this use
took advantage of other key military attributes—logistical
sophistication, responsiveness to direction, and a commitment to serving the nation.
As the Cold War came to dominate international
relations, the armed forces entered a 50-year period in
which a large, heavily armed force became a fixture of
American foreign and defense policy. The Cold War, with its
singleness of purpose, provided a prism through which all
operations were viewed and dominated the experiences and
perceptions of two generations of professional officers.
Although the U.S. military traditionally had carried out all
of the kinds of operations discussed here, including
preparing for and fighting major wars, World War II and the
Cold War brought this latter responsibility to extraordinary
prominence and emphasized it over all others. The military
came to define itself, “almost exclusively, as either deterring
wars or fighting and winning them.” Civil-military
operations and the elements of our forces that engaged in
them came to be seen as less important than combat
elements, and this two-tiered view hardened into what
Richard Shultz called “an enduring aspect of U.S. military
culture.”25 As a result, the classic gendarme functions—
stability operations, law enforcement, disaster relief, and
infrastructure development, for which the Army was
initially established and in which the Navy and Marines
often played major parts—all were ignored or relegated to
secondary status.
In carrying out their historically wide array of missions,
U.S. forces operated in the tradition established nearly
2,000 years earlier by the Army of imperial Rome. On the
frontiers of the empire, in Britain, along the Rhine and the
Danube, then through the Levant and across North Africa,
the Roman army conducted gendarme missions—keeping
barbarians out; battling outlaws within; mapping; building
forts, roads, bridges, and aqueducts; supervising laborers in
mines and quarries; and digging canals and dams. Like
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soldiers everywhere and always, the legionnaires hated
such work.26 Nevertheless, they carried out their orders,
and in times of peak construction, thousands became
masons, brickmakers, and the like, while hundreds of
sailors poled barges and steered lighters. Overall, they
became “the gendarmerie of the empire’s edges and keepers
of its gates,” policing the frontier, managing checkpoints
and crossings, and responding to trouble.”27 Like our Army
on the frontier, which Michael Tate characterized as “the
‘right arm’ of the federal government in its 19th-century
expansionist policies,” the Roman army was “the dominant
institutional factor in the development of the frontier.”28 In
either case, an army devoted only to fighting foreign wars
could never have had such a dramatic impact on overall
development.
In Europe, the tradition of armed forces carrying out
multiple gendarme functions changed at the beginning of
the 19th century. During the Napoleonic era, the national
police or gendarmerie was created to carry out functions
other than waging war against foreign enemies.29 Most
European nations followed the French model, and the new
organizations sometimes actually contained more
professional military forces than the regular armies they
supplemented. As Clive Emsley wrote, “the gendarmes
were professional soldiers/policemen at a time when the
armies of continental Europe were increasingly shifting
from a professional mercenary to a conscript base.”30
In some ways the gendarme forces that emerged from
the Napoleonic period conducted the same kinds of
operations carried out by American regulars. They patrolled
remote areas, chased bandits, and responded to floods,
earthquakes, and train wrecks. They also spied on political
radicals, collected taxes, and enforced conscription. In
Europe they helped consolidate central state power, while
in the United States, soldiers enforcing the law were
transitional figures until territories became states with
their own legal systems. As if to illustrate the intimate
connection with the regular armed forces, in France and
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Bavaria individual officers and noncommissioned officers
frequently moved from one organization to the other.31
Overall, gendarme functions tended to be various and
complicated and to lack clear, immediate results.
Campaigns against bandits or Indians could seem endless
and sometimes very nearly were. They lacked the focus of a
big conflict against a single enemy with a clear desired
result. Natural disasters and other catastrophes were
unpredictable and disrupted routines. Operations tended to
alternate between wars and gendarme tasks, but inevitably
what we now call “operations other than war” occupied the
armed forces for longer periods of time.32
Plainly there is a gap between the reality of who
American soldiers have been, on one hand, and who they
think they are and what they think they should legitimately
do, on the other.33 Perhaps this is due to poor performance in
unconventional situations, notably Vietnam and Somalia.
On the other hand, it may be because the Army did so well in
the central conventional arena, the face-off against the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Maybe the massive
financial stake in procurement programs that support
preparation for major conventional warfare accounts for the
focus on such a mission. Intellectual investments in
doctrine that concentrates on large conventional conflict
and justifies large conventional forces may also turn
attention in that direction. Or maybe soldiers are ignorant
of their operational past, particularly the 150 years before
World War II and the Cold War. Whatever the reasons, the
result is a failure to appreciate the long-standing legitimacy
of gendarme or constabulary operations, to understand
their importance and their demands on resources, and to
devote enough thought to their proper execution. As Eliot
Cohen observed,
International police work is the wayward child that the
Pentagon cannot decide whether to embrace (because it is the
only job immediately available and because it justifies the
current force structure) or reject (because it conflicts with Cold
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War concepts of what the military exists to do). Posturing by
both parties has made the problem worse, as Republicans insist
that they would walk away from all peacekeeping or
peace-enforcement missions, whereas Democrats are too eager
to accept such involvements without conceding the long-term
problems they pose for the defense establishment.34

If operations in the 1990s share so many attributes with
earlier operations, what sets recent work apart? I would
suggest three major differences. One is the complexity of
modern operations short of war, which tend to involve other
nations’ forces as well as international organizations, many
U.S. government agencies, contractors, and private
charities. Second, they are more immediately visible
because of the electronic media. Finally, there are all those
names. Their large number—at least 375 from the end of
1989 to the beginning of 2001—obscures continuities and
creates an impression of a diffuse, even hyperactive
condition. Forty or so names have been applied to one
decade-long effort to bring peace and order to the Balkans
and another 40 or so to the 10-year effort to influence the
behavior of the Iraqi government. Clarity would surely be
served by going beyond the many names of phases and
aspects and adjuncts and calling these operations what they
are.35 The war in Vietnam annually spawned about 20
English-language names for operations, but the overall
awareness of the existence of a single conflict was never lost
in the sea of names. It was always the Vietnam War. The
point has still not been reached where we view the
decade-long conflicts in Southwest Asia and the Balkans as
single long-term campaigns or view clearly the other
operational clusters of the 1990s.
The bottom line is two-fold. Were the 1990s different
from the Cold War and other earlier periods? You bet. Were
the 1990s outside the framework of the nation’s military
experience and tradition? Not at all.
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CHAPTER 3
ARMY TRANSFORMATION:
A TALE OF TWO DOCTRINES
David Jablonsky
And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more
difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more
uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things.
Niccolo Machiavelli1

Not since General Hans von Seeckt’s efforts with the
German Reichswehr in the early 1920s, has a military
organization so self-consciously set about transforming
itself as the U.S. Army today. It is part of an overall process
that has been met with enthusiastic endorsements ranging
from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to congressionally-mandated blue ribbon
panels. Still, specifics concerning the process have been
hard to come by with one defense analyst noting the
similarity of “transformation” as a military concept to the
Christian idea of transubstantiation: “no one is exactly sure
what it means, but most believers have an opinion about
it.”2 Generally, however, the concept is linked with the idea
of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The interest in this
revolution in the early 1990s led by the end of the decade to a
growing acceptance of the need for military transformation
if the RMA were to be achieved. Thus, the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Working Group defined
military transformation as “the set of activities by which
DoD [Department of Defense] attempts to harness the
revolution in military affairs to make fundamental changes
45

in technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and
organizational structure.”3 The process, then, combines the
acquisition of new military systems with appropriate
divestiture and modifications dealing with doctrine and
organization—all focused on maximizing the capabilities of
future armed forces.
To “jump start” this process, Chief of Staff of the Army
General Eric K. Shinseki began in the fall of 1999 to invest
in current “off-the-shelf” equipment to stimulate the
development of doctrine and organizational design even as
the Army began a search for the new technologies that
would deliver the material for a future force. That force
would be strategically responsive and dominant across a
full spectrum of operations ranging from peacetime military
engagement to smaller-scale contingencies to major theater
war. The swiftness of the process, General Shinseki
acknowledged, would be “unnerving to some.”4 Nevertheless, there was an urgency to the process for the Army,
concerned with becoming more relevant in a rapidly
changing geostrategic environment in which strategic
speed and lethality could no longer successfully exist as
separate variables. “All our combat power is useless if we
cannot get it to the theater in time or maneuver it
tactically,” Major General James Dubik, the head of the
experimental force at Fort Lewis, pointed out. “Right now
our heavy forces have limited strategic deployability and
our light forces have limited tactical utility. Transformation
will take care of that disconnect.”5
How well Army transformation is able to deal with that
disconnect, however, will depend a great deal on future U.S.
policy concerning the use of military force. At one extreme is
the so-called Powell Doctrine, a relatively restrictive
approach to the subject. At the other extreme is what has
popularly come to be called the Clinton Doctrine, a more
liberal prescription for the use of force. The purpose of this
chapter is to demonstrate how those two doctrines will
influence the transformation of the U.S. Army as it
struggles to move forward toward a genuine revolution in
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military affairs, and how that transformation process can,
in turn, mitigate the worst excesses of both doctrines. In the
end, it is the ability of the U.S. Army to use the new
technology for the use of military force that will determine
the success of the RMA. In this regard, it is well to remember
why Thomas Huxley remained unimpressed at the end of
the 19th century by all the knowledge, machinery, and
power that had extended human competence over the
physical environment. “The great issue,” he pointed out,
“about which hangs a true sublimity and the terror of
overhanging fate is, what are you going to do with all these
things?”6
Army Transformation.
Military organizations are societies built around and upon the
prevailing weapons systems. Intuitively and quite correctly
the military man feels that a change in weapon portends a
change in the arrangements of his society.
Elting Morison7

To assert that the seeds of Army transformation were
planted in the unused AH-64 Apache helicopters on the
Albanian-Kosovo border in 1999 is to do a disservice to the
decades-long efforts by the U.S. Army to solve the problem
of how to field a force light enough to be projected quickly on
a global basis and lethal enough to dominate upon arrival.
In the 1980s, the Army attempted to deal with this problem
by transforming itself with the concept of the HighTechnology Light Division (HTLD). That effort succumbed
to bureaucratic infighting by 1988, leaving a window of
vulnerability clearly demonstrated two years later when
the U.S. line in the Saudi Arabian sand was held for several
weeks only by the lightly armed and relatively immobile
forces of the 82nd Airborne Division and a Marine
Expeditionary Force.8 From the Gulf War to 1997, the pace
of U.S. military operations increased by at least 300
percent, even as the armed forces were buffeted by cuts in
structure, weapons programs and personnel strength.
47

During that period, the Army conducted a series of futures
efforts beginning with the 1992 series of simulations and
exercises known as the Louisiana Maneuvers. That
program gave way to the Force XXI process, a series of
experiments in war fighting designed to generate and test
new ideas. Next came the Army After Next project, the use
of studies, conferences, and war games to postulate those
elements of the RMA on which the Army should focus in
future geostrategic environments. These programs involved
separate but complementary processes coordinated through
distinct light and heavy modernization plans along similar,
not common, system and organizational designs. The result
was a continued bifurcation of the force between heavy and
light units.9
From this extended perspective, the Army’s problems
with Task Force Hawk simply highlighted the need to
accelerate experimental efforts to solve a long-simmering
problem. Landpower enthusiasts might point out that much
analysis of the Serbian campaign failed to take into account
the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army that
complemented the NATO attack. 10 But there was no
disguising the fact that the 11-week campaign had been
decided by the 730 Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft that
had flown more than 36,000 sorties in aircraft that ranged
from Cold War F-16s to the newest B-2s. In the wake of that
campaign, there was considerable conjecture about the
Army’s strategic relevancy in newspaper and magazine
articles.11 The Deputy Secretary of Defense was even more
direct. “If the Army holds onto nostalgic versions of its grand
past,” he warned in August 1999, “it is going to atrophy and
die.”12 It was a message concerning deployability, lethality,
and sustainability that was well understood in the Army.
“We are committed to remain relevant,” General Dubik
pointed out, “able to respond quickly, and provide the
appropriate forces for . . . contingencies.”13
The key to Army relevancy is an Army transformation
process that rests on four foundations: the conduct of future
war, the future operating environment, the increasing
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significance of full spectrum operations, and the diminished
utility of the current force. Together, these elements compel
the current Army process toward a combination of
evolutionary and revolutionary change. It is, in short, a
self-stylized “balanced” approach designed to fully
capitalize on leap-ahead technology while retaining current
warfighting capabilities.14 But the Army process also
recognizes that emerging technologies cannot alone produce
an RMA—that they serve as enablers for much more
far-reaching changes in doctrine, concepts, and organization, which together cause fundamentally new ways of
conducting military operations. At some critical point, the
cumulative effects of technical advances and military
innovation in all these areas invalidate former conceptual
structures and cause a basic alteration in accepted
definitions and measurements of military effectiveness.
Such experimentation, however, is not easy; and in fact the
Defense Science Board Task Force has called it “an
unnatural act” for any large established organization.15
Moreover, as General Dubik has cautioned,
There is no guarantee to any of this. There is no playbook.
There is no answer book. . . .
We must . . . make sure we get it close to right. We know we will
not get it precisely right. But our job is not to get it so wrong
that we hamstring the next generation of leaders. We have to
get it right enough, so that in 2015, when the nation asks the
Army to do something, it is flexible enough to accomplish any
potential mission.16

The Interim Force is the centerpiece in the balanced
process of “getting it right.” The force consists of medium
weight Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) designed
“to meet a near-term strategic requirement that now is
absent, as well as to prepare the Army for the long-term. . .”17
To achieve these goals, the IBCTs will operate within the
current division structures and provide a complementary
capability to the current light and heavy units that comprise
the Legacy Force. At the same time, the IBCTs will act as a
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bridging force until science and technology allow the
realization of the Objective Force, the ultimate Army
product of the RMA. The key to the bridging process is the
development of the Future Combat System (FCS), which is
to combine the capabilities of the current howitzers, main
battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles while weighing
in at a weight not to exceed 20 tons—a figure in dramatic
contrast, for example, to the 70 tons of the M1A1 Abrams
Tank. Once the FCS emerges, it will be adopted by the
Legacy and Interim Forces which will then merge into the
Objective Force.18
The Interim Force concept is a revolutionary bridge to
the future Objective Force. To begin with, the IBCT is not a
theoretical construct, but a test-bed force with goals of
deploying a brigade to a forward base within 4 days, a
division within 5 days, and five divisions within 30 days.
And yet the units are being created without waiting for the
development of new technology. Instead, the Army is
focused on evaluating and refining the operations and
organizational concept for these forces derived from the
future environment envisaged as the type in which the units
would operate, from the kind of characteristics desired in
the force, and from the capabilities that would then be
required. This type of parallel effort is designed to produce a
complete RMA when the emerging technology comes on
line, unlike those incomplete revolutions in the past when
doctrine and organization lagged the new technology as
they did with the so-called “dead hand” of Napoleon in the
American Civil War and with the French pursuit of offensive
a outrance at the beginning of World War I. “As we develop
the IBCTs at Fort Lewis, train them and get the doctrine
right,” General Dubik notes in this regard, “we will be
producing the doctrine and training that we need for the
objective force.”19 As technology produces the revolutionary
breakthroughs necessary to complement this doctrine,
distinctions between the bifurcated force will blur, with the
Objective Force taking on the lethality associated with
heavy units and the agility that is the mark of light units.
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At the other end of the Army’s balanced linkage, the
relationship of the Interim and Legacy forces is more
conservative—founded on a determination by the Army “not
to permit” transformation to compromise near-term
warfighting capabilities.20 From this perspective, the IBCT
is designed to bolster the current Legacy Force by
enhancing the ability of the regional CINCs and Joint Task
Force commanders to respond. For the legacy light division,
the interim unit will become the most mobile, lethal and
survivable element, extending the division’s tactical
mobility while increasing the organic firepower in support
of dismounted operations, and thus is likely to be employed
in the main divisional effort. On the other hand, the IBCT
will probably be the first brigade to deploy as part of a heavy
division in order to consolidate and extend the security of air
and sea ports of debarkation, thus facilitating the reception,
staging and onward integration of the remainder of the
division. The new formations will also provide a dramatic
improvement in national and theater conventional deterrence by presenting the National Command Authorities
(NCA) with the capability to position a credible and flexible
combat force on the ground anywhere in the world within 96
hours. At the same time, the accelerated development of the
initial interim brigades will provide impetus to the
transformation process by allowing the training and
development of soldiers and leaders in the doctrine and
org an iz ation of thes e new f or mati ons wi thout
compromising the Army’s basic raison d’ etre of winning
wars.21
In all this, a major issue for the Legacy Force is
divestiture of old technology, organization and doctrine—a
key element if the Army’s revolution in military affairs is
ultimately to be complete. The Army has already
restructured five major programs and cancelled seven
others in order to free $16 billion for the transformation
effort. How well the right systems and doctrine are
available for that process depends on the Army’s ability to
maintain a viable Legacy Force. But 75 percent of that force
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already exceeds its service half-life. Moreover, as the Legacy
Force comes to the end of that cycle, there will be increasing
costs for operation and maintenance—producing further
pressure for recapitalization, the replacement, as opposed
to modernization, of aging systems.22 One solution is to
identify and prioritize modernization and/or recapitalization for those legacy systems that have applicability for
the Objective Force. Some systems, however, need to be
continued even if they don’t fall in this category since their
elimination would pose too great a risk to the legacy
guarantee of near-term warfighting capabilities. The Heavy
Equipment Transporter System (HET), for example, is
required to replace an aging fleet of trucks that will carry
the tanks, Bradleys, and howitzers until transformation is
effected.
Ultimately, there is no pat solution to the tension
between divestiture concerned with a Legacy Force and the
need to hedge against an uncertain future. It is a tension
that is particularly sharp for the military profession, which
has little room for any illusions about the stakes in national
security affairs. “If you have lost a battle,” G. K. Chesterton
once noted, “you cannot believe that you have won it.”23
There is no guarantee, for example, that the technology for
the Objective Force will materialize, potentially leaving a
“Worst-of-Both-Worlds” force that could still consume
substantial amounts of strategic lift, while lacking combat
punch and sustainability. Nor is it ever a certainty that
some new technological variant will be correctly
understood. Thus, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig—a year
into World War I—could inform the War Office that “the
machine-gun is a much overrated weapon, two per battalion
is more than sufficient.”24 There is also no assurance that
emerging doctrine and concepts will survive a future test as
was demonstrated by the Maginot Line, an efficient and
effective use of military resources in terms of the static
trench warfare of World War I, but useless against the
mobile German Army doctrine of 1940. Most importantly,
there is the overriding need to retain a near-term strategic
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hedge of readiness for major theater war. Thus, it is not
surprising that the Army has adopted a conservative
resourcing strategy during transformation designed to
keep:
a balance of old and new systems to maintain readiness for
today while preparing for the future. This strategy will
selectively retain or extend the life of legacy systems,
synchronize divestiture with acquisition, and bring new
systems as rapidly as possible in accordance with new
operational concepts.25

The tension between the legacy and objective forces was
reflected in a draft U.S. Government Accounting Office
(USGAO) Report provided to the Army in January 2001 that
identified risk in the transformation efforts. The
development of the Objective Force, the report asserted,
represented the Army’s “foremost challenge” because of
uncertainty as to whether the required technology would
mature enough to enable the development of the Future
Combat Systems as envisioned or in time to meet the
transformation schedule. The Army, the report added,
should consider achieving Objective Force capabilities in
stages—a strategy that could provide worthwhile increases
in capability but might also require a continuation of legacy
and interim forces “longer than anticipated.” The Army
response was that the report overly focused on equipment,
ignoring the Army’s “holistic” approach which also involved
the considerable progress being made in organizational,
doctrinal and institutional change. Focusing on acquisition
alone, one source concluded, was like “looking through a
coke bottle . . . at the stars.”26
In any event, the Army leadership was bent on further
expediting the transformation effort. On March 1, 2001, the
Chief of Staff announced that the Army would lose
relevancy if an Objective Force capability was not fielded by
2010. There would be no waiting for the development of
better systems if it meant slowing down the transformation
process. “This is about speed,” General Shinseki added.27 As
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a consequence, the Army would increase funding of the
integrated Future Combat System for FYs 03-08. In April
2003, there would be a readiness review of the FCS in order
to select the best technologies and concepts for the next
phase of the process. “We will make the tough calls, we will
shift resources to the most promising technical solutions.”28
The second milestone would be the development and
demonstration of a prototype FCS model beginning in FY
06. “Our intent,” the Chief concluded, “is to accelerate the
transition to research and development by collapsing
traditional lines.”29
This was hardly good news for those within the Army
who already perceived transformation as challenging the
most cherished service assumptions. Not surprisingly, some
heavy armor and artillery advocates had indicated
resistance as had some in the aviation community
concerned about the lack of reference to Army aviation
attack units.30 And the fact that the Interim Force would
rely on fire support from Air Force, Navy and coalition
assets was perceived by some as abandonment of the Army’s
organic role in deep attack.31 Outside the Army, one official
of the Air Force Association summarized that service’s
position in the post-Kosovo conflict era by asserting that
“transformation cannot take place without a shift in service
roles from the current emphasis on surface warfare to
aero-space warfare.”32 And the Commandant of the Marine
Corps warned against attempts by each service to claim that
it was the “expeditionary force” of choice for the nation.
“There is no way,” he pointed out, “that the entire armed
forces of the United States can fit into the tip of the spear.”33
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The Powell and Clinton Doctrines.
What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re
always talking about if we can’t use it?
Madeleine Albright to Colin Powell34

Ambassador Madeleine Albright’s exasperated question
to General Colin Powell reflected a difference in outlook that
was set in train in October 1984 when Secretary of State
George Shultz delivered a speech warning against
“self-doubt” and “paralysis” in the conduct of foreign policy.
There must be more flexibility in the use of American
military power, Shultz concluded a year after 241 American
deaths in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut,
emphasizing that the United States should not become “the
Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and
how to respond. . . .”35 The next month, Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger replied with six criteria to determine
the conditions under which the use of military force
overseas was warranted: Involvement of vital national
interests; clear intention of winning; clearly defined
political and military objectives; a constant reassessment of
objectives and forces; a reasonable assurance of public and
congressional support prior to commitment; and the use of
U.S. forces as a last resort.36 For Shultz, these criteria set
such high hurdles for the use of force that they served as a
“counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis,” “the Vietnam
syndrome in spades carried to an absurd level and a
complete abdication of the duties of [world] leadership.”37
Nevertheless, the Weinberger Doctrine was applied in the
Gulf War, with vital interests at stake, overwhelming force
applied quickly, and all other options such as economic
sanctions tried first. The final proof that the war affirmed
the Vietnam syndrome rather than “kicking” it occurred
when Powell pressed for formal Congressional authorization to use force in order not to leave U.S. troops “dangling
out there” without domestic support.38
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By the time of the Gulf War, however, there had already
begun to emerge a more complicated geostrategic landscape
of failed states, civil wars and ethnic conflicts. Difficult
decisions for the use of military force in this more complex
environment seemed increasingly further removed from a
doctrine that was virtually immune to ambiguity. As a
consequence, as he neared the end of his term in office in
1992, President George Bush discounted the need for “rigid
criteria” concerning the use of military force that “would
give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining
their own actions.” In this new context, the relative
intensity of an interest would not be a guide, and force, the
President concluded, could be “a useful backdrop to
diplomacy, a complement to it, or, if need be, a temporary
alternative.”39 This move away from “last resort” answered
an important criticism of the Weinberger Doctrine, since
threatened or actual use of force had always been a basic
ingredient of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Moreover,
as the rise of Nazi Germany repeatedly demonstrated, there
could also be a need for early and politically decisive use of
force against an aggressor. “[T]he capability and will to use
force as a first resort,” Richard Nixon noted a year after the
appearance of the Weinberger Doctrine, “. . . reduces the
possibility of having to use force as a last resort when the
risk of casualties would be far greater.”40
In a similar manner, President Bush’s rejection of the
vital interest criterion reflected a growing lack of consensus
on what constituted such a degree of intensity. To begin
with, many of Bush’s predecessors shared the penchant of
indiscriminately declaring interests to be vital, whether it
was Dwight Eisenhower over Quemoy and Matsu, Lyndon
Johnson over Vietnam, or Ronald Reagan over Lebanon.
Moreover, it was argued, even when it was impossible to
distinguish between intensities of interests, great powers
might still use military force on behalf of nonvital interests
ranging from credibility to maintaining order. Most
importantly, some critics also pointed to a false dichotomy
between interest-based and value-based military
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intervention given America’s long history of combining
these variables. President Woodrow Wilson intervened in
1917, for example, with the geopolitical goal of restoring the
European balance of power couched as a strategic crusade
for democracy. And Harry Truman’s Cold War doctrine of
1947 was a geopolitical call to contain Communism in a
world, he pointed out, half-slave, half-free. In all this, there
is a tendency, as Senator John McCain has noted, “to
underestimate the importance of American values . . . for
orienting our relations with the rest of the world.”41 And
even Henry Kissinger, the ultimate modern proponent of
Realpolitik, has conceded that the
alleged dichotomy of pragmatism and morality seems to me a
misleading choice. Pragmatism without a moral element leads
to random activism, brutality, or stagnation. We must always
be pragmatic about our national security. We cannot abandon
national security in pursuit of virtue. But beyond this bedrock
of all policy, our challenge is to advance our principles in a way
that does not isolate us in the long run.42

Many of these considerations were reflected in General
Powell’s evolving thoughts on the military use of force
during his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Instead of “last resort,” there was the limited use of the
military for political reasons: “When force is used deftly—in
smooth coordination with diplomatic and economic
policy—bullets may never have to fly.” This, in turn, meant
a wider range of military missions across a spectrum of
operations that could be far removed from a rigid focus on
vital interests: “I believe peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations are a given.”43 And in his final public address
before retiring as Chairman, Powell acknowledged that
clear objectives were not always possible in the use of
military force, that situations often were ambiguous and
“murky.”44 By that time Powell could warn that there was
“no fixed set of rules for the use of military force” and that to
establish such criteria was dangerous, first because it
destroyed the ambiguity of U.S. intentions.
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Second, having a fixed set of rules for how you will go to war is
like saying you are always going to use the elevator in the event
of fire in your apartment building. Surely enough, when the fire
comes the elevator will be engulfed in flames or, worse, it will
look good when you get in it only to fill with smoke and flames
and crash a few minutes later. But do you stay in your
apartment and burn to death because your plan calls for using
the elevator to escape and the elevator is untenable? No, you run
to the stairs, an outside fire escape or a window. In short, your
plans to escape should be governed by the circumstances of the
fire when it starts.45

All this notwithstanding, Powell still found that
Weinberger’s criteria were a “practical guide” when it came
to the relevant questions concerned with matching force
and objectives. Most importantly, the guideline of national
interest intensity was still critical for him in terms of
prioritization and sustainment in the use of any military
force—a Clausewitzian linkage that he always appreciated.
“Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled
by its political object,” the Prussian philosopher had long
ago warned, “the value of this object must determine the
sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in
duration.”46 Thus, as the former Yugoslavia began to come
apart in 1991, Powell urged a caution based on a variant of
the Weinberger Doctrine that, while adjusting the last
resort criterion and acknowledging the role of early force
intervention, still called for a policy of selective global
engagement primarily based on U.S. national interests. The
Chairman’s rationale also included such Weinberger
derivatives as the use of overwhelming force for clear
political and military objectives and a need for constant
reassessment of the relationship of force utilization to these
objectives as well as to the American people and their
representatives. To this was added a clear distrust of
technology as a panacea for the military in the use of force
and, despite a nod to the utility of pre-conflict force
utilization, of the use of the military for the purpose of
signaling. Soon, what quickly came to be known as the
Powell Doctrine was being interpreted by its critics as a
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reluctance to intervene anywhere with military force,
unless the intervention was so massively disproportionate
as to become virtually free of risk. But Powell was having
none of it. “Decisive means and results are always to be
preferred,” he wrote at the time, “even if they are not always
possible.”
We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest
that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing
or a limited attack. When the “surgery” is over and the desired
result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward
with talk of just a little escalation. . . . History has not been
kind to this approach. . . .47

At the beginning of the William Clinton Administration,
Powell had considerable influence on the President with
this type of thinking concerning the use of force. All this was
reflected in a new National Security Strategy in 1995, which
in a section entitled “Deciding When and How to Employ
U.S. Forces,” almost outdid The Weinberger cum Powell
Doctrine.48 But by that time, appearances were deceiving.
In the last 2 years of the first Clinton administration, with
General Powell out of office, the President increasingly
resorted to the use of military force across a full spectrum of
operations—to the extent that in the 1996 Presidential
campaign, Senator Robert Dole noted that the administration had initiated more military deployments than any of its
predecessors. Nevertheless, there was little protest from the
Pentagon or the public since operations such as those in
Haiti and Bosnia were virtually free of casualties.
Moreover, many military leaders realized that executing
such operations could contribute to force relevancy and help
justify a sizeable budget and force structure. And in fact the
President added $100 billion to his own defense program
between 1994 and early 1996. Finally, despite its
Powell-like rhetoric, the administration simply substituted
exit dates for clear goals or real strategy.49
The new doctrine emerged more clearly in the second
Clinton administration. To begin with, the President
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continued a low-risk, high-tech approach to the use of force
across a full spectrum of operations, begun after the 1993
Somalia debacle, in order to avoid American casualties and
keep collateral damage to an absolute minimum. By 1999,
this was almost a doctrinal shibboleth. The “paramount
lesson learned from Operation ALLIED FORCE,” the
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
declared after the Serbian campaign, “is that the well-being
of our people must remain our first priority.”50 Added to this
approach was the use of military force to signal disapproval
and dictate behavior. Operation DESERT FOX against Iraq
in 1998, for example, was less a tribute to Erwin Rommel
than Robert McNamara as the Clinton administration
employed strictly controlled force to deliver precisionguided messages. “We are talking about using military
force,” Secretary of State Albright pointed out at the time,
“but we are not talking about war.”51 That same year, the
United States fired 79 sea-launched cruise missiles at
suspected terrorist sources in Afghanistan and the Sudan.
“Let our actions today send this message loud and clear,” the
President declared, “there will be no sanctuary for
terrorists.” 52 Finally, there was Operation ALLIED
FORCE, a finely-calibrated “air only” war of incrementalism and gradualism, studded with pauses for negotiation
and strategy—all reminiscent of the Vietnam conflict.53
Kosovo resulted in further fin de siecle twists to the
emerging Clinton Doctrine. For the President, morals and
values as much as geopolitics played a key role, with every
cruise missile and bomb in that conflict aimed not only at
destroying the Serbian national will, but also at
demolishing the idea that leaders could commit criminal
acts so long as they acted within their own country. For the
first time, one administration official explained, Clinton
was stating that “genocide is in and of itself a national
interest where we should attack.” 54 The President
elaborated on this theme in an exuberant speech to NATO
troops in Macedonia following the successful conclusion of
the Kosovo campaign. In this brave new world, he
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emphasized, national sovereignty would be subordinated to
human rights. In terms of “ethnic or religious conflict” in the
world, universality would be “an important principle” that
he hoped would be applied in the future “whether within or
beyond” the borders of a country. “Whether you live in Africa
or Central Europe or any other place,” Clinton concluded, “if
somebody comes after civilians and tries to kill them en
masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or
their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will
stop it.”55 Administration officials were quick to back away
from the soaring, apparently open-ended rhetoric. “I don’t
think anybody ever articulated a doctrine which said that
we ought to intervene whenever there’s a humanitarian
problem,” the National Security Advisor pointed out.
“That’s not a doctrine, that’s just a kind of prescription for
America to be all over the world and ineffective.”56 And the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs cautioned that “the military
makes a great hammer in America’s foreign policy tool box,
but not every problem we face is a nail.”57
Nevertheless, in the wake of Kosovo, the President
continued to give pride of place to values in the basic
components of his emerging doctrine for the use of force.
First, there was the increasingly pessimistic appraisal of
the international security environment—“a viper’s nest of
perils,” in Secretary Albright’s description, ranging from
terrorism and international crime to computer hackers and
genocidal violence.58 The second ingredient of the Clinton
Doctrine was the assumption that, as the dominant world
power with global economic interests in an increasingly
interdependent environment, the United States had a
vested interest in the maintenance of international
stability, of world order.59 The third component was the
conviction that in order to achieve international stability,
the United States must maintain sufficient forces to
conduct simultaneous military action against multiple
adversaries—a primary constabulary mission for American
military power to ensure the system didn’t break down,
causing globalization to fail. Implicit in this linkage to world
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order was the idea that the best way to maintain stability in
areas that truly mattered to the United States was to
diminish instability in other areas, however unimportant
that instability might appear, before it could build in
intensity and spread to areas of significant interest. It was,
as Secretary Albright demonstrated, the harnessing of the
“domino theory” to the concept of shaping. “Common sense
tells us,” she commented, “that it is sometimes better to deal
with instability when it is still at arm’s length than to wait
until it is at our doorstep.”60 President Clinton was even
more explicit in terms of the shaping function in a February
1999 speech that foreshadowed the bombing decision in
Serbia.
It’s easy . . . to say that we really have no interests in who lives in
this or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brush land in
the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan
River. But the time measure of our interests lies in not how
small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble
pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what
are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester
and spread.61

In the end, the criteria that are popularly ascribed to
both doctrines are only factors to be considered, not absolute
requirements like those of Just War doctrine. Moreover,
because the Powell Doctrine has moved somewhat from the
strict constructionist Weinberger position, and because the
Clinton Doctrine began its early evolution when Powell was
Chairman of the JCS, there are many similarities. Both
believe in using force in conjunction with the other elements
of national power; both recognize that force may be used in a
wide spectrum of situations to include those involving peace
and humanitarian operations; and both believe in the use of
quick, overwhelming and decisive force for clear military
and political objectives. In terms of applying that decisive
force, the Clinton approach is generally to rely on standoff
high-tech weapons, while the Powell Doctrine includes a
basic distrust of technology as a panacea in the use of force
combined with a recognition that conflict resolution always
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and conflict termination nearly always require the use of
landpower.
The Powell Doctrine is often described as a strategy of
reluctance focused on a narrowly defined concept of national
security which, if taken too literally, can amount “to virtual
isolationism again, via the great circle route.”62 But with its
emphasis on national interests and a finite amount of
resources, the Powell Doctrine ensures a selectivity in nearand mid-term shaping and responding activities in order to
prepare for future regional and near peer threats. On the
other hand, the Clinton Doctrine has been accused of a
willingness to use military force only when the political cost
of standing aloof exceeded the cost of a carefully staged and
limited intervention. Moreover, there is the general charge
of doctrinal inconsistency in an administration that never
made clear why the United States pulled out of Somalia,
why it elected to stay out of Rwanda, or why it stayed out of
Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor for as long as it did and then
elected to intervene in the way that it did.63 But by
emphasizing shaping and responding activities across a full
spectrum of operations in the near- and mid-term, the
Clinton Doctrine offers the potential of preparing for the
future by using military force to resolve crises, prevent
conflicts and instability, and deter aggression—all of which
could lead to the outbreak of major wars. Ultimately, there
will be some mix of the two doctrines in the new Bush
administration, which will, in turn, determine the mix of the
Shape-Respond-Prepare strategic variables. That
combination will directly affect the Army transformation
process and determine if the United States in the future can
avoid both Munich-like appeasements and Vietnam-like
quagmires.
Revolution or Evolution.
Unlike other organizations, military forces in peacetime must
innovate and prepare for a war 1) that will occur at some
indeterminate point in the future, 2) against an opponent who
may not yet be identified, 3) in political conditions which one
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cannot accurately predict, and 4) in an arena of brutality and
violence which one cannot replicate.
Williamson Murray64

At first blush, the Clinton Doctrine appears made to
order for Army transformation. To begin with, there is the
balanced Shape-Respond-Prepare approach to the full
spectrum of operations, a rich source of experimentation for
the Interim Force as it moves toward the versatile Objective
Force. That very versatility can ensure that the Army
remains the most relevant and effective force for shaping
the international environment. Added to this are the
transformation products of increased deployability,
lethality, and sustainability which can provide the Army a
rapid response capability across the full spectrum of
operations as a warfighting force and a strategic deterrent.
Prior to conflict, this force capability can also buy U.S.
authorities critical time for analysis and assessment as well
as impart a synergism to other diplomatic, economic, and
political crisis resolution tools. The problem is that this
balanced Shape-Respond-Prepare approach is a good
defense strategy only if it is adequately resourced. If not, it
can be disastrous, particularly in the absence of clearly
articulated priorities on where to place emphasis and where
to accept or manage risk. In that kind of environment,
trying to square the means-end circle of full spectrum
dominance has left the services in a position in their
transformation efforts, as Andrew Krepenivich has
described it, “of trying to create bricks without straw.”65
This has been particularly hard on the Army which, in its
pursuit of post-Cold War relevancy, has been hoisted with
its own petard of accepting the concept of full spectrum
dominance—a dilemma nicely summarized by General
Dubik:
Crises arise and we cannot say “no” to the National Command
Authority. If the President says, “Go to Kosovo,” we do not say,
“Gee, we are kind of busy.” And when he says, “Remember,
besides Bosnia you have to train for major theater war,” we do
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not say “Hey, we could sure use a break.” If things heat up in
East or Southwest Asia, the call is not, “Are you ready?” It is
simply “Go.”66

The result of all this is an environment in which it is
difficult to effect fundamental transformation. Certainly
the current operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the force is a
far cry from the 1920s—a period often cited as a model for
military innovation. “It is not about money,” one DoD
official commented in this regard. “They were as poor as
church mice, but their best minds had time on their hands,
figuring out where to go. A lot of talent was geared toward
developing new doctrine. Today our personnel don’t think
about these kinds of issues.”67 For the Army, this lack of
organizational slack is particularly significant. In a recent
war game played in preparation for QDR 2001, for example,
an interim division was used in the later years of the game
period. The conclusion was that the Army is and will be the
most highly used of the services across the entire spectrum
of operations.68
A key ingredient of the Army’s problem is the emphasis
in the Clinton Doctrine on maintaining world order and
stability—“policing democracy’s empire” in a chaotic
post-Cold War world while preparing for the larger and
longer term regional and near-peer threats.69 By doing both,
as Harold Winton has illustrated with the interwar British
experience, it makes it extremely difficult at the political
and military leadership levels to transform an army.70
Although the British had established the Royal Tank
Corps as early as 1923, the continuing demands on the
Army as a constabulary force to maintain the empire slowly
drained funds from new equipment and training, thus
diminishing incentives for new doctrinal thinking. Added to
this was a regimental system that further inhibited
innovation with a requirement for a 1-to-1 ratio of home
units to those policing the imperial domains. The result was
the uninterrupted decline of the British armored forces
until the beginning of World War II.71
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At the political level, the resultant diminution of the
army’s capability to conduct high-tech major theater war on
the continent led to the so-called Ten Year Rule, which
assumed “that the British Empire will not be engaged in any
war during the next 10 years, and that no Expeditionary
Force is required to this purpose. . . .”72 The automatic
annual renewal through 1932 of this assumption left the
British ripe for appeasement of the emerging peer threat in
Nazi Germany and set the stage for the strategy of limited
liability on the continent. 73 Under that strategy, the
government’s priorities for an army viewed primarily as a
colonial police force were protection of the British Isles and
the trade routes, garrisoning the empire, and, finally,
cooperating to defend Britain’s allies—but only after
meeting the other commitments. “Our contributions by
land,” Neville Chamberlain announced to his colleagues
upon assuming office in spring 1937, “should be on a limited
scale.”74
Not surprisingly, the Powell Doctrine pervades the
philosophy for the use of force in the new administration.
For the new National Security Adviser, U.S. national
interests must be the primary basis for such use. “It takes
courage to set priorities.” As for the Clinton Doctrine: “If
priorities and intent are not clear, they cannot be
criticized.”75 President Bush was equally adamant, pointing
out that he would avoid “missions without end” and not send
troops “to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide” outside U.S.
national interests. “Nor do I think we ought to try to be the
peacekeepers all around the world,” he concluded. “When
America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the
g oa l mu st be clear , and the vi c tor y mus t be
overwhelming.”76
The adoption of this more selective global engagement
was accompanied by a well-publicized campaign for DoD
transformation with the goal of obtaining dramatic
improvements of military effectiveness at reduced cost. To
this end, the President announced that he had given
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld “a broad mandate to
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challenge the status quo as we design a new architecture for
the defense of America. . . . Our goal is to move beyond
marginal improvements to harness new technologies that
will support a new strategy.”77 Implicit in this type of
accelerated approach to transformation is the existence of
greater short-term risk for a long-term payoff which only
intensifies the paradox of the investment-divestment
tensions between the Legacy Force and Objective Force. On
the one hand, there is the question of whether the new
technology will mature quickly enough to meet the Army’s
ambitious transformation schedule. On the other, there is
the approaching obsolescence of many of the Army’s
systems—one of the reasons for the acceleration to 2010 of
the Federal Communication Service (FCS) fielding
objective, which in turn brings the question full circle back
to the speed of technology maturation.78
In all this, the Army’s position remains that there is a
need to maintain a substantive Legacy Force in order to
hedge against such uncertainties. It is a position that is not
helped by the well-publicized recapitalization effort for that
force with the 155 mm Crusader howitzer, a weapons
system so heavy, in a time of increased deployability
emphasis, that an Air Force C-5 will not be able to carry both
the gun and its supply vehicle. For some, this smacks of a
“Colonel Blimp”-like reaction to change, typical of military
inertia and epitomized by the British officer in the interwar
years who insisted on maintaining the horse in the artillery
and cavalry “because thereby you will keep up the high
standard of intelligence in the man from his association
with the horse.”79 From this perspective, as Eliot Cohen
points out, only a “ruthless retirement” of obsolete
hardware will demonstrate “that Washington is finally
serious about the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs.’”80 But the
services are also aware of the dangers in switching
modernization funds. In 1994, for example, the Navy offered
to drop below the authorized size of the fleet to free funds for
developing future capabilities. Instead, the projected
savings were used to reduce budget shortfalls—a lesson
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that was not lost on service chiefs when QDR discussions
began.81
Such pressures are to be expected in the absence of major
threats, after years of deferred modernization and
readiness problems, and given such administration
priorities as national missile defense. In that environment,
there is a natural temptation to focus on “revolutionary”
concepts and technology at the expense of the Legacy Force.
Certainly, there is always the danger that a legacy force can
mitigate the transforming potential of new technology. The
French cavalry in the interwar years, for instance, simply
absorbed the new machines of war into the old doctrine.
Rather than allowing the characteristics of the new
technology to serve as a basis for creating new doctrine and
organizations, the French leaders created missions that
remained within the old framework. As a consequence,
tanks became subordinate and supporting weapons to the
infantry and the cavalry—“a strange hodgepodge of oats,
history and oil. . . .”82
The Interim Force can do much to mitigate such
developments by demonstrating that RMAs can come about
not just by transforming all elements of the force, but by
identifying and exploiting synergies between the old and
the new. The German Army between the World Wars offers
a striking example of this—using experimentation to
determine what new systems and capabilities would be
needed, what legacy systems and capabilities should be
sustained, and what kind of mix of the two should be
created. For example, legacy systems such as artillery were
motorized to support the tanks. And great care was taken to
include the right mix of new capabilities such as airborne,
close air support and radio communication with such legacy
capabilities as engineer and logistics in order to produce
optimum capabilities for mechanized air-land operations.
In this regard, even the considerable resistance by the
German Army leaders to the Armor idea proved fortuitous.
“All nonsense, my dear Guderian, all nonsense,” von
Rundstedt commented to the father of German armor at the
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end of a tank field exercise in the late 1930s.83 As a result,
the German Army followed a conservative program that
focused on traditional formations and the placement of
armored force development within the structure of regular
army doctrine and conventional military forces. By staying
within this combined arms structure, traditional German
doctrine provided the broad framework for the development
of panzer divisions and for the infantry and artillery to
extend the tank’s potential.
The Doctrinal Combination.
Using the American armed forces as the world’s “911” will
degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles,
and fuel concern among the great powers that the United
States has decided to enforce notions of “limited sovereignty”
worldwide in the name of humanitarianism.
Condoleezza Rice84

The ascendancy of the more selective engagement of the
Powell Doctrine in the new administration should not be
overemphasized in terms of Army transformation.
Americans associate themselves with Thomas Jefferson
and Woodrow Wilson, not Niccolo Machiavelli and Klemens
von Metternich. In the click of a TV switch or a “mouse,” the
American public can be face-to-face with the realities of the
post-Cold War world. The new President may choose his use
of force at the lower end of the operations spectrum more
consistently and effectively than his predecessor. What he
cannot do is choose not to choose. The new environment is
much more than just a balance of power world. In one way or
another, as General Powell acknowledges, the United
States cannot avoid the full spectrum of the Clinton
Doctrine.
For the Army, the most critical area on that spectrum
that is not addressed by transformation is peace operations.
As the recent experiences in both Bosnia and Kosovo
demonstrate, conflict termination in smaller-scale
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contingencies in the new environment normally requires
long-term peace enforcement, usually provided by ground
troops, for conflict resolution. Given the charter of Army
transformation, there is little to be gained in terms of
technology, doctrine and organization experimentation by
using the Interim Force in peace operations. Army
transformation documents make much of physical and
mental agility and versatility that support “seamless
transitions between benign and hostile environments,” but
admit that how that is to be accomplished “is not
self-evident.”85 The fact remains that the transformed Army
as currently envisioned will not solve the dichotomy
between peace operations and warfighting in terms of
readiness and training; nor will it ease the problem of
OPTEMPO even under the most selective implementation
of th e P owell doc tr i ne. Onl y by exp and i ng the
transformation effort to consider such experimental
concepts as a two-force army will the process face the full
force implications of the crossover between the Powell and
Clinton Doctrines.86
Peace operations are symptomatic of the problems of
trying to incorporate the two use of force doctrines into a
coherent strategy. There is general agreement that some
form of transformation must occur if the United States is to
maintain its military superiority into the future. Joint
Vision 2020 provides a broad picture of that future, but little
guidance concerning the objectives, pace and requirements.
In particular, the new administration will have to address
the specific objectives that should guide transformation and
the degree of urgency for pursuing the process in order to
articulate a defense strategy. Decisions on what will be
required in terms of investment and divestiture will be
required for programming guidance. Finally, there must be
risk accountability associated with the objectives, pace and
requirements established in pursuit of transformation. A
policy of accelerated transformation will have to account for
any additional risks concerning the ability of the U.S.
military to meet near- and mid-term requirements such as
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warfighting. On the other hand, in the event of a more
modest transformation effort, there will be a need to account
for any risks in the ability of the U.S. armed forces to deal
with future challenges. In any event, “ad hocism” will not do;
there must be an overarching framework to reconcile the
two doctrines. “Case-by-caseism, even if done competently,
is simply inadequate,” Richard Haass points out in this
regard. “ . . . . You pay a real price for not having a grand
strategy.”87
Another aspect of Joint Vision 2020 that has an impact
on Army transformation is that the document discourages
jointness by preserving each service’s distinct interests with
its discrete separations of the concepts of Dominant
Maneuver and Precision Engagement. The result is a
bifurcated intellectual revolution with competitive, not
complementary, traditions in the form of maneuver theory
developed from Blitzkrieg doctrine and precision strike
theory derived from interwar strategic bombing theory. All
this only encourages each service to pursue its separate
path across the spectrum of operations, even to the point of
perfecting concepts beyond the point of meaningful joint
contribution and at the expense of other services. In the end,
there is a critical requirement to bring together the separate
paths of the intellectual revolution. Joint experimentation
needs to go beyond interoperability and the current service
“seams” to exploit integration, synergies, and interdependence in order to create and explore joint capabilities that do
not currently exist. In a time of limited resources, without
new joint operational concepts and architecture, the way
the United States fights will not be fully transformed.88
For the Army, a Defense-wide approach to transformation is axiomatic. More than any other member of the armed
forces, the Army is dependent in fundamental ways on
change within the other services. A transformed Army, for
example, will have far greater reliance in the future on
remote forces and strategic mobility provided outside its
organization. As a result, the Army continues to emphasize
that in the transformation process, “the Services must
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b ecome more inte r de p e nde nt” and that thi s
interdependence “is achieved through the deliberate,
mutual reliance on the capabilities of other Services to
maximize the synergy of the joint force while minimizing its
vulnerabilities. . . .”89 At the same time, there is a
recognition that Joint Forces Command has not yet become
the authoritative voice on transformation in the context of
both force development and joint experimentation.
Moreover, the commanders in chief of the unified commands
deal primarily with current threats and thus have a
relatively short-term focus compared to the services, which
have the responsibility for the long-term equipping and
training of the force. In this context, continued Army
experimentation can provide key input to what will have to
become a joint venture in order, as the Army recognizes, for
a complete transformation process to occur.90
There has been a sense of urgency to that experimentation since the outset of the Army transformation
effort—the idea, in General Shinseki’s words, that there is
only “a narrow window,” that “these conditions will not last
for very long.”91 Part of that urgency, of course, has to do
with the growing obsolescence of the Legacy Force. But
much of it also has to do with the sense of ubiquitous and
rapid technological change leavened by the understanding
that technology can only provide the promise of innovation,
that it does not determine the process of change. That can
only come from the top—a process hindered by the
maximum 4-year tenure of an Army Chief of Staff.92 In those
circumstances, it is difficult to find time to create a
transformation vision and attract a hard core of innovators
in the spirit of General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, who wrote
to the British War Office in the 1920s that his experimental
armored forces should be connected with “many
enthusiastic experts and visionaries . . . ; it doesn’t matter
how wild their views are if only they have a touch of divine
fire. I will supply the common sense of advanced middle
age.”93 All this the Chief of Staff has set in train. The more
difficult task is to institutionalize a process that can achieve
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his vision. “Much of what we are up against,” General Dubik
points out, “is not technology but mindsets, institutional
obstacles. . . . Part of what we are doing involves breaking
the bureaucracy and rebuilding it for the new force.”94
Conclusion.
“Continuity” must reign over those principles, practices and
organizations that remain useful; “change” over those
variables that have lost their utility.
James M. Dubik95

The combination of the Powell and Clinton Doctrines
will facilitate the interaction referred to by General Dubik
as the Army moves forward in the transformation process.
Taken singly, each doctrine could have adverse effects on
that process. With just the Clinton approach, there would be
little chance for the Interim Force to influence the Objective
Force, because it would be consumed in helping a legacy
constabulary force to spread indiscriminately across the
operations spectrum in the endless service of world order.
Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to make
any substantial divestiture or to find time or incentive to
change organization, concepts and doctrine. On the other
hand, the Powell Doctrine when taken alone could cause the
RMA to become too narrowly focused on the Holy Grail of
future peer threats, ignoring more immediate asymmetrical
challenges throughout the entire spectrum of operations. In
that type of situation, there would be fewer opportunities to
try out full Interim Force improvements in organization and
doctrine and more chance for premature divestiture of the
Legacy Force.
In combination, the two doctrines have had a positive
effect on Army transformation. There is the reminder from
the Clinton Doctrine of the worth of shaping and responding
in terms of deterrence and compellance, all of which can be
achieved in a safer and more capable manner with the
initial combination of Interim and Legacy forces and,
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eventually, with the Objective Force. Added to this is the
fact that the full operational spectrum is a permanent
fixture of the new environment, and that by orienting
against threats across this spectrum, the Army will develop
a more versatile and agile Objective Force that can provide
the NCA more options and will thereby improve the chances
of “getting it right” in the transformation process. From the
Powell Doctrine, there is the reminder that absent
prioritization, the characteristics of the Objective Force
may only ensure the equivalent of a more speedy dispatch of
Custer and his troops to Little Big Horn. Moreover, there is
also the emphasis on restraint with the fascination
concerning the technological revolution—that, in fact,
technology is not a panacea for the use of military force and
needs to be disciplined by the concomitant development of
doctrine and organization and the realities of committing
landpower in force intervention. In the end, the net result
has been to reinforce the three-force Army initiative for
achieving acceptable transformation risk in the near-, mid-,
and long-term.
This is an essentially conservative approach to a
revolutionary process. But it has the merit of using the
synergism of change and continuity to maximum effect.96
Moreover, in a time of resource constraints, by initially
transforming a small part of the force and linking it to the
past and present, the process has avoided creating two
armies, an important aspect of congressional relations as
transformation proceeds. Most importantly, Army
transformation has stirred important debates—in sharp
contrast to the French experience in the interwar years
when the High Command would not allow dissenting
opinion on doctrine. “Everybody got the message,” André
Beaufre noted in his memoirs, “and a profound silence
reigned until the awakening of 1940.”97 Equally important,
there has been little of the strident advocacy in either camp
like that of J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart in interwar
Britain, which exacerbated the split between the innovators
and the large mass of professional soldiers, thus assuring
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that the ideas of the innovators played a decreasing role in
the preparation of British ground forces for the next
conflict.98 In any event, the current debates on Army
transformation reflect a positive interest in the process of
change which is always a good thing. In the interwar United
States, where there was no interest for the most part in the
military, there was no pressure to change. In the case of the
American horse cavalry, this resulted in tacit permission for
the cavalry professional to romanticize an increasingly
untenable situation in the most mechanized nation in the
world.
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PART II: TRANSFORMATION PLANS
AND BARRIERS
The conference opened with an address by Admiral
(retired) William Owens, former Vice Chairman of the JCS,
entitled “Roadblocks to Transformation: Institutional and
Attitudinal Impediments to Change.” He discounted the
utility of history as a guide to the future, and advocated a
number of radical changes to achieve real and lasting
military reform. He is a firm believer in the potential of a
perceived “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) resulting
from advances in Command, Control, Communication,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR). He argued that true transformation is being held
back by service parochialism, leadership without vision,
stovepipe organizations, a lack of jointness, and too much
attachment to old platforms and technologies.
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense James Locher
reinforced Admiral Owens’ emphasis on the need to alter
organizational cultures and the difficulties involved. To
overcome the conservative inertia, low adaptability, and
lack of focus that have stymied previous attempts to reform
the Department of Defense (DoD), Locher outlined a
number of key requirements. These included high-quality
leadership with realistic future visions, a sense of urgency
to overcome complacency, the establishment of a powerful
supporting coalition for reform, and a program to sustain
and protect innovators within DoD. Brigadier General
(retired) Huba Wass de Czege agreed on the importance of
having a clear vision of the pace and direction for change
based on a new strategic orientation. The cost of getting it
wrong can be catastrophic, as demonstrated by France in
1940.
A number of commentators had suggestions for ways to
determine that new strategic orientation. Carl Conetta of
the Project on Defense Alternatives stressed the importance
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of national economic over military power, and argued for a
true information age organization with a smaller force
structure that deemphasizes global military presence and
shaping. At the other extreme, Professor Andrew Bacevich
of Boston University asserted that America’s global purpose
is to maintain hegemony, and to do so it will need to exploit
new technology to strengthen powerful neo-imperial
military forces. Ralph Peters does not believe Americans
have any such long-term vision, and instead sees the
country as reacting to the widespread turmoil of a
post-colonial era plagued by legacies of bad borders and
Western models inappropriate for emerging nations.
Accordingly, military forces must be flexible and adaptable
enough to perform many missions they would prefer not to
do, including “small, dirty wars."
One panel of the conference consisted of representatives
from the Quadrennial Defense Review offices of each of the
American armed services: Brigadier General Lynn Hartsell
of the Army, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Ehrhard of the Air
Force, Captain Arthur Barber of the Navy, and Colonel
John Priddy of the Marines. They presented briefings on
their own particular approach to transformation. While
there were some similarities in the service positions, such as
in the exploitation of new technology, it was also obvious
that there is no joint vision or unifying approach to
American military reform.
While each service has its own unique perspective on
transformation, the Army has the most comprehensive and
total program for reform. Change is essential to meet a
strategic environment that has replaced the global
confrontation of the Cold War with regional chaos featuring
a full spectrum of threats ranging from terrorists to ballistic
missiles. It is too risky to postpone the process. As George
Marshall said about building up the American Army for
World War II, “Before the war I had time but no money;
when the war started I had money but no time.”
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Though threats have propagated and become more
varied, certain enduring requirements remain. Joint forces
will still have to be able to deter conflict, dominate
adversaries in violent wars, restore stability after
hostilities, and reassure friends and allies. The transformed
Army will still be able to perform these missions while
providing new and enhanced options for National
Command Authorities (NCAs). This will be accomplished by
sustaining and recapitalizing the current Legacy Force,
fielding a lighter but still lethal Interim Force by 2003, and
developing the Objective Force that will be the culmination
of the transformation effort. The new Army will be of
increased value to decisionmakers by maintaining the
decisive qualities of land power while adding new
capabilities for power projection and strategic speed.
The service understands that more than just equipment
will have to be modernized. Soldiers will need new training
and leaders will have to be educated differently to handle
the increased demands and capabilities of the Objective
Force. Organizations and doctrine will also need revision.
The Transformed Army will combine lethality and
survivability with agility and versatility. Units will arrive
quickly and fully supplied: a brigade within 96 hours, a
division within 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.
Because of the new speed of deployability, Army forces will
start the fight earlier and decisively resolve the situation in
about half the time currently projected. Quicker finishes
mean lower casualties, less collateral damage to towns and
infrastructure, and fewer refugees.
As a number of previous commentators had remarked,
these advances cannot occur without significant changes in
military culture. The Army is aware of this, and plans to
change the way the organization thinks and operates. New
comman d, con tro l , c ommuni c ati ons, c omp uter s ,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
technology will make information a new weapon. Forces will
be able to avoid enemy strengths and focus combat power on
vulnerabilities, acting first and finishing decisively with
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massed effects. Soldiers will need to think in terms of
simultaneous and continuous operations instead of the
sequential planning now utilized. Leaders will have to
nurture an atmosphere encouraging experimentation,
innovation, and calculated risks.
The Objective Force will enhance joint capabilities and
provide theater commanders-in-chief and NCAs with more
options. It will generate power rapidly, and apply it
decisively. It will use precision fires and dominant
maneuver to control ground on a continuous basis, ensure
access for joint and combined forces, and transition rapidly
between operations. With integrated joint systems, it will
“see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively.”
The current Army has begun transformation while
maintaining readiness and the ability to be “persuasive in
peace and invincible in war.” New equipment like the
Comanche helicopter is being developed, and the Interim
Brigade Combat Team is undergoing testing. The whole
process can be put at risk, however, if leaders invest poorly,
do not think boldly, delay efforts too long, or allow
fragmentation to occur. The most essential enabler,
therefore, to achieve successful full spectrum transformation, is skillful and visionary leadership.
In contrast to the Army’s emphasis on the new aspects of
its transformation process, the Air Force takes the position
that it has always been an innovative service, and its
continuing efforts in that direction will be a primary driver
for joint force and national security transformation. There
are three key elements leading to major changes in defense:
advanced and innovative stealth and precision technologies, new concepts of operations such as “effects-based”
planning that make use of those technologies, and new joint
organizational structures such as the Joint Force Air
Component Commander.
More than any of the other armed services, the Air Force
has always been focused on technology. It foresees great
advantages to be obtained by the deployment of new
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surveillance and weapons systems into space, which will
prov ide th e n a tio n i mp r essi ve gl obal vi gi l anc e,
communication, navigation, and precision strike
capabilities. Advances in atmospheric delivery vehicles,
precision mu n itions, and c ommand and c ontr ol
mechanisms will yield “order-of magnitude” improvements
in third-dimensional precision engagement and dominant
maneuver that will be applied rapidly and simultaneously
across an entire theater. Even more dramatic changes will
come when directed energy systems will provide “speed of
light” lethal effects. For now, the leap-ahead technologies
necessary to propel and sustain these advances in aerospace
power are embodied in the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter.
However, they must be purchased in enough quantities to
replace today’s aircraft which are becoming increasingly
obsolescent, and fill ten equally capable Aerospace
Expeditionary Forces.
Based upon a glowing assessment of the Air Force’s role
in Operation DESERT STORM and the Balkans, as well as
great optimism about the capabilities of future technology,
the service advocates a number of new concepts for joint
operations. Of all the services, the Air Force has the clearest
vision of how it wants to fight. “Global Reconnaissance
Strike/Global Strike Task Forces” will defeat antiaccess
threats, as F-22s supported by aerial refueling can operate
from bases thousands of miles away from targets. Vaguely
defined “Effects-Based Operations” will better integrate
elements of national power to compel desired political
outcomes in “Coercive Campaigns.” Aggression will be
stopped in “Rapid Halt Operations” that will isolate and
incapacitate enemy forces. “Global Network Centric
Warfare” will enable near real time global force application
to assure access to space and information capabilities while
denying them to adversaries.
While couched in joint terms, these concepts all rely
primarily on exploiting the nation’s overwhelming
superiority in aerospace power, which will be further
enhanced by taking advantage of the ongoing RMA. Stealth
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and stand-off technology facilitating the joint power projection
of Global Reconnaissance Strike Forces is the answer to antiaccess threats. All-weather precision engagement can halt
aggression rapidly and ease the deployment and operation of
follow-on forces. Integration of air, space, and information assets
enables effects-based operations. The speed, power, and
flexibility of aerospace forces give the United States the
capability to respond quickly to any emergency and conduct
multiple wars.
To make the full transition from a Cold War garrison force to
a true Aerospace Force, the Air Force plans to reorganize with a
focus on the complex demands of expeditionary contin-gency
operations. The core of deployable combat power and forward
presence will be in ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, with a
base of support in the remainder of the service. This future force
will be able to achieve the effects of mass without having to mass
itself. Though all services are investing in the advantages of
aerospace power, the Air Force is best positioned to exploit the
resulting edges in speed, reach, per-spective, agility, mobility,
stealth, and survivability. The service's maintenance of
information and aerospace superiority will ensure the precision
engagement, agile combat support, global attack capability, and
rapid global mobility so essential for joint operations.
The Navy sees itself as having four primary missions for the
nation: maintaining command of the seas, projecting U.S. power
with forward presence to shape and respond to crises, assuring
sustained access for American forces around the world, and
enabling the transformation of the joint force to fight and win
future wars. The first two put an especially heavy burden on the
service for current operations. It guarantees the free flow of the
99 percent of intercontinental trade volume that goes by sea. The
Navy typically deploys about a third of its ships at any one time
and responded to 144 crises in the 1990s. All eleven carrier battle
groups deployed since December 1998 have conducted combat
operations.
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However, the Navy also realizes it needs to transform to
perform its own missions better as well as to facilitate
expeditionary operations by the other services. It plans to
accomplish this through a new focus on Network Centric
Operations and improvements in its abilities to deliver
precision strikes and “artillery from the sea.” With
American maritime dominance unchallenged in the post
Cold War period, the service can now concern itself more
with directly and promptly influencing land battles. As in
the past, the new Navy will still be expeditionary, forward
deployed, self-sustaining, and mobile so it is difficult to
target. However, it sees that it needs to shift from an
organization focused on single missions and sea control to
multi-mission, networked units that can project power and
better conduct littoral joint operations.
As with the Air Force, the Navy has identified some key
technologies necessary for a transformation from a
platform-centered sea control force to an expeditionary
network-centric organization that can assure littoral access
for joint forces. Required ships include a fleet of
AEGIS-class ships capable of theater ballistic missile
defense and Virginia-class nuclear submarines. F/A-18s
and Joint Strike Fighters will provide a multi-mission air
capability. Procurement strategies already indicate trends
toward the new force, with acquisition of more precision
guided munitions (PGM) and fewer anti-ship missiles or
anti-submarine torpedoes.
The 21st century Navy will display a number of new
features. Networks will link all elements to process
information better and increase knowledge as well as
lethality. New Land Attack Ships and an increased number
of PGM-capable aircraft will magnify the power and
flexibility of firepower support. All-electric ships will
improve fleet efficiency, while other new designs will reduce
manpower requirements. All these changes will improve
relevance and responsiveness. During Operation DESERT
STORM it took 3 days to plan a Tomahawk cruise missile
mission. By 1998 for Operation ALLIED FORCE, it took
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only an average of 101 minutes from tasking to engaging the
target. By 2004 missiles that can be retargeted in flight will
respond in near real-time. The netted, dispersed, agile Navy
of the future will have increased lethality, flexibility, and
efficiency.
The Navy’s transformation efforts will be coordinated
closely with the Marine Corps’ strides to improve their own
brand of expeditionary warfare, which they expect to be in
great demand in the complex world of the future. However,
the Marines see their own reform as an evolutionary process
building on their current strengths and being of more
limited scope than that of the other services.
The Marines’ stimulus for transformation is future
uncertainty, as adversaries evolve and technology diffuses.
However, they also emphasize their contemporary
importance as the nation’s premier expeditionary “Total
Force in Readiness.” The Marines portray the combined
arms team of their Air Ground Task Force as the “Joint
Force Commander’s Leatherman Tool” that provides
strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility.
Tailored for the mission, Marine forces provide continuous
forward presence and power projection capability to
promote national interests, influence vital regions, and win
the nation’s battles. They perceive a robust forcible entry
capability as one of their most important capabilities, now
and in the future.
To further refine and improve the service for its future
missions, its leaders plan to train better Marines, optimize
the performance of their forces, and capitalize on
innovation, experimentation, and new technology. Like the
Air Force, the Marines believe they have an innovative
tradition. This will contribute to new warfighting concepts
as well as a reform in service business practices. They plan
to field new camouflage uniforms, modular individual
weapon systems, advanced all-terrain vehicles, and
improved artillery, while incorporating the Joint Strike
Fighter and MV-22 Osprey into their force structure. The
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end result will be a force with increased speed, precision,
and stealth that will remain “the right force for the next
fight.”
The contrast in service presentations is revealing. The
Army sees the most need for change and has developed the
broadest program for transformation, but details on its final
Objective Force remain sketchy at best. The Air Force has
the clearest vision of the structure of its future units and
how they will fight, but is narrowly focused primarily on
winning major theater wars and of all the services most
heavily depends on the promise of new technology. The
Navy and Marines emphasize how well they are performing
their current missions and see transformation more as
reinforcing their present strengths while also adding some
new capabilities.
While all the presentations displayed the word “joint” on
many slides, there was little evidence of any unified
interservice approach to transformation except, as should
be expected, in the Navy and Marine plans. With conflicting
visions and constrained budgets, many hard choices will
have to be made, and certainly no service will get everything
it wants. That will make the proper selections of new
technology and directions even more critical, to make sure
the right programs survive to meet the demands of a violent
fu tu re. A n d ch oo si ng any one ser vi c e ap p r oac h
predominantly over the others takes the risk of creating an
unbalanced force incapable of handling a full spectrum of
threats and missions.
Another factor that will influence the final course of
service transformation will be the positions of the new Bush
administration and Congress. There are many indications
that the President and his advisers are aware of the need for
defense reform, but their concepts may differ greatly from
those of the service chiefs, who have not been major players
in the conduct of Secretary of Defense Dennis Rumsfeld’s
initial reviews. Congress has also displayed much
independence on defense issues, and if their initial reactions
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to proposals to close bases and reduce force structure are an
indication of the future, then making significant changes in
the services may be even more problematic.
The two chapters that follow in this section present
additional perspectives on the paths of defense
transformation and the obstacles along the way. Dr. Chris
Demchak of the University of Arizona and Dr. Patrick Allen
of General Dynamics, both members of the Cyberspace
Policy Research Group, provide a complex analysis of how
the current military system discourages and stifles
innovation. They also argue that the evolving plans for
reform will create a structure that is very susceptible to
surprise because of a lack of flexibility and redundancy, and
propose an alternative model to facilitate transformation.
Then Dr. Leslie Lewis and Dr. Roger Allen Brown from
RAND Corporation describe how fiscal constraints will
affect efforts for defense reform, and suggest some trade-offs
and divestitures to further the process. While the initial
impact of the September terrorist attacks has bolstered the
DoD budget, the limitations covered in the chapter will still
have an impact on future transformation efforts.
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CHAPTER 4
TECHNOLOGY AND COMPLEXITY:
THE MODERN MILITARY’S CAPACITY
FOR CHANGE
Chris C. Demchak
Patrick D. Allen
All organizations change over time. The essential
question for managers is how to determine what
evolutionary path the organization is on, how to identify a
preferred path if the current one is not desirable, and then
how to achieve the desired path. We presume the Army as
any institution has the capacity to change in some direction
and will do so as driven by constraints and contingencies.
Building on that presumption, however, we argue that the
effectiveness of the transition process significantly depends
on the clear articulation of the desired end states. If the
attributes of the path are either a) unlikely to be achieved,
or b) not clearly understood and reinforced by use of change
agents, then the transition will produce a path not explicitly
chosen by anyone. This path is quite likely to be
undesirable.
In particular, we suggest the Army’s debate over
achieving a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has
produced two features. The first is a very rough consensus
on an RMA model that needs an extraordinary amount of
slack and redundancy to succeed and that lacks clear
articulation of this requirement. As a result, the system
emerging in the Objective Force and ancillary changes is
unlikely to achieve this RMA. Secondly, Army senior
managers are not using change agents effectively.
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Innovative individuals are not being nurtured by
sympathetic senior officers and innovative organizations
are routinely permitted to die for lack of institutional and
financial support. Both reduce the chances that the
endeavor will succeed. Our analysis includes the use of
complexity theory to evaluate the likelihood of the
envisioned RMA, and describes the effects of incentives and
disincentives for individuals and organizations in support of
institutional change. In conclusion, we suggest the
“Atrium” model, adapted from the hyperlinked organizational model by Nonaka and Tageuchi (1997), as a longterm organizing and guiding option for future military
organization and the institutionalizing of change. In the
near term, we recommend policy changes to encourage trial
and error and the growth of change agents and institutions.
CHANGE TO WHAT? THE RMA MILITARY
AS A PREFERRED ORGANIZATIONAL PATH
The U.S. Army has led the debate in defining new
military structures and operations. It has expressed a new
ranking of military needs for a novel, information-enabled
organization loosely falling under the rubric of the RMA.
This organization promises new levels of speed, accuracy,
low friendly and civilian risk, and reach that are extremely
attractive.1
Notionally Capturing the New Technological Age.
The RMA has, at its core, a technology-driven
transformation of military organizations into large-scale,
highly-synchronized deployable combat systems using
networked computer technologies.2 In the United States,
this has become captured by the term “system of systems”
indicating a massively integrated overarching network of
computer networks that are equally facile in acquiring,
providing, and processing real-time information for nearly
instantaneous actions.3
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With a smaller force lacking the redundancy of large
standing forces, an RMA requires a profound and
unprecedented alteration in military organization if it is to
be accomplished successfully. 4 The complexity of the
networked technologies forces new organizational designs
that emphasize “synchrony,” i.e., the elements moving in
tightly coupled, extremely rapid operations. While this
vision of an invincible machine has been dreamt of and even
attempted by countless military commanders, only now
with massive computerization and the “death of distance”
through networks can it seem to be possible to know enough
to make the vision real.5
Achieving an all-purpose, highly scalable, fully
informed, tightly networked human machine of
unprecedented range, accuracy, speed, and lethality
requires extraordinary geographical reach, rapid
absorptive capacity, and surprise-mitigation in a social
system. To get information reliably across distances
requires electronic (or future equivalent) networks. To
present the information for rapid and accurate “find, access
and absorb” operations across a multitude of different
terminal and human filtering characteristics requires
quickly interpreted iconography and client-server
independent graphical mechanisms. Finally, to make this
exchange timely requires a continuously available
many-to-many format with the organizational emphasis on
real-time updating, refreshing, and refining of material.
The Many-to-Many Challenge
The new model clearly involves widely shared
knowledge and, by implication, a new approach to
knowledge management based on web-like technologies. In
complex systems, effective “systems fit” depends on
knowledge that is reliably accurate, rapidly and widely
disseminated, and, most importantly, requires that the
people at the nodes are able to acquire the knowledge
pumped through these networks and know how, when and
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where to use it. In the American image, this volume of
information is constant, seamless, and intensely active. The
nets link sources from overhead unmanned aerial and
satellite sensors to the infrared night vision device of the
individual solder. The massive data maps in the Pentagon
directly download to the full color near real-time battle map
display of the rugged laptop of the tank commander and to
streamlined information warfare (IW) forces, which will
operate quickly, accurately, lethally, and effectively. These
forces will need to be protected against enemy jamming,
logic bombs, sniffer programs, herf guns (variation of
jamming), or computer worms while able to impose the
same and much, much more in direct explosive material on
opposing forces.6
In particular, these networks need to be established,
effectively used and maintained for real-time accessibility
even before hostilities begin, not retained and energized
just when hostilities are imminent as traditional militaries
operate.7 In the U.S. RMA and its emergent notions of IW,
there are three general issues particularly concerning
information-technology (IT)-enabled militaries which touch
directly on issues studied in complexity research.8 These are
a) the physically and cognitively complex organizational
interactions in a dynamic large-scale system, b) the varying
time req u irements of p atter n d i sc er nment and
reconstruction in the use of these systems, and c) the
differences between data, information, knowledge, and
wisdom in accommodating surprise.9 Not understanding
the organizational requirements of such complexity while
modernizing into this model risks dangerous mismatches
between operational orders and actual organizational
capabilities.10
HOW LIKELY IN THIS OR ANY LARGE-SCALE
COMPLEX SYSTEM?
Obtaining critical knowledge can be a savior; however,
ensuring its availability can be a burden. The artifacts and
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technique of advanced information systems cannot
effectively perform without the right organization.11 The
difficulties for the global military community in this sea
change search for modern capabilities lie in what is clear
from the promotional literature—that the new model of a
military is built on an incredibly rapid, accurate, lethal, and
small set of networked battle systems. What is implicit or
omitted from the discussion is that these systems are
complex and depend on web-based technologies in which the
more integrated the system, the greater the surprise
potential simply from the intricacies of the systems
themselves.
The RMA’s level of complexity, especially in the efforts to
ensure precision and synchronization, ensures surprise. In
essence, a full implementation of the RMA “system of
systems” imposes an extensive knowledge burden for the
using organization that must explicitly be taken into
account in a redesigned organization if it is to operate
successfully.
Complex Systems Mean Surprise.
It is extremely difficult to discern in advance the actual
dynamic capabilities of large organizations inextricably
intertwined with complex electronic equipment. Yet,
modern society is increasingly marked by the growth of
these highly integrated systems. This observation has led to
the development of a field of study devoted to understanding
the implications of “Large Technical Systems” (LTS),
especially the organizational control mechanisms and social
risks associated with them.12 Recognizing that such large
systems can manifest “artifactual success combined with
system failure,”13 scholars in this new field focus on the
conditions under which these systems impose risks on
themselves and on unwitting societies. In particular, LTS
studies are focused on identifying the constellations of
circumstances most likely to produce costly or catastrophic
surprises.
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The central attributes of an LTS are as follows. First, an
identifiable social system with boundaries and internal
coherence emerges when heterogeneous small-to-mid- scale
organizational activities (linked at their core by
interdependencies among machine elements) expand,
possibly compete, and then consolidate into a highly
interdependent and spatially wide-ranging network of
essential relations.14
Second, the scale of these phenomena is such that they
are extraordinarily complex and hence difficult to
comprehend by average nonexpert individuals, a situation
affording the system considerable insulation from normal
mechanisms of social control other than costly concerted
efforts in times of crisis.15
Third, the system’s inherent complexity and spatial
reach increase the likely opportunity costs of predicting,
mitigating, protecting against, or surviving the surprising
outcomes of complex systems. LTSs have a particular
potential for deleterious surprises.16 In any system, some
outcomes will always remain unknown (‘unknowable
unknowns’) while others are knowable with sufficient
research but not currently known (‘knowable unknowns’). A
set of undesirable unknowns, called here the ‘rogue’ set,
produce the unpleasant surprises. These unexpected
negative events are more likely to be disruptive because any
complex system is more tightly coupled and prone to
experience ripple effects from shortcomings in key nodes
along lengthy contingent chains.
Both machines and organizations can be such complex
systems with rogue sets. ‘Accommodating the knowledge
burden’ can reduce the “rogueness” of the set of unknown
and unknowable unknowns.17 In any case, accommodation
involves having the right knowledge available when and
where surprises could occur. This can mean literally
knowing enough in advance to avert the surprise, or making
the system operate so that the effect of the surprises is
negligible and does not ripple far. Unaccommodated
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systemic surprises, if large, frequent, and persistent, tend to
channel human individual and group behaviors in
directions often not anticipated by the designers.18
The fix is redundancy or slack designed into the
organization from the outset. Organizational designs robust
for surprises usually incorporate slack in terms of time to
perform or precision in processes, or redundancy of
elements that provide critical knowledge in operations.19
Traditionally, militaries choose redundancy as the easiest
way to accommodate surprise. That means a duplication of
equivalent knowledge modalities at the time and place of
need. For example, for decades after World War II, the U.S.
Army considered 100 percent staffing of a unit to actually be
125 percent because 25 percent casualties were expected in
any conflict.20 If redundancy is not chosen, then slack can
serve to force discontinuities in the organization’s tight
coupling. This deliberate decoupling or additional friction in
the coupling can avert, reroute, mitigate, or ameliorate the
deviant surprise event, dampening or stopping its ripple
effects.
Although people are often the source of surprise events,
they function equally as dampeners in highly integrated
systems. Human variations interrupt the automaticity of
networked processes, both slowing it down but also possibly
saving the system by localizing deleterious ripple effects. In
wide-ranging, highly automatic networks, such dampening
has to be planned into the system. Otherwise, full-scale
redundancy of elements is necessary to assure a system’s
reliability.
Key to knowing the amount of either redundancy or
slack (which amounts to reduced automaticity) that will
accommodate surprises is trial and error under fully
stressed conditions. For all their differences in approach,21
the overlapping lessons of complexity theory and chaos
theory are that both indirectly argue for trial and error
learning in large systems, however expensive.22 In short,
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time occupied with trial and error learning is essential for
mitigating surprise, especially from rogue outcomes.
In military terms, then, if peacetime preparations do not
enable high fidelity trial and error of intended operations,
then the organization is unlikely to be able to mitigate rogue
outcomes when they emerge. If the organization is not doing
the activity in peacetime—and the more complex the
activity, the more routinely performed it must be—then the
organization is unlikely to be able to do it effectively under
any other circumstances.
RMA Design in “Objective Force” and Transition
Plan Short on Complexity Accommodation.
Complexity matters critically in this U.S. RMA model
because its initial approach to knowledge management is to
limit slack and redundancy to speed up processes and
reduce costs.23 The appropriate mesh of organizational
knowledge, precision requirements, and accommodation of
surprise then measure effectiveness in these systems.24
Since militaries cannot carry everywhere an extra set of
everything, fully integrated and ready to be turned on,
having mirrored all files, then slack must be built into the
RMA design. Put baldly, a fully implemented RMA will
demand high levels of preciseness in system network flows,
minimal slack or dampening in transaction times, and
extraordinary accuracy in filtering overwhelming real time
data for the right knowledge at the right place.
All complex systems depend extremely on initial
conditions and should understand the inevitability of the
knowledge burden. However, accommodating surprise does
not appear to guide the initial design of this RMA model.25
Rather, the dominant theme is that somehow the Army,
heavily focused on deploying to fight enemies in a
conventional manner, will transform itself into the highly
synchronized and accurately targeted RMA force. For
example, the Army’s 2001 Posture Statement says, “the
Army is trained and equipped for the overwhelming and
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synchronized application of land combat power.” It goes on
to say the “presence of landpower [physically] also
guarantees compliance with the terms of peace.”26 The
dominant organizational view, therefore, is that this
organization applies explosive power, not knowledge-based
disruptive pressures more in keeping with the information
age. Another page states “while engagement activities
foster conditions that prevent and deter wars, the Army’s
core function is to remain ready to respond anywhere in the
world to fight and win the Nation’s wars.”27 The promise is
that this current force will be transformed into new
organizational structures that will provide “a more
responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable,
and sustainable force: a force designed to meet the
challenges of frequent operations in an uncertain
international security environment and achieve dominance
at every point on the spectrum of operations.”28
The October 1999 Army Vision Statement has much the
same language that suggests a profound misunderstanding
of what is required to produce an RMA or, indeed, any
knowledge-based complex organization. The following
assertion is worth quoting in full.
Our commitment to meeting these challenges compels
comprehensive transformation of The Army. To this end,
we will begin immediately to transition the entire Army
into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant
at every point on the spectrum of operations. We will
jumpstart the process by investing in today’s off-the-shelf
technology to stimulate the development of doctrine,
organizational design, and leader training even as we
begin a search for new technologies for the objective force.
Doing so will extend our technological overmatch.29

In implementing that vision, the Army Transformation
Plan to the new “Objective Force” states the following, also
worth quoting in full:
We are increasing our investment in science and
technology to accelerate Army Transformation—Future
Combat Systems (FCS) specifically. . . . When the
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technology is mature, and production lines are ready, we
will field the Objective Force in unit sets—at least
brigade size. Organizations will be complete suites of new
integrated combat systems achieving the capabilities
outlined in The Army Vision—responsive, deployable,
agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable.30

For the transition force, the “Interim Force,” the plan is
to have at least six interim brigade combat teams which are
explicitly “not an experimental force to be tested for
development [because w]e know the requirement. We need
operational and warfighting capability now.”31
The language suggests a profound misunderstanding of
what full spectrum of operations using information
technologies implies for organizations in terms of slack,
redundancy, and knowledge. The statements about the
“Objective Force” do not clearly articulate a model that
accommodates complex system surprises. Trial and error
under high fidelity conditions is not likely when the
“interim” force is not used for development. Rather, this
approach is like ordering a car design that no one has ever
driven, cannot be returned, will take a long time to produce,
and will cost everything if one is wrong about its
functioning. Furthermore, the new RMA organization is
planned on a shoestring budget where, for the sake of
efficiency and a promotional banner of streamlining the
organization, redundancy and slack are deliberately
reduced in the human-machine mesh of the highly
synchronized organizational design.
Surprise is therefore encouraged in this model; the
orchestration of elements has a knowledge burden that the
organization is unlikely to be able to accommodate.32
Whatever the system that emerges on the ground, if it
approaches the synchrony, speed, and interdependence
goals of the RMA, it will be highly brittle. With so little clear
articulation about how these new brigades actually make
this synchrony more likely, the slow process of change
without adequate trial and error learning in the interim
force further encourages deviations not congruent with the
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original design goals. It is, therefore, our assessment that
the RMA model is not likely to be achieved on the current
and planned organizational path. What emerges on this
path is likely to be less successful in a complex long-range,
highly meshed human-electronic and physically demanding
operational environment.
CHANGE HOW?
No matter how difficult it is to achieve an RMA force, the
current transformation process would not do it. In their
policy and organizational actions, the senior Army leaders
do not demonstrate a good understanding of how to change
the culture of their organization and thereby get the best
outcome possible even under a poor articulation of the RMA
model. If this situation continues, the RMA vision is
unlikely to be implemented properly, if at all.
It is never easy to change military organizations. They
are often perceived to be more resistant, or less capable of
change, than other organizations because of their strong
tendency to path dependence on initial conditions.
Successful change means the new organization will
satisfactorily change the path to meet the emerging
constraints and contingencies of its emerging environment.
Wars are so infrequent that a military focused on war as its
defining operational environment has few opportunities to
test ideas about new paths. Furthermore, the external
conditions pushing for change come equally infrequently.
Large conflicts leave behind leftover stocks of materiel,
disrupted economies, populations uninterested in investing
in more war materiel, and a generation of military leaders
who, either as winners or losers, need to move out before
new ideas can be implemented. Thus, organizational
change is heavily incremental, internally buried, and often
creeping in unexpected directions.
For the U.S. Army, the good news is that current
domestic and global circumstances actively promote change
involving new technologies. The circumstances identified by
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Trevor Dupuy are emerging. 33 The leadership of the
organization and the wider political system are recognizing
the new technologies. There is a growing cross-pollination
and goal conformity across the nation’s technical, financial,
and military resources. Finally, there are emerging
contemporaneous occasions for experimenting in
battle 34 —albeit not in battle as it is traditionally
recognized.35
These circumstances have taken 20 years to develop, a
period consistent with the historically normal time taken
for militaries to incorporate new technologies. Indeed, as I
argue elsewhere, the last 20 years has seen an
unprecedented change in the implicit rankings of military
technological choices from the old triad of guns, bombs and
nukes to include “information” as a destructive, or at least
disruptive, weapon.36 Simultaneously, a reweighting of six
basic military needs has emerged among leaders of the
global military community, from a primary emphasis on
lethality, reach, and resupply to one in which a more equal
weight is given to accuracy, legitimacy, and speed/
timeliness.37
The difficulty, however, is in the demonstrated
understanding of the Army leadership about how to direct
change under such fortuitous circumstances. The broader
social and business literature on organizational change has
emphasized the need for direct chief executive officer (CEO)
involvement in any transition. This involvement begins
with a clear identification of explicit elements of the desired
end state and then, importantly, personal support for
change agents. The senior leaders must know what they
want structurally and say so clearly enough for others to
accept it. But these leaders must also select, publicly honor,
and personally reinforce change agents.38 Furthermore, the
change agents must be knowledgeable about the new
technologies and able to innovate to move their part of the
organization in the direction desired by the senior
leadership. Without these mechanisms being continuously
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sustained, change does not occur in the form, frequency, or
cumulative direction desired.
Currently in the “no-fail” culture of the U.S. Army,
would-be innovators are being wasted or driven out. This is
not the rather hackneyed critique that there is no room in
today’s Army for a Patton. Change agents are directed
innovators. To succeed, they will need to have the latitude to
innovate and then to have that innovation guided and
publicly nurtured. In commercial terms, this vision of a
military is something akin to a business process
reengineering (BPR) effort, a dramatic changeover when
continuous improvements are not working or not
preferred.39 Without these innovators performing trial and
error experiments that the rest of the organization then
absorbs, the BPR fails. To have effective change agents, the
Army needs to foster a culture welcoming to innovators—
both innovative individuals and innovative organizations—
and it does not currently succeed here. Rather, the current
system discourages innovative individuals and stifles
innovative organizations.
Innovative Change Agents Discouraged.
Admiral William Owens asked before he retired, “Where
is the revolutionary who will lead the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA)?”40 There was no one he could point to. No
Billy Mitchells, no Alfred Mahans, no George Pattons, no
George Marshalls. What is different about the Army now
versus other times in the past is that there are currently no
rewards for risk taking, and many punishments for even the
smallest mistakes. As one officer in the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College Survey stated, “Risk
aversion has become a military cultural thing; commanders
are not willing to take risks (and subordinates know it).”41
Individuals respond to the rewards and punishments
imposed by the institution in which he or she belongs, or
they opt out of that institution entirely.42 In the current U.S.
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military, the perceived pattern is that if an officer makes
one mistake, he or she is out of the best career paths.43
A “no-fail” Army is unlikely to rescue its innovators or
grow sufficient change agents. George Washington would
never have become the General of the Army in today’s Army
since his first major action at Fort Necessity was a major
defeat. He was also with General John Burgoyne at his
debacle. Washington lost most of his Revolutionary War
battles as well, especially early in the conflict. Washington
learned from his mistakes, but it is not clear the current
Army leadership allows middle-ranking officers the time
and opportunity to learn from trial and inevitable error.
When General Jack Kidd was retiring, he was asked,
“What’s the one thing a commander should do?” He
answered, “Protect your mavericks. Otherwise, everyone
around you thinks like you, and you will all be surprised.”
Few incentives exist for commanders to protect their
mavericks in today’s Army. Since one bad or merely neutral
officer evaluation report (OER) can ruin a career, a highly
risk averse senior rater can derail an innovative change
agent easily.44 The system provides no effective recourse for
an officer who is unfairly rated. When a subordinate makes
a mistake, the system has not taught the superior officer to
respond with a learning perspective. Rather, the system
encourages the senior officer to be concerned that he or she
will also suffer in evaluations if a subordinate makes an
error, irrespective of the actual portion of blame due the
senior member. Supporting evidence comes from the
survey: “Top-down loyalty DOES NOT EXIST. Senior
leaders will throw subordinates under the bus in a
heartbeat to protect or advance their career.”45
This trend is not only found in the Army. In 1996,
terrorists blew up a U.S. apartment building in Saudi
Arabia after the commander had argued for increased
security consistently for months. He was blamed for the
attack despite his efforts to avoid this outcome. The Chief of
Staff of the Air Force attempted to save this officer’s career
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by preemptively resigning as the responsible commander,
but the local commander was forced to retire anyway, losing
his once almost certain bid to be a major general.46 This
pattern strongly suggests high levels of risk aversion are
being institutionally reinforced in U.S. military organizations.
There is also a tendency of the current system to ignore
knowledge-focused work in its rewards. The officer
promotion system leans more positively towards combat
officers whose skills are with the more destructive and
physical aspect of the overall mission. Today’s battlefields
and future battlefields will increasingly involve spaces not
associated with any physical terrain. The system currently
does not encourage people who understand this nonphysical
knowledge environment, those who can visualize and
operate comfortably in spaces they cannot visit personally
and see directly with their own eyes.
The role model for the fighter in the Information Age is
less likely to be the snake-eating physically macho man.
While the organization will still need folks with close
combat skills, the information age also requires individuals
with unique abilities to think in abstract spaces—
cyberspaces, virtual spaces, and abstracted representations
of reality that provide information superiority and
battlefield dominance. To paraphrase Colonel (retired) Bob
Killebrew, officers need to be professional soldiers,
practitioners and scholars in the art of war in the
information-enabled age, not warriors who pull the triggers.
Nor should senior officers be themselves focused on trying to
be physical warriors. 47 The information warrior or
“I-fighter” will need to be free to innovate and to have a
self-construction as someone who is mentally macho—bold,
risk taking, decisive in defining and experimenting with
new ways of fighting in both the physical and the virtual
battlefields. This type of military force will not emerge
without trained, encouraged, rewarded, and protected
change agents. Without those institutional and public
rewards, the officers and enlisted soldiers best qualified to
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succeed on tomorrow’s battlefield will continue to opt out of
the Army.
Innovative Organizations Stifled.
Just as the Army leadership is not demonstrating the
will or understanding to encourage change agents, they
show less understanding of the technologies they intend to
acquire. This is quite consistent with the generalist ethos of
the organization but is undesirable in an era of change to
complex information systems. This pattern is not, however,
surprising. The Army’s history with innovative
organizations is not encouraging. The leadership has
consistently shown a tendency to attempt to shove new
technologies into older organizational structures. When
they have not done so, they have also shown a gross
misunderstanding of the technology-human mesh, and
innovative organizations have not fared well as a result.
A good example of this lack of understanding in the
modern age is the Army’s attempt to adapt to the nuclear
age using an innovative structure called the Pentomic
division. During the fifties, the organization experimented
with preparations for tactical atomic warfare. The
emergence of the atomic weapon, its inherent complexity
and the political aggrandizement of the Strategic Air
Command (SAC) seemed to place conventional forces close
to obsolescence, portraying the development of large, noisy,
lumbering tanks as foolish expenditures. The Korean War,
with its rough terrain and difficult supply lines, added to the
general perception of the tank as a weapon that had seen its
day. Army research explored the use of small nuclear
weapons. Atomic projectiles were developed for 280 mm, 8
inch, and 155 mm artillery pieces. Army missile
development throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
included in the larger systems a capability to fire nuclear
rounds. With the Pentomic division, the organization
devised an innovative structure for the new technology and
the nuclear battle.
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Based on a conventional war and equipment, especially
the tank, the previous structure, called the “square
division,” with its massed forces provided excellent targets
for enemy nuclear weapons. Survival on the nuclear
battlefield required organizational flexibility and avoidance
of massed forces. Army research introduced the “Pentomic”
division in 1956; by 1958, all divisions had been reorganized
into pentomic structures. The new division was a collection
of five brigades, each with three tactical command posts and
few fixed boundaries. Each division was cut in strength from
the standard 17,000 soldiers: airborne to 11,486; infantry to
13,748; and armor to 14,617. Designed to be expansible by
the addition of other brigades, the new division structure in
principle increased firepower, mobility to disperse or
concentrate quickly, and communications for very rapid
changes in position or activities.48
The Pentomic division had serious organizational
drawbacks. Given the relative weakness of any individual
brigade, lengthy offensive activities could not be supported;
the division as a whole was more suitable for defense than
offense. Communication problems were horrific; much
equipment simply did not work as planned. There were
other serious operational problems.49 By the early 1960s, it
was clear that the atomic weapon would have limited
applicability in the most likely type of war, the guerilla war.
The Army’s research focus turned to helicopters and
missiles, attempting to put a missile on a tank and to drop a
tank from a helicopter or plane.
In 1962, only 4 years after the first Pentomic division
was unveiled, a new more conventional division emerged.
By 1964, all the divisions had been reorganized into this
structure called, appropriately enough, the Reorganized
Army Division, or “ROAD” division. This division was
noteworthy only in its ordinariness after the Pentomic
structure and its return to about 15,000 people. The key
feature of the ROAD division was its traditional basis in the
assumptions of a nontechnical army. Its internal
organization had more to do with the number of people
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subordinate to each commander and their redundancy than
did the pentomic with its clear connection to assumptions
about technical advances. The ROAD division signaled that
the portion of the managerial level responsible for
structuring the forces intended to continue the Army
structure as one built upon people despite the enthusiasm
elsewhere in the service for technical advances. Equipment
advancements and opportunities would continue to be
forced into the basic organizational mold. The only
exceptions were the helicopter units and air defense missile
units such as IHAWK. Tactical nuclear war did not
disappear; only the Pentomic division did. The ROAD
division remained in effect with minor variations until the
Division 86 reorganizations of the 1980s.50
In the early 1980s, Chief of Staff of the Army General
Edward Meyer attempted to be innovative in designing a
new organization. He authorized an experiment with the
High Technology Test Bed (HTTB), which later evolved into
the High Technology Light Division (HTLD). “He directed
the HTTB to design a division to fight primarily in the
Middle East and secondarily as part of NATO. Reinforcing
NATO was an addition to the original mission statement
because the Army didn’t believe it could justify developing
an entirely new division that could not support its primary
strategic mission.”51
However, this new and innovative organization had to
exist with insufficient funding and attempt to thrive in an
institutional environment suspicious of technology-based
innovations.
The division found a number of obstacles in the path of
conducting an effective evaluation. There was constant
tension with Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), which had the traditional mission of
developing and testing designs, and Forces Command
(FORSCOM), which was responsible for maintaining
trained and ready forces for deployment. The division
drew from and competed for resources with both these
major headquarters.52
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Without sufficient funding to equip the new division as
planned, the HTLD (located in Washington state) could not
demonstrate capabilities that developed sufficient internal
institutional supporters in Headquarters, Department of
the Army in Washington. In 1984, Army Chief of Staff
General William Wickham switched it to the High
Technology Motorized Division (HTMD), presumably in
order to save it.53
Nonetheless, although the HTMD continued to exist for
the next 4 years, it was always considered a competitor and
a target. Its ideas could not diffuse because, without
high-level internal support, traditional organizations
considered adopting anything from the innovative
organization as a win for the innovative organization.
Finally, in 1988, ”the Army was finding it difficult to justify
maintaining multiple types of infantry divisions . . . the
motorized capability was determined to be least
essential.”54
The HTLD died because the leadership did not ensure its
adequate resources and its clear integration in their notions
of the future Army. Therefore, the “zero sum game”
bureaucratic politics calculus of the traditional Army
elemen ts work ed agai ns t any i nnovati ve Ar my
organizations. It is significant that the RMA Objective
Force BCT is many years away, not going to be tested in
developments with the interim force, and vague in its
expression. Unless the Army chooses to protect, support and
publicly reward its innovative organizations, such
organizations will continue to be stifled by the traditional
elements of the Army through constraints on funding and
on the transfer of innovative ideas and results.
A final example of innovative knowledge-focused
organizations is the current battle laboratories. Originally
designed to help circumvent the cumbersome acquisition
system, the Battle Labs were designed to be centers of rapid
innovation. Unfortunately, many battle labs were co-opted
early on by the traditional TRADOC School System (at one
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point, there was one per branch school). But the real threat
to the Labs was the inflexible POM cycle and the funding
streams controlled by the traditional acquisition
community. There was no transition plan to get innovative
ideas into the acquisition cycle, partly because the
traditional acquisition community would consider such a
transfer a win for the labs. Whenever a battle lab had a
success (such as Warrior becoming the All Source Analysis
System and Phoenix becoming the Maneuver Control
System), it was done quietly, and credit for the successes
were subsumed in the “acquisition fold.”
There was no public reward for the innovative
organization, for fear of insulting the traditional acquisition
community. Moreover, the funding stream for the labs
continued to diminish, until each of the battle labs became
primarily dependent on the traditional acquisition center it
was supposed to be prodding. Its primary source of
independent funding was the Advanced Concepts and
Technology II Program (ACT II), usually announced
annually through a broad agency announcement (BAA).
This year, it was announced that the ACT II BAA would be
terminated. The battle labs now have no substantive
independent funding source, and therefore cannot speak of
alternatives outside what is approved by the traditional
acquisition community. Any innovation being produced by
the battle labs is quickly being stifled, and will soon be no
more. The traditional acquisition community will then
breathe a sigh of relief and continue to perform “business as
usual,” which does not include innovation, nor innovative
organizations competing for resources or limelight.
Overall, innovative organizations and individuals have
not fared well within the Army in recent years. Senior
leaders have failed to protect, nurture, and publicly reward
them and then it becomes easier for existing units to either
ignore them or to argue that they are not effective.
Moreover, the innovations developed by these change agent
organizations must be injected into the rest of the
traditional Army organizations, with public rewards given
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to the traditional Army organizations that accept and build
upon these innovations.
A PREFERRED AND ACHIEVABLE ALTERNATIVE
An alternative that is both preferred and achievable
accomplishes the following goals. First, it meets the
complex constraints and contingencies of the new national
security environment. Second, its structure accommodates
complex systemic surprises, trend prediction, recovery from
unknowable unknowns, continuous improvement,
reliability/maintenance, and member training and job
content/context satisfaction.55
An alternative model of a future military organization is
doable under the following tests. Its elements are clearly
stated a n d comp r ehens i bl e to al l member s . Its
requirements are compatible with resources available in
the environment at least, in the organization as well at best.
Its senior leaders embrace the new format continuously and
publicly. The organizational conditions permit change
agents to be selected, trained, positioned, nurtured, and
rewarded.
The Atrium Model—The Long-Term Ideal.
To meet these aims in today’s national security
environment, the model must be information-based, as well
as compatible broadly with some existing structures, most
contingencies, and a basic understanding of operations. We
propose a variant of the “hypertext” organization described
by Nonaka and Takeuchi.56 Labeled the ”Atrium" model of
an information-based organization, this refinement is a
design that treats knowledge as the new element in the
modern military organization. Knowledge is the whole
process of sophisticated and rapid collection and massive
archiving of data, then data mining it into information, and,
finally, integrating and displaying knowledge for local
decisions, long- term thinking, or reorienting future paths.57
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In their original work on successful corporations
innovating in this direction, Nonaka and Takeuchi describe
the knowledge base (KB) as a third and equal partner in the
organization. The other two are a central business operation
that functions much like the previous firm, and a set of task
forces answering to the CEO for innovative and
problem-solving missions. People cycle between the task
forces and the central operation, each time data dumping
their experiences in the knowledge base. The result is the
computerized gathering of the implicit knowledge of the
organization and an incredible wealth of information about
that firm’s inner workings and responses to contingencies
and constraints, and opportunities.58
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s work is relevant for any
organization in a complex environment because it attempts
to reconcile the competing demands and benefits of both
matrix and hierarchical organizational forms. Matrix
organizations are more innovative, flexible, and able to
perform double loop learning, 59 but they are slow.
Hierarchical organizations are more inflexible and need
explicit plans and trained responses but they are fast in
operation under predictable circumstances. In the original
model and in my refinement, the knowledge base of the
organization is actively nurtured both in the humans and in
the digitized integrated institutional structure to get both
the speed and the innovation to increase the accuracy of
responses to demands by the environment.
The major contribution here is that the knowledge base
is integral to the success of processes and the survival of the
institution. Nonaka and Tageuchi have identified several
Japanese corporations that seem to operate along these
lines productively and one is struck by an interesting
distinction—implicit knowledge developed by human
interactions related to the job is not only viewed as a source
of value by the corporation but also as key to long-term
survival. It is this view of knowledge that distinguishes
these corporations and makes them more prepared for
surprise in the marketplace.
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In adapting the hyperlinked design and social
construction to a military setting, I have given this concept
of a knowledge base a name, the “Atrium.”60 The term
captures the sense of being a place to which a member of the
organization can go, virtually or otherwise, to contribute
and acquire essential knowledge, and that it is a place of
refuge to think out solutions. The mental image is that it is
overarching, something that protects as well as demands
inputs. It is a player in the structure of the organization, but
one that supports, suggests, and helps channel the actions
of the others in the organization.
The model has three main organizational elements.
There is the main stem of operations functionally divided as
it is today but with fewer subdivisions. Here are the finance,
personnel, transportation, operations, logistics, and
recruitment elements that keep main systems functioning.
Then there is the Atrium—an underlying computerized
database that is graphically accessible much like a 3D
website. Military members interact with the Atrium in
three ways: as consumers of knowledge from queries they
inputted, as contributors providing explicit and implicit
data to the underlying matrix, and as knowledge producers
massaging the information into knowledge that is then
available through various recall and query techniques to
the consumers.
Finally, there are the task forces. These are specialized
units that have existed for years in preparation for
particular missions that may or may not ever emerge. In the
Atrium model, a cadre of permanent support staff is left in
specialized task forces. But the mission with the task force
is time limited, and the bulk of the members rotate in and
out on 6- to 12-month assignments, developing skills but
also staying connected with the needs and problems of the
main stem of operations.
There is a final aspect to the Atrium model that
specifically recognizes the role of the Atrium knowledge
base itself. That is the periodic rotation of every member
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into the Atrium to be both a contributor of implicit
knowledge and to learn or refresh his or her producer
experiences. Over time, career soldiers will then be able
both to use the Atrium and also to adapt its products to
emerging needs. The goal is that the Atrium processes and
data base will not only gather implicit knowledge, but that
every organizational member will be skilled enough to
innovate in some way with or through this knowledge.
Preferred.
Due to the knowledge focus of this organization, the
model proposed here is more likely to meet the surprises
imposed by the more complex national security
environment, including new web-borne national security
threats. Complex systems will impose destructive surprises
unless knowledge about their form and/or frequency is
obtained and accurately and rapidly acted upon in advance.
That is the essential knowledge burden of living in and
surviving with complex systems.
First, the Atrium provides knowledge leading to wider
choices. The military organization survives best when it is
first knowledge-focused and surprise resistant, and then is
able to disrupt or destroy other systems as the analysis of
the situation dictates. An Atrium-based military does not
lose its destruction mission but that is not its key capability.
Also, the knowledge base is not merely an elevated rapid
pipeline system connecting actors and thrusting avalanches
of nearly unprocessed data to low and high level
decisionmakers. The Atrium’s defining characteristic is
that it is more like an extremely knowledgeable partner. Its
central function is to accumulate the organization’s explicit
and implicit information into knowledge that enables high
and low decisionmakers to make wiser decisions. It is not
the third player below humans and weapon systems and not
primarily focused on supporting rapid deployment of
potentially destructive operations. The Atrium makes the
difference in recovery from the unknowable surprises, in
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supporting continuous improvement, in facilitating
reliability and maintenance, and in member training and
job content satisfaction, as well as in accurate and rapid
trend predictions. If the Atrium experience can also be made
aesthetically attractive, then even job context can be helped
in this model.
Second, the Atrium directly contributes to stability and
dampening rogue outcomes in a complex system under
stress. A fully organizationally-transparent, interactive,
maintained, and easily accessed web community with data
warehousing and mining on call can become a “trusted
source” that is consulted when surprising rumors, shortfalls
in knowledge, or routine information needs are
encountered. It also allows the controller of the content of
that site enormous advantage, albeit not face-to-face, over
what is widely believed to be true.
Third, it has a face that is exportable. “I-fighters” are on
call 24/7 and known to be so, and could be the key to
maintaining American military dominance. If the future
produces a hostile China, the United States will be much the
smaller nation in population. An exchange of one for two
casualties in a deployment of our small, lighter forces is less
likely to deter determined leadership of such a large
country. However, as China digitizes vigorously as it
currently seeks to do, its vulnerability to information war
techniques will begin to level the playing field.61 A threat by
an Atrium-based force to disrupt or disable a quarter of the
Chinese economy at will may be credible, especially after it
is done once to demonstrate capability. By the same token,
the RMA does little to reduce a growing U.S. vulnerability to
foreign electronic attacks during peacetime. A 24/7 Atrium
military would collect, refine, profile, and suggest responses
to avert such disruptions whether in peacetime or during
active hostilities.
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Doable.
This model is doable because it has conceptual handles
enabling senior leaders to implement it, check on the
implementation, focus change agents on it, and then
publicly reward progress. It can be and should be socially
constructed as a key player in the organization.
The Atrium is more than a library or a database on a
server; it is a structure in and of itself integrating
applications and data. It reaches into the task forces who
use it for data mining while also sustaining general
operations, sharing information broadly. But it is also a
place where task force members can conceptually “go there”
to consume, contribute, or produce some of its knowledge.
Its tools are increasingly available. Recently a major
database corporation has announced a new application
specifically designed to capture the implicit knowledge of an
organization, as well as the usual data now collected.62
Secondly, it has an explicit focus on participation by all
members of the organization. Task force members, for
example, are required to download their experiences in a
task force into the knowledge base before they are permitted
to return to their positions in the hierarchical portion of the
organization. Similarly, operations in the general hierarchy
are required to interact through the knowledge base
systems so that patterns in operations and actions are
automatically captured for analysis.63
This participation obligation makes the field fertile for
change agents who are there to help other members learn by
doing and profit from the experience. They will also be able
to innovate procedures and report ideas for improvements
in processes and use. Because of the knowledge focus of this
partner, the knowledge of the change agents also becomes
entered into the system and available for integration into
decisions.
Third, the “atrium” form is an explicit embrace of what
has been called the “new knowledge management” and, as
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such, can build on experiences in the private sector more
clearly than vaguely stated “synchrony.”64 In particular, the
new knowledge management means using network/web
technologies to move from controlling information
inventories as human relationship-based “controlled
hoards” to web-based “trusted source” structures.65 This
approach faces considerable resistance because socially
reconstructing knowledge from something to be hoarded for
power within an organization to something to be shared to
ob ta in an d su stai n c ap abi l i ti es i s a si gni f i c ant
transformation of expectations.66 But when the Atrium
experience is socially constructed by the combination of
constant leadership support and effective change agents,
entering into and interacting with the Atrium will be
essentially going to work with a major player in the
institution. Such a conception rationalizes the efforts to
ensure implicit knowledge is integrated into the long-term
analyses of the organization, such as the time spent in
downloads of experiences and information from the task
force members before they return to more hierarchical
stem.67
Fourth, the characteristics of members from the
surrounding community will make the Atrium increasingly
feasible. Recruiting soldiers for this kind of a military will
get easier and easier. The surrounding community is more
familiar with, interested in, and able to use computers.
Today’s young people are more likely to be interested in an
appropriately marketed “I-fighter” who is capable of a
“hack-back” in defense of their nation. The current
Israeli-Arab hacker war was started by just this kind of
young people.68
Using Reserves as producers or contributors will
immediately become simpler. A Reservist plugs in
anywhere in the country and logs hours putting together
data displays or mining topics as needed. Reservists are
then more able to integrate into the force when needed
because they have been studying real data really used and
actually needed.
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FINAL COMMENTS
To make this transformation, a first step is to view
organizations as large-scale systems prone to rippling
effects when relevant knowledge is not present.
Focus on Knowledge-based Structures and
Operations.
Channeling the future military evolutionary path needs
to have a goal in sight that explicitly accommodates this
central characteristic. An Atrium-based military provides
that clarity and reorientation appropriate for an
information age. It is an ideal type, an image that provides
direction for a myriad of smaller decisions. As such, it is an
improvement over the RMA and the oddly named “objective
force” currently dominating U.S. Army thinking.
Channel Change with Eyes on the Long-Term
Atrium-like Outcome.
In the longer run, complex systems are predictable only
broadly in trends and a full-scale effort to implement the
Atrium model will not exactly produce this vision. What it
does produce, however, will be more knowledge-based and
more adaptable to emerging circumstances than what is
planned now.
Short-Term Change to Allow Innovators to Survive.
Organizational culture is built on shared daily practices.
Changing that requires daily nudges by change agents, both
innovative individuals and innovative organizations.
Nurturing innovative individuals requires immediate
short-term changes to policy in two areas. First, incentives
need to be initiated to protect, nurture, and publicly reward
innovators and risk takers within the Army. One example
would be to institutionalize a way to delete learning
mistakes from an officer’s record, such as allowing officers to
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exclude one OER. Second, the Army needs to create
incentives to protect, nurture, and publicly reward those
who support the Army’s innovators; for example,
institutionalizing a way for senior officers to allow
subordinate mistakes without themselves suffering career
costs, and rewarding them for innovative subordinates—
even if they are not always right. The path to successful
innovation, and its rewards, needs to be more clearly
articulated by the senior leadership who are themselves
rated on how they selected, nurtured, publicly rewarded,
and channeled change agents.
Nurturing innovative institutions requires a similar
pair of incentives. First, the innovative institutions require
sufficient charter and resources to accomplish their
mission. A programmed set-aside of serious funds for
innovative knowledge-based organizations and their tools
needs to be created, with the intent that they will grow the
Atrium military along the proper path in the future. They
must also be allowed to experiment with rotating task
forces, collecting data for mining, etc. Second, the Army
needs to define incentives to traditional Army organizations
that support the innovative organizations, and accept and
employ their innovations. Unless the traditional
organizations are motivated to help the innovative
organizations, they will compete with them and eventually
force them out or incapacitate them. The Army must
incentivize the environment around the innovative
organization.
A final note: the Atrium model is an ideal type. No
complex system will produce exactly what we envision.
However, as a clearly articulated ideal type, it serves as a
guide, keeping the evolution on the proper path. Even an 80
percent solution in 20 years along this path is more likely to
accommodate the surprises of a complex world than the
path currently being pursued.
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CHAPTER 5
WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW
ABOUT AN UNCERTAIN DOD BUDGET?
Leslie K. Lewis1
Roger Allen Brown
Introduction and Background.
When we began to write this chapter in January 2001,
we hypothesized that by the end of February the
Department of Defense (DoD) would have a general
understanding of the U.S. defense agenda of the next 4
years—“increase combat readiness." The services concluded
that, although the exact details of the Bush agenda would
still have to be laid out, President George W. Bush would
hold to his campaign promise to increase the defense budget
by about $45 billion dollars over the next 10 years from the
current budget of $30l billion in 2002. In anticipation of the
increases in the 2002 defense budget, each service began to
compile its individual wish lists. The lists included new and
upgraded equipment, increases in end strength, and
improvements to the quality of life—housing, health care,
and pay. To underpin these goals, the services then
appealed directly to the Congress and further pressed their
cases for increases in defense expenditure with little or no
deviation from current investment plans. They hoped to
build on the “general bipartisan consensus that the military
is underfunded.” To further solidify their respective
positions (while standing “shoulder-to-shoulder”), the
services and Joint Staff developed a Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) strategy supporting increases in defense
expenditure for their various initiatives.2 The services’ and
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Joint Staff’s QDR strategies argued that DoD’s
transformation is occurring at about the right pace, but
additional funding will be needed to meet current
operational requirements while continuing individual
service transformations with minimum risk.
To bolster the beliefs that national defense is severely
underfunded, the services and Joint Staff identified dollar
shortfalls in a number of areas. For example, the Navy
asserts that, for current ship and aircraft repair and spare
parts, it is underfunded by approximately $2 billion. The Air
Force argues that it might have to decrease its flying hours
without a substantial budget increase. The Air Force’s spare
parts and fuel bills total about $1.4 billion over budget in the
current year. Its F-22 procurement program continues
slipping to the out-years of the defense program.3 The Army
is focused on its transformation and says that it needs about
$2.6 billion in 2001 to continue to meet its goals of moving
from a heavy Cold War force to a lighter, more deployable,
interim medium force.
In late 2000, DoD expected to request a $5 billion
supplemental to the 2001 Budget to meet rising costs for
fuel and to pay for ongoing contingency operations. The
supplemental request included $1.3 billion for the flying
hour accounts, $1.4 billion to address increases in health
care costs, and $500 million for fuel price adjustments.
Another $200 million was tagged for ship construction costs,
while $500 million is for congressionally-approved benefits
for which no funding was provided. An additional $100
million was allocated for repairs to the USS Cole, and $400
million for Army base operations costs.4
However, by early February it became clear that the new
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald H. Rumsfeld was not
necessarily going to adhere to the services’ and Joint Staff
plans. First, he reprimanded the service chiefs for “end
running him and going to Congress.” Then he and Bush
indicated that there would be no request for additional
funding to the 2001 defense budget until a broad
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assessment of the military had been completed. In
mid-February 2001 he tasked Andrew Marshall, Director of
the Net Assessment Office, to do a strategy review and to
complete it by the end of March 2001. In early March the
SecDef stood-up multiple task forces or panels to assess
such areas as (1) transformation, (2) quality of life and
morale, (3) strategy, (4) acquisition, (5) conventional forces,
(6) processes and organization, (7) strategic nuclear forces,
and (8) others—not all of the subject areas are publicly
known but some sources quote a total of 18 task forces or
panels working within the review.
This chapter has undergone several revisions to track
the developing reengineering of the DoD. In late March,
Marshall revealed that U.S. defense policy needed to be
refocused on the Pacific Rim, away from Russia and Eastern
Europe, on the belief the decline of Russia has provided an
opportunity for China to play an increasing independent
role in Asia. There was also some hint that the two Major
Theater War (MTW) strategy would be reviewed and at
least partially modified. Rumsfeld has hinted that an
increase in defense expenditures will probably be
necessary.
There is no clear consensus concerning how to fix defense
resources in order to meet operational demands while
achieving a mostly undefined transformation. Some defense
analysts argue that, regardless of what funding Rumsfeld
requests, defense expenditures will increase because
Congress voted to raise the budget by approximately 5
percent, or about $14 billion, in 2002. Critics of the
legislation argue that passing budget increases without
strong guidance from the administration on the role of and
vision for the military will only enable the Services to
continue funding Cold War weapons and practices.5 Others
argue that, even with some divestiture of Cold War legacy
systems, the DoD will have to have substantial increases in
the defense budget in order to meet its personnel and
operations requirements.6 Michael O’Hanlon contends that
with significant divestiture of Cold War systems and taking
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advantage of the strategic pause to develop leap ahead
technologies, the DoD could save at least $10 billion. The
budgetary requirements and budgetary resource gap could
be overcome, but it will require a well-defined strategy.7
Integral to any new strategy is the development of new
concepts of operations. For example, another round of base
closures and rethinking the U.S. forward posture would be
essential. Others argue that any DoD transformation
funded within the current $314 billion top line must address
some highly political and emotional issues. Some
controversial topics, such as the Marine Corps giving up
bases on Okinawa along with one or two Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEUs), and considering forward
stationing for the Navy, wherein crews would rotate while
the ships stay in a relatively limited geographic area, in
order to gain substantial savings from limiting ship
investment, will need to be addressed.8 Other issues might
be the divestiture of at least one fighter aircraft program
and stopping the purchase of additional Navy large carriers,
which are viewed by some as too vulnerable.
Others argue that regardless of directed changes in DoD
investment, the DoD is heading for a train wreck. Daniel
Goure and Jeffrey Ranney argue that the annual defense
budget needs to be increased by approximately $100 billion
in order to modernize, maintain, and sustain the 1997 QDR
force.9 Without substantial increases in the defense budget,
the DoD will continually trade away procurement to meet
near-term readiness. This is occurring during a period in
which DoD equipment is at or soon to reach the end of its
service life, and replacements have been slowed due to the
services raiding procurement accounts to meet operational
demands.
Little is known about what the strategic review
encompasses except that it is thorough and will provide the
foundation for the direction DoD will go over the next 4
years. More immediately, it probably will provide the basis
of the SecDef’s guidance to the services and the Joint Staff
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for a pared down 2001 QDR. As this chapter is being
written, a lot of uncertainty exists as to what the new
administration will define as the new defense strategy and
DoD’s budgetary requirements. Whatever is decided, an
assessment of the defense budget from the perspective of
what is fixed—those expenses the DoD must meet in every
budget—reveals that the interdependence of several key
areas drives almost the entire defense budget. In early
March Bush presented his budget to the Congress. He did
lay out a roadmap for expenditure, but did not provide a lot
of details. The underlying assumption of the budget plan is
that the economy will continue to grow. Bush outlined
several key areas on which he will focus on next year. The
first priority is the tax cut with the underlying premise
being that the budget surplus should be redistributed to the
American people. The tax cut proposal is predicated on the
belief that government spending increases can be held
below 6 percent over the next 10 years.10 The second priority
that the President identified is education. He also wants
increased attention and resources provided to science and
math training, the establishment of rigorous national
education standards, and a voucher plan for alternatives to
failed schools.
The rest of this chapter explores various areas of the
DoD budget in an attempt to assess what elements of the
budget provide the most latitude for change/transformation
within the DoD, and those that will constrain change.
The Defense Strategy.
Few defense analysts acknowledge that the defense
strategy is fiscally constrained. Many assert that a
nonfiscally constrained strategy should be used to define
the roles and missions of the military. Nothing could be
further from the truth. For example, in 1993 the Bottom-Up
Review’s (BURs) initial findings supported the need of the
United States to perform two simultaneous MTWs. This
objective proved to be too expensive given the Clinton
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administration’s desire to reap the peace dividend. The
BURs findings were adjusted to state that the sizing
mechanism for the U.S. military would be its ability to
conduct two nearly simultaneous MTWs. This strategy has
driven the defense budget for the last 8 years. The BUR also
asserted that, as long as the U.S. military was prepared for a
strategy based on the two nearly simultaneous MTWs, it
would have sufficient resources to conduct any type of lesser
operation that it might be asked to do. The problem is that
the strategy is underpinned by the erroneous belief such a
robust force could also handle a wide array of contingency
operations. In other words, if the U.S. military planned for
the large-scale war—such as the Gulf War—then its
capabilities would be more than sufficient to handle any
other type of contingency.
The BUR strategy did not consider that peacekeeping,
humanitarian, and coalition operations in the post-Soviet
Union environment might require different types of
capabilities and a lot of tailoring of the existing ones.11 In
1993, the U.S. military was involved in few such operations.
The BUR strategy does not provide a “forcing function” to
move some of the services to develop new concepts of
operations and all services to divest themselves of legacy
systems. Although there have been some changes in the
services’ practices brought on by the defense budget
dropping approximately $100 billion dollars (in 2000
dollars) from $382.5 billion to $279 billion, basically the
DoD of today looks like a smaller Cold War force. Although
the BUR strategy does not provide the DoD with sufficient
flexibility to meet its highest probability missions, it is the
foundational piece that the Army (and until recently the Air
Force) uses to argue both its force size and structure.12
The two-MTW strategy has been deemed affordable at
about $230-$260 billion—the defense budget between 1992
and 2000. The problem with this approach is that many
contingency operations do not adhere to the rigid
assumptions that are derived from the BUR.13 For example,
increasingly, contingency operations require different
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tooth-to-tail ratios, a great deal of tailoring, and a wide
variety of capabilities. Frequently, U.S. forces are being
asked to operate in regions with little or no developed
infrastructure and very weak governments. These
assumptions are driven by the existing strategy.
Recent work at the National Defense University (NDU)
explicitly attempts to fiscally inform the defense strategy.
The QDR 2001 Working Group was chartered by the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), to develop different
defense strategy options, the criteria for sizing the
conventional forces, and the identification of the required
capabilities to support each proposed option. 14 The
assessment sought to identify the types of missions that the
U.S. military might be asked to perform in the next 10 to 20
years. The QDR Working Group developed four defense
strategy alternatives. The four strategies span the
spectrum from:
1. Maintain the current defense strategy,
2. Engage more selectively and accelerate transformation,
3. Engage more selectively and strengthen warfighting
capability, and finally,
4. Engage today to prevent conflict tomorrow.
Each of these defense strategies suggests a different
defense budget and investment strategy. For example,
Strategy 2, Engage More Selectively and Accelerate
Transformation, suggests that U.S. military investment
should be focused on leap-ahead capabilities while only
becoming enmeshed in contingency operations that are
judged to be critical to our national well-being. The strategy
also suggests that the DoD should divest itself of most Cold
War legacy systems. The services fought hard against any
potential findings that they felt challenged their current
force structures and investment plans.
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If the SecDef should choose one of these defense
strategies or develop a hybrid, the defense strategy will
provide the guidelines for sizing of the defense budget. This
is in spite of the National Defense Panel (NDP), the group
appointed by Congress to review the 1997 QDR report,
noting that the defense strategy should not be a force-sizing
mechanism. The Defense Science Board (DSB) on DoD
Transformation made similar findings.15 Nonetheless, few
attempts have been made by the services, especially the
Army and Air Force, to move away from the defense
strategy as being the sizing mechanism for their forces. The
force sizing assessments are usually based on minimizing
the risk to the United States and its allies, but risk is never
defined nor is it quantified. Whatever the new defense
strategy, the SecDef and his advisors must accept that some
of the services will attempt to use it as a sizing mechanism.
The strategy will provide the first indicator as to what the
Bush defense agenda could cost. The new strategy must
provide some clear guidance on the DoD’s investment
priorities and how these priorities will be met. If the priority
is to increase U.S. investment in Homeland Defense and
National Missile Defense, then the SecDef must provide
some strategic guidance on the resource options and the
trade spaces.
Indications are that the Bush administration will at
least modify the defense strategy to accommodate missile
defense. The new strategy might call for a single MTW
requirement combined with multiple contingencies. But
whatever the new strategy, it must be sufficiently defined so
that it establishes the parameters on how the priorities will
be set for the defense budget.
Resource Drivers in the Defense Budget.
Many people believe that the defense budget’s major
resource allocation is for operating costs or what is also
termed the numbers, types, and readiness levels of DoD’s
forces. Others believe that modernization and procurement
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are the major resource drivers, while still others contend
that support and infrastructure that include such areas as
civilian pay, military medical care, and family housing are
the largest cost drivers. Importantly, these elements are all
interrelated, and an assessment is needed to better
understand how these areas interact. The assessment
reveals some of the constraints and hard choices faced when
trying to develop savings within the DoD budget.
Assessing the FY 2002 Defense Budget by the six major
appropriations (i.e., Military Personnel [(MILPERS],
Operations and Maintenance [O&M], Procurement
[PROC], Research and Development [R&D], Military
Construction [MILCON], and Family Housing Accounts
[FHA]), it is not a surprise to find that the O&M account is
the largest at 37 percent. The O&M account includes the
bulk of civilian pay and the consumables that support
operations and training. Also, it should be noted that
Military Personnel, at about 26 percent of the total, is the
second largest account and primarily covers pay for Active
and Reserve military personnel. Figure 1 shows the
breakdown by these six principal appropriations and their
respective percentages of the total FY 2002 Defense

Figure 1. Appropriation Analysis.
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Department budget.16 While this gives some direct insights
as to the general uses of the defense resources, further
analysis is necessary to relate these appropriations to the
resources that support major defense functional categories.17
We have chosen three sets of major functional categories
often used as the targets for defense resource reductions for
examination. These are Force Structure and Readiness,
Modernization, and Infrastructure and Sustainment. Those
familiar with defense activities will recognize the
difficulties in further separating these categories into their
constituent elements. Force structure provides little utility
unless it is ready for use, and the services promote the
highest readiness objectives for their mission forces; the
result being that readiness is inexplicably linked to force
structure. Similarly, service infrastructure is the
foundation for their respective abilities to sustain
capabilities, forces, and institutions. In the following figures
we examine the magnitude and makeup of resources
associated with each of these functional categories.

Figure 2. Force Structure and Readiness Overlay.
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Figure 2 shows how force structure and readiness are
funded principally in two of the major appropriations:
Military Personnel and O&M.18 This is due to the major
components of those functions being tied to pay of military
members assigned to units in the force structure (this
component of resources is often referred to as military end
strength but is more aptly represented by person-years) and
the consumables, such as fuel and spare parts, that support
unit operations and training. Savings from force structure
reductions with their consequent cuts in military personnel
are generally estimated to be on the order of $40,000-45,000
per person-year including pay, entitlements, and an
apportionment of O&M for reduced training expenditures.
Cuts in military personnel are useful in that they affect both
the year of execution and all succeeding program years
where the person-years are reduced. Since reductions in
military personnel are usually effected by speeding up
attrition through “early-out” programs and reductions in
accessions, the initial year of any planned end strength
reduction usually yields only about one half of the
person-year savings that are achieved in the succeeding
years. Large reductions in military personnel require
several years to effect due to the need to assure appropriate
skill mixes and experience levels are retained. Direct cuts in
readiness resources, such as suggested by Senator John
McCain in 1996 by implementing “tiered readiness” for
major force elements, are difficult to achieve in practice
since they would suggest that some of the active forces
would not be ready for employment on short notice.19 The
Air Force with its Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept is
moving in this direction; the Navy and Marine Corps have
adopted this concept. Such readiness reductions
traditionally have been strongly resisted by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service Chiefs, and the
Commanders-in-Chief of the combatant commands.
Historically, other efforts at direct reductions to readiness
resources, which reduce training time and degrade unit
effectiveness, have not been easily applied, especially by the
Army. Hence, the only way to effectively gain large savings
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from readiness is to eliminate the demand for readiness
resources. This can be accomplished by eliminating major
force elements, such as Army divisions, Air Force air wings,
Navy ships, and Marine brigades, since units taken out of
the force structure will not need to expend their training
and operations resources. Reducing major force elements
also provides an opportunity to take person-year
reductions, which are generally of higher values than
readiness reductions alone.

Figure 3. Modernization Overlay.
Figure 3 shows those appropriations associated with
defense modernization activities. Modernization requires
resources primarily from five of the appropriations.
Procurement and R&D are the largest appropriations for
this activity as they cover the development and production
costs of new weapons systems. Few people realize that the
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Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, and
Military Construction appropriations also support service
modernization. The MILPERS covers those individuals
involved in acquisition; MILCON funds those facilities
required to support the fielding of new modern weapons
systems such as aircraft shelters, runways, and
maintenance buildings; and the O&M resources support
operational testing requirements, provision of spare parts,
new equipment training teams that accompany fielding
activities, and pay for civilians assigned to these activities.
The cancellation, delay, or reductions in quantities
produced or capabilities of major service weapons systems
that are in development or just beginning production and
fielding usually effect the largest long-term reductions in
the defense program. In the 1997 QDR, the SecDef decided
to reduce the total number of aircraft in the F-22 fighter
program. This decision was a reduction taken at the end of
the production program; hence the savings achieved were
only in the out-years. To achieve savings in the near-term
years in modernization, entire programs must be
terminated. This can be achieved either by stopping a
system during development or ending production of a fully
developed system.
Modernization provides a direct contribution to the
fielding of new and enhanced capabilities. Killing systems
in development, delaying their development, slowing or
ending production may result in the lack of needed
capabilities that risk the loss of future advantages for our
military forces. Hence, decisions to foreclose future
capabilities are often difficult to effect with any finality;
several systems have received new life in subsequent years
after they were cancelled when new administrations or
defense leaders become responsible for reconsidering these
decisions. Program termination decisions have generally
resulted in the requirement to pay termination costs that
significantly reduce savings and eliminate all or a portion of
a desired capability. Decisions to delay developments or
reduce rates of production of weapons systems generally
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increase the unit cost of each remaining system in the
program. Hence, the savings from these types of decisions
are usually of less overall value and not realized until later
in the program out-years. Most decisions affecting
modernization programs very often incur some level of
resistance or wrath from the affected industries and their
congressional sponsors and these reactions usually increase
in intensity with a system cancellation. Another
consideration in taking reductions from modernization is
their effects on the defense industrial base. With the many
consolidations of defense companies over the past decade,
there are fewer companies to compete for defense contracts.
The loss of on-going business through program kills, delays,
or reductions may adversely affect future defense industrial
capabilities. The lesson learned from reviewing recent
history appears to be that new administrations should
cancel modernization programs early in development and
early within their terms of office to have some assurance
that these decisions would have some lasting effect and
yield the desired resource savings.
There is an intertemporal interplay between
modernization and readiness spending. Modernization is
long-term investment and its outputs—equipments and
capabilities—have long lives (with usefulness often
debated). Postponing investment does not reduce the
existing stock of capital except through the depreciation
associated with wear and tear, and ultimately,
obsolescence. Readiness is annual consumption of a
commodity; the consequences of buying or not buying
readiness have different consequences on the DoD.
Our third examination is of infrastructure and
sustainment. Figure 4 shows the appropriations that are
affected by infrastructure and sustainment. It reveals that
that, due to their inherent crosscutting nature,
infrastructure and sustainment affect all six of the
appropriations. This functional category has been one of the
most difficult in which to take timely reductions and achieve
defense savings. In the 1990s, the congressionally approved
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Figure 4. Infrastructure and Sustainment.
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) act was used to close
excess or inefficient military bases and eliminate,
consolidate, or transfer their related functions and military
and civilian jobs. The BRAC process provided useful
long-term reductions in military infrastructure while
assuring needed sustainment capabilities and eliminated
the potential for revisiting decisions in Congress once they
were approved. Assuming congressional approval for
additional rounds of BRAC authority, the primary
difficulties of using this approach to achieve defense
resource reductions are that there are high initial costs to
close bases and assure necessary environmental clean-up,
and the elimination of civilian jobs usually takes several
years due to extensive protections for the civilian workforce.
Thus BRAC savings are not generally achieved until 5 or
more years after the closure is effected, and they are
generally preceded by high up-front near-term costs.
Another resource reduction area within infrastructure and
sustainment is to reduce civilian jobs without the benefit of
a BRAC to save the related costs from reduced civilian
person-years. As mentioned earlier, reducing the civilian
defense workforce seldom yields any saving until the second
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or third year after a reduction decision is reached due to job
protection laws and rules. The lengthy period to achieve
such civilian reductions is another reason that such
reductions need to be decided early in a new administration
to assure they are fully effected.
Another area for potential savings in the infrastructure
and sustainment category is to change the stock levels of
sustainment items kept in the inventory, thus reducing the
costs over time to care for items in supply and directly
reducing costs for the replacement of supplies no longer
stocked. This area of savings also takes several years to
effect as the supplies already on hand must be lowered
through consumption, and the costs of the supply inventory
care and maintenance can be reduced only as efficiencies in
storage can be achieved. The problem with using
sustainment as a billpayer, at least for the Army and the Air
Force, is that spares and depot reparables are already in low
stock. These shortages are due to retention of legacy
systems, increased use of equipment in operations, and the
traditional use of these accounts by the services to pay other
bills.20
Outsourcing or privatization of various logistics and
installation functions, such as military family housing, has
seen recent initiatives to reduce the infrastructure costs,
but these have yielded only marginal benefits. Two other
areas of infrastructure that may provide savings are
reductions in recruiting and individual training that are
strongly related to the size of the overall defense force
structure, but reductions in force structure seldom produce
commensurate reductions of the same proportion in
training and recruiting infrastructure. Nearly the same
institutional staffs and operating costs for these functions
will be needed to handle reductions of throughput that are
reduced by only 10-15 percent. Since the training base and
recruiting structures must accommodate an interrelated
seasonal personnel flow, direct cuts to either of these
infrastructure areas will over time directly impact
readiness of the forces. One area within recruiting that
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some might suggest for reduction is the high cost of
advertising, but few with any experience in accession
management would consider such reductions effective since
recruiting is and will remain a very competitive activity.
Hence, one can expect to achieve significant savings from
reductions in training base and recruiting infrastructures
only with commensurate force structure reductions.
New Strategies and Additional Costs.
Although the defense strategic review is nearing
completion, the new DoD roadmap remains to be fully
defined. The Bush administration has already identified
two objectives requiring increased expenditures: (1)
increasing military pay, and (2) the development of a missile
defense capability. The increase in military pay is also tied
to improving housing and medical care for the active
military. The President indicated that the military pay
would increase about 5.3 percent (or 4.1 adjusted for
inflation). The Congressisonal Budget Office (CBO)
estimates of pay increases at a 1.5 percent increase per year
over a 10-year period (adjusted from an actual percentage
raise of 3.3 percent per year) would cost the DoD
approximately $85 billion per year. The calculation is based
on sustaining the force structure and end strength at
approximately the same size.21
The administration has not been bashful about
identifying a robust missile defense capability. As of this
writing a missile defense architecture has yet to be
identified; therefore, it is difficult to gage the exact costs.
Many critics of missile defense argue that the technology
necessary to support a full-scale missile defense does not
exist yet. Currently there are three elements associated
with missile defense:
1. The development and fielding of interoperable
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to protect U.S. forces and
interests in theaters of operations;
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2. The development of active defenses to protect the U.S.
homeland against long-range missile threats—National
Missile Defense (NMD); and,
3. The development of an advanced technology
program.22
The TMD portion of the architecture consists of the
higher and lower tiers and several interrelated systems. For
example, the PATRIOT system (PAC-3) remains the
foundational piece of the lower-tier theater missile defense.
The system is currently being improved in the areas of
interceptor performance and increased lethality. The
PAC-3 improvements include the new PAC-3 hit-to-kill
missile, enhanced remote launch, communications and
computer/software improvements, and radar upgrades to
improve tracking and targeting.23 The upper-tier program
is in competition between two systems: the Theater High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Theater
Wide (NTW). The goal is to achieve a quicker and more
efficient capability. The architecture for the Upper Tier and
an acquisition strategy have not been completely defined.
Both the programs are being restructured to meet a 2007
date First Unit Equipped (FUE) and a phased capability
approach. Another objective of the overall program is to
reduce risk through phased funding.
The NMD portion of the program contains space and
ground-based elements: sensors, interceptors, and
associated Battle Management Command, Control and
Communications capabilities. There has been no decision
on when the system will be deployed, but much of it hinges
on the technology and its reliability. Nonetheless, the NMD
program is on a fast track because it is believed that there
are sufficient threats from rogue nations to necessitate the
development and deployment of the system. The goal is to
deploy an initial NMD capability in fiscal year 2005. The
DoD wants to include in this package approximately 20
interceptors. In 2007 the program plan calls for moving to
an expanded-capability-one-architecture that consists of
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approximately 100 interceptors. Estimated additional costs
for these two phases (05 and 07) are approximately $6
billion dollars above the existing resources in the Future
Year Defense Program.24 Some defense analysts place the
total costs of fielding a complete missile defense around
$100 billion over the next 10 years; these estimates do not
include sustainment costs.25
The issue facing the DoD is not only that the defense
budget is not going to get substantially larger; it must also
be able to pay for these new initiatives. Some analysts
contend that another round of draconian cuts could provide
sufficient monies to support the QOL and missile defense
programs. Certainly another round of BRAC could provide
about another $5.5 billion. However, the BRAC process
takes about 2 years to complete, and savings would be
garnered 3-4 years after the selected bases were closed, and
all the up-front costs of closure were paid.26
Another way to assess where resources might be found to
pay for new initiatives is to link investment to possible new
stra teg ies th at mi ght be ad op ted by the Bush
administration. Four possible strategies have been
identified that are worthy of examination: Transformation,
Concurrent MTWs, SSC Focus, and Engagement. These
strategies include ones that have been discussed at length
within the national security community. For example, the
NDU study looked at several of these strategies in their
preparatory work for the QDR. Our examination of these
strategies linked them to resources and forces, mission
focus objectives, and transformation paths and their timing.
Table 1 displays a short summary of each strategy.

155

Table 1. Major Assumptions for Strategies.
If the Transformation Strategy were adopted, several
areas of divestiture could be readily identified. The first is
that there would be a deemphasis on the major force
elements with the savings redistributed to transformation.
The transformation would include improving the quality of
life of the current force, development of a missile defense
capability and improvement of the U.S. ability to globally
project power. If the United States decided to maintain its
current course, force structure and modernization would
continue at about the same rates as now. This strategy is
called the Concurrent MTWs Strategy. In this strategy,
there would be greater emphasis on ensuring that current
forces are capable of supporting identified MTWs, while
Sma ller-Scale Conti ngenc i es ( SSCs ) woul d be
deemphasized. Investment dollars could be spent on legacy
force sustainment and modernization, TMD, and a very
slow transformation that is only loosely defined. Table 1
summarizes the other strategies and their associated
assumptions.
Few assessments of different strategies have examined
resource impacts. Therefore, within the context of the
defense appropriations we assessed what the implications
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would be for on each of these four strategies. For example, if
the Transformation Strategy were adopted, the force
structure and readiness accounts would decrease. The DoD
would divest itself of force structure in order to pay for
modernization to support global power projection and the
homeland defense mission. The reductions in force
structure would also impact infrastructure and
sustainment because less recruitment, individual training,
housing, base support, and sustainment would be required
of a smaller force. The Concurrent MTWs Strategy presents
some anomalies. For example, if the Bush administration
were truly interested in sustaining a two MTW capability,
then there would have to be new concepts of operation that
would improve the effectiveness of current force with
near-term capability enhancements or some increases in
force structure, the assumption being that the United
States would need a larger force structure to fight two
simultaneous wars. Investment would have to be reoriented
towards ensuring that there is sufficient strategic lift for
these missions and lethality for such a force. This implies
that the United States would divest itself of many of the
capabilities required for peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations and eliminate those legacy capabilities not
essential for the conduct of MTWs. The consolidation of the
force around the MTW missions could also lead to the
requirement for some unidentified decreases in
infrastructure and sustainment resources.
Summary and Conclusions.
This brief examination suggests that early in a new
administration’s term, it must make fundamental decisions
on the level of resources it will provide for national defense.
The SecDef must also decide early in his term where
reductions and efficiencies are to be taken from the existing
forces, capabilities, and programs if there is to be any
assurance that these savings can be realized. Lastly, with
the interrelationship of many of the major functional
categories discussed above, expectations for savings in the
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initial years after decisions for reductions are likely to be
only marginal. The fragmentation over time of the direct
relationship between such things as force structure and
infrastructure makes taking reductions and the realization
of their immediate financial benefits extremely difficult.
This assessment begins to provide a basis for trade-offs
and divestiture. The goals of investment and divestment
must be structured within the strategy. The question that
remains to be answered is affordability of any of the possible
courses that the Bush administration might choose. It
appears that regardless of what strategy is chosen, one
needs a set of common resource “topline” assumptions for all
alternative strategies. And it appears that regardless of the
strategy there will have to be increases in overall defense
expenditure to support new initiatives such as missile
defense. Importantly, as one moves through the different
strategies there is a need to relate characteristics and
objectives of each alternative strategy to the resource
drivers—force structure and readiness, modernization, and
infrastructure and sustainment. Some examples of these
characteristics and their interrelated nature are
modernized legacy forces, advanced technology capabilities,
and slow transformation. One common element integral to
any strategy will be additional rounds of BRAC to reduce
infrastructure and reductions in sustainment through new
concepts that will assure very lean logistics. Another
common area that will need to be explored for reductions is
the role and size of the strategic nuclear forces and heavy
conventional land forces. Depending on the strategy, these
force elements provide some potential areas for
reorientation and potential divestiture, but one must be
clear on what is needed to assure a feasible strategy. For
example, will lighter or medium forces replace heavy
conventional land force? Will the costs associated with that
force transformation be affordable in concert with other
demands of the strategy?
The costs associated with defense will be further
clarified through the priorities set for the missions in any
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strategy that is adopted. The strategy must explicitly
identify the required capabilities to support the missions
and their relative priorities. Also there needs to be a clear
identification of the resource priorities associated with a
particular strategy. Once these decisions are made,
transformation should be addressed within two contexts:
relative priority of the required future capabilities and the
schedule for their availability. This information will
facilitate the identification of the resources necessary to
achieve operational readiness and ultimately decide the
feasibility of the strategy.
The strong link that we are suggesting between strategy
and resources argues that alternative strategies can only be
explored through a very systematic assessment of strategy,
resource drivers, and identification of capability
alternatives. The constant iteration of these elements
provides defense strategists and resource planners a
realistic way to evaluate current and future requirements.
Some might argue that such an approach would hinder the
ability to develop a pure strategy; we argue that the
feasibility of the strategy depends upon its affordability and
maintainability that can only be assured through such an
approach. Some of the fundamental building blocks that
might be used to develop a fiscally informed strategy are
Major Joint Military Capabilities, Key Service Capabilities,
and Enabling Capabilities. Some examples of the subareas
under these building blocks would include:

•

•

Major Joint Military Capabilities

−

Conventional Precision Strike

−

Forced Regional Access or Entry

−

Focused Regional Reconnaissance, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

Key Service Capabilities
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•

−

Air Supremacy or Superiority

−

Sea Supremacy or Superiority

−

Territory and population control and occupation

Enabling Capabilities

−

Network Centric Distributed Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence

−

On-call Assured Logistics Support

Once these capability sets have been identified, the
inter-relationships among the resource drivers and their
subelements can be identified and assessed.
The Bush administration has a major challenge to
develop a strategy that will provide the necessary
capab ilities for the near - ter m and as sur e the
transformation of capabilities into the future that will
protect our national interests in an environment of evolving
globalization and the possibility of a future multipolar
international structure. To accommodate the President’s
announced initiatives and assure his principal objective of a
premier defense establishment, the selection of the defense
strategy will definitely be driven by equally important
decisions affecting resource elements that will define and
shape its content. As we discussed earlier, these decisions
will not be easily reached or sustained without the full
support of the new administration, the military services,
and Congress. Once these decisions are made, the
transformation could be slower than desired because of the
complex ities assoc i ated wi th c ap tur i ng the
inter-relationships and dependencies of the defense budget.
This further suggests that rather than a sweeping
restructuring of defense, the administration should focus on
a few critical areas that will generate forcing functions to
have the services develop options for their realignment and
divestiture that will support DoD’s transformation plan.
160

The Office of the Secretary of Defense could then evaluate
the options for responsiveness, relevance, affordability, and
feasibility. This allows an interactive and iterative process
that recognizes the external forces that will impact the
defen se prog ra m thr oughout the tenur e of thi s
administration and could accommodate mid-course
corrections.
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PART III: EXTERNAL VIEWS
OF TRANSFORMATION
There are many interested, and some disinterested,
outside observers of the transformation of the American
defense establishment. Unfortunately most of the American
public falls into the latter category, according to Richard
Friedman of the National Strategy Forum, another speaker.
They have little interest in foreign affairs except to make
sure that no instability affects their domestic tranquility.
Though civilian elites tend to hold the military in high
regard, most civilians have little understanding of military
culture, and their apparently high level of support for the
armed forces is shaky and shallow, according to Friedman.
He asserted that the term “transformation” has no
resonance with the public, and that a more accurate and
understandable title for the conference would be
“Adaptation of the Department of Stability in a Period of
Relative Peace (and We’re Really Not Sure About the
Prosperity).” He argued that it is essential for the military
to maintain its credibility in order to make its case for
transformation with the public, and predicted a resurgence
of interest in foreign affairs when there is a significant
terrorist incident at home or Americans realize that the
process of globalization will affect their jobs. Recent events
will certainly test this hypothesis.
Agencies and allies who must work with the Department
of Defense (DoD) are much more focused on the progress and
results of transformation programs. Dr. John Finney of the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State,
assured the attendees of his organization’s support for
DoD’s efforts, and asserted they needed to be part of a wider
undertaking to reform the whole U.S. Government to
conduct a strategy of global engagement better. Colonel
Richard Wilson of the Australian Army described his own
country’s plans for continuous force modernization as it
prepares for a future of increasing Operations Other Than
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War. The Australians share American concerns about
casualties, collateral damage, and leveraging new
technology, and will monitor the course of American defense
transformation with great interest.
The two chapters in this section are also from allies or
potential coalition partners, and they reflect some other
concerns brought up by Colonel Wilson. Colonel W. H.
Moore is responsible for the conceptual and force
development work for the future army of the United
Kin g dom. He emp has i zes p os si bl e p r obl ems i n
interoperability, fearing that the pace or direction of
American military reform will produce a force that will have
great difficulty working with armed services from other
nations. Colonel (retired) Leonid Polyakov, Director of
Military Programs at the Ukrainian Razumkov Centre for
Economic and Political Studies, is more concerned that the
transformed American force will be too dependent on
technology and underestimate the importance of human
factors in warfare. He also wants to publicize current
Ukrainian contributions to combined operations with U.S.
forces. Their observations merit serious consideration as
the U.S. DoD embarks on its ambitious transformation
program.
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CHAPTER 6
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S VIEW OF U.S. ARMY
TRANSFORMATION
W. H. Moore
From the United Kingdom’s (UK) perspective, the U.S.
Army Transformation process is one of the more
adventurous and exciting military programs in the world
today. Emanating from General Eric Shinseki’s vision as he
took office as Chief of Staff of the Army, it has moved ahead
with breathtaking pace. Indeed, it is very hard to keep up
with this rate in America, let alone 4,000 miles away in the
UK. I have therefore had to draw a line in the sand on which
to base my lecture, and have taken the situation as
presented at the Association of the United States Army
(AUSA) in March 2001 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, as my
benchmark. My chapter will focus on what the UK Army is
doing to meet the new challenges of the future operating
environment, and then draw out the similarities and
differences with the U.S. Army. Let me say at the start,
though, that I find the transformation process an entirely
logical program, that, if successful, will focus America’s
Army on the key aspects of rapid effect and deployability,
thus making it an appropriate force for the 21st century.
The process would appear to have minimal risk in that it
does improve the Legacy Forces—thus maintaining a strong
warfighting capability—at the same time as it is developing
both its Interim and Objective Forces. I have no doubt that
transformation will be successful, provided that the money
is available for all three strands.
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The UK Ministry of Defence differs from its U.S.
counterpart in that it is more closely integrated; it has to
be—the UK has smaller Armed Forces and therefore has to
make the most economical use of all its scarce assets. The
UK Army, for example, does not have its own budget, and
procurement of equipment is a truly Joint affair, and this
brings me to my first observation about transformation.
Despite the rhetoric from AUSA, I am not yet convinced that
U.S. Army transformation has the full support of the other
services, and despite the ongoing Rumsfeld review, I am not
sure how much Defense support it has (in terms of dollars).
While I realize that I may be on sticky ground in this
respect, this is just a perception. I hope that I am wrong. But
this does lead me to the next point, that of perception itself.
U.S. Army transformation, to the outside world, seems very
focused on equipment and a Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA). And yet this is not the case, as any discussion with
somebody from your Training and Doctrine Command or a
U.S. Army senior leader will tell me. In fact, the U.S. Army
is taking a holistic view of what they are currently doing,
but this is not the picture that is often portrayed outside of
the United States. You may not consider that such an
observation is valid, but if your allies do not have a real
grasp of what you are up to, they will find it difficult to work
out how we might best work together. I will return to this
point.
The UK took a close look at its future in the Strategic
Defence Review of 1998, a year after the Labour
Government came to power. It was clear that the UK faced
no clearly identifiable strategic threat, and while its first
priority was to ensure the defense of the UK, the Armed
Forces were to pursue a more expeditionary role. But how
were they to be configured for such a mission?
A look at how they might operate in the future would see
a battlespace that has many more players than it had
during the Cold War. In the UK Army, we would see
ourselves operating more closely with the maritime and air
components to project power to where it was truly most
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needed. More, and very different, allies would be involved in
coalitions of the willing. In addition, there would be many
more interested parties in theatre than hitherto.
C on tractors, other gover nmental d ep ar tments,
nongovernmental organizations like the Red Cross and
charities, the United Nations, bodies like the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
multinational cartels—all of whom would be in theatre
before us, and would remain behind long after the Armed
Forces had left. People—possibly the neutrals—who would
either be dependent upon armed forces, supportive of their
actions, or downright hostile to their mere presence, would
also complicate the issue. This is a very convoluted picture
indeed.
To conduct a successful campaign, a totally integrated
approach by all those parties would be required in order to
bring the crisis to a satisfactory conclusion. This is the
environment in which the UK sees itself operating in the
future. Allies are key to us—we cannot go it alone, and
therefore we have defined our developmental priorities
accordingly: first and most importantly, the ability to
conduct alliance and coalition warfighting; second, using
those same capabilities, to conduct national-only
warfighting (a re-run of the Falklands, for example); and
third, using the same set of capabilities again, other
operations. Therefore we heavily depend on our allies, and
this brings me to the one major concern that I have about the
U.S. transformation process.
The UK and other allies need to operate alongside the
United States if we are to create that effect to which I
alluded previously. Equipment interfaces will be key, and
our way of doing business together should be broadly
recog n iz ab le, a s s houl d our way of thi nki ng—
interoperability of the mind is probably the key factor. You
are running ahead so fast, that we may not be able to keep
pace, or even to catch up when you have attained your goals.
This may be our problem, and why should you wait for us?
But the bottom line is that we will need to fight together,
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and this may require some accommodation now. Thus the
most important criteria for the UK is to stay engaged, to
understand what you are doing, and for both our nations to
have a dialogue to ensure that we can continue to conduct
operations effectively and together. We need to understand
your concepts of operations and your capabilities before we
get to the line of departure if we are to achieve that
integrated effect I mentioned earlier.
Any developmental process has to take cognizance of the
trends and challenges that are likely to be faced by its armed
forces. While any prediction of the future is fraught with
danger—as many of our compatriots have discovered to
their cost—there are, nonetheless, some enduring trends
and challenges that we will all face. One such challenge is to
get into theatre more quickly and with more effect in order
to deter, coerce or ultimately defeat an enemy before he has
got himself set—an attempt to nip a crisis in the bud. We are
therefore extremely supportive of the concept behind the
U.S. transformation process. Indeed, we have defined a
similar idea and have termed it Rapid and Early Effect—the
rapid part being the military contribution to early effect,
where the emphasis is not on the speed of deployment, but
rather the operational and tactical impact once deployed.
The UK Army is currently only capable of conducting rapid
effect in low-risk or small other operations—in fact, we are
rather good at it. Witness the highly successful operation by
the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment to rescue the
hostages from the West Side Boys in Sierra Leone late last
year. But we need to do better—we need to develop our
forces to conduct rapid effect in more intense other
operations. The only difference that the UK has with the
United States is that we do not believe that we will be able to
develop a rapid effect force capable of warfighting against a
matched enemy until about 2025. We do not believe that the
step change in technology will occur in the timeframe that
the United States is planning for the objective force. We
hope it does because it would allow the more rapid
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transformation of some of our forces as well, but the
revolution has yet to occur.
The UK is therefore looking at improving the capability
of its light forces, developing what we term “Medium
Forces,” and the necessary rebalancing of our heavier
forces. Medium forces will be configured under present
tentative plans to fit the C130 envelope, and we are
currently deciding the effect that this concept might have on
our equipment programme. The Future Rapid Effect
System (FRES) is in a very early stage, embryonic when
compared to what the United States is doing with its
interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs). Nonetheless,
because we do not believe in a short-term technology fix, our
approach is more incremental in nature. The UK is aiming
to identify the technologies it would wish to insert
downstream, and then introduce them incrementally as the
various constituents become proven. By taking such a
modular approach, there is less technical risk, and a more
level funding profile is maintained throughout. This latter
point is most important owing to the joint nature of our
procurement process to which I alluded earlier. A very
expensive project with high technical risk is vulnerable in
times when defense budgets are being squeezed. Our
process is therefore one of evolution, not revolution—
incremental rather than Big Bang.
Our Medium Forces are also unlikely to be hard-wired,
and their peacetime structure is therefore different from
your IBCTs. The UK envisages force packaging from our
heavy, medium, and light forces to achieve the necessary
effect. In a simple warfighting scenario, the light forces
would effect entry, the medium forces might stabilize the
situation, and the heavy forces would produce the decisive
action. Medium forces, for the UK, must, however, have
utility around the spectrum of conflict—we are too small to
develop niche capabilities. Until this step change in
technology occurs they will have utility:
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•

In support of Heavy Forces in warfighting (rear area
operations, flank operations, complex terrain)

•

For the more intense Other Operations (short of
warfighting)

•

For achieving Rapid Effect (in operations short of
warfighting).

We have yet to decide on how these might evolve in
structural terms, but one solution might be to develop
medium forces from our current mechanized and light
forces to provide an intervention and utility force. This
recognizes that full spectrum ground maneuver using
medium forces can only take place in around 2025. In
summary then, our medium forces, when developed, must
have the widest possible utility in the future operating
environment. In this concept, we are completely on board
with the U.S. Army—the ends are the same, it is just the
ways and the means that differ.
Before closing, there are one or two other minor
observations to be made about the U.S. Army transformation. I hesitate to raise them because they are not just
pertinent to the United States and are prevalent among the
corridor conversations in our own ministry. I am
increasingly worried by the over-reliance on technology to
produce solutions for warfare. In the final act, the resolution
of a conflict invariably centers on issues of people and
territory, tasks which demand the deployment of land
forces: uniquely and inescapably so. The concept of killing at
a distance, using high tech sensors linked to long-range
weapon systems from all the services against a matched
enemy in a warfighting operation, is an entirely logical
solution. But many enemies, even sophisticated ones, will
not wish to present themselves for such high technology
destruction and defeat, and technology may not have the
effect that we might hope on other less sophisticated
adversaries, as the Russians discovered on the streets of
Grozny. I may be a skeptic, but I hope I do not have my head
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buried in the sand, when I say that I am wary of analysts
who say that we can always win at a distance. History does
not bear out their contentions, and there must be an
injection of reality into this debate, and the inevitable
balance must be found.
Perhaps I can leave you with some thoughts about how
the UK—a strong ally and supporter of the United
States—views your exciting and fast-paced transformation
process. I will use the analogy of a set of stop (traffic) lights.
The red represents major concerns, the amber depicts
current worries that I would expect to be resolved over time,
and the green is the light top left of the exit door on a
C130—i.e., that you are heading in the right direction.
Table 1 shows my assessment of Army transformation using
this traffic light metaphor.
The way in which the U.S. Army is transforming itself to
meet the challenges of this century is logical and, provided
the money holds out, will result in a highly effective
intervention force that can also win its nation’s wars. We in
the UK would wish to remain closely engaged in what you
are doing.
Concerns (Red)
Interoperability with Allies
could be a problem in terms
of equipment and the way
in which the U.S. will fight

Short Term Worries (Amber)
The perceived lack of a
Joint/Defense approach could
undermine what the Army is trying
to achieve
The perceived lack of marketing,
especially to allies, will not aid
interoperability
A potential over-reliance on
technology and stand-off attack
could lead to problems among less
sophisticated enemies
There is potential for competing
interests among the Legacy,
Objective and Interim Forces,
especially for money
The timeframe for a step change in
technology required to deliver the
Objective Force is unrealistic

Table 1.
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Strong Support (Green)
A logical process that is required to
adapt forces to the new operating
environment
The Objective Force will improve
operoperational effectiveness
The Objective Force will stand a
better chance of preventing crisis
escalation
The maintenance of the Legacy
Force ensures minimal operational
risk while the Interim and
Objective Forces are developed
The holistic process pursued will
result in the realization of true
capability
The proactive validation and
experimentation program will
allow incremental and iterative
development

CHAPTER 7
AMERICAN DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION:
A VIEW FROM UKRAINE1
Leonid I. Polyakov
I want to present a Ukrainian perspective on U.S.
defense transformation. I can suggest two reasons why such
a perspective might be of interest. The first reason is that
the past decade of experience in U.S./Ukrainian military
cooperation within the framework of American “peacetime
engagement” programs has shown that our nations share a
converging interest in both parties having a robust defense.
The United States has consistently been the most active
foreign advocate and supporter of Ukraine’s independence.
So, we think that you care about us, and we care about
your strength. We consider your defense capabilities as one
of the cornerstones of continued American support to
Ukraine. In other words, we care about your future as a kind
of guarantee of our own future.
The second reason is that experience in recent years
(NATO implementation forces [IFOR], stabilization forces
[SFOR], and Kosovo forces [KFOR]) also demonstrates that
Ukrainian troops have been and continue to be a potential
coalition partner with the U.S. Army in future contingencies. Therefore, it is not unthinkable that the success of our
future combined operations to some extent could depend on
how we shape our interoperability now.
My chapter is divided into two parts. First, I will cover
some considerations concerning the general operational
dimensions of American defense transformation in an era of
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peace and prosperity. Then I will discuss some aspects of
interoperability between the United States Army, a
“high-tech info age force,” and the Ukrainian Army, a
“low-tech industrial age force.”
An Example from History.
To illustrate the possible effects of transformation on
U.S. military forces and to highlight potential dangers, I
offer this example from 2,000 years ago.
In the year 9 AD, the Roman General Varus led three
Roman Legions (a force equivalent to a U.S. Army Corps
today) on an expedition to punish rebelling native tribes in
Germany. The Romans had the best military technology,
the best doctrine, and the best training available in the
whole world at that time. Their army had not been defeated
in battle in 100 years. The Romans were led on their march
by friendly German troops who knew the region, allies who
had sworn allegiance to Rome forever and were
interoperable within the framework of the Roman military
system. The allied scouting party was led by Arminius, a
German prince who had been made a Roman officer and
citizen because of his demonstrated intense loyalty to Rome.
Arminius led the three Roman legions into the dense forests
and swamps of the Teutoberger Wald. When the Roman
legions were deep into the woods, their German allies
suddenly disappeared. Then other German warriors
attacked the Romans on three sides. The Romans were not
able to deploy into their normally deadly combat formations
because of the thick forest and swampy ground. They were
faced with an asymmetric battle that they had not been
trained for, and they could not adequately adapt to the
unfamiliar conditions. All three legions were destroyed.
On a larger scale, the German victory in this battle
changed all of European history. Afterwards, the Romans
withdrew behind the Rhine and never again colonized much
of Germany except below the Danube. Initially they did
launch a punishing strike against the German tribes in
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revenge for the loss of their legions, but the Romans soon
had to withdraw because they now had too few troops to
occupy the area. Their response resembled a modern
Tomahawk cruise missile attack against Iraq, or terrorists,
today. Such actions hurt your enemy for a few days or
months, but if you do not occupy the ground, you get only
some momentary satisfaction and never solve the problem.
Because Rome failed to occupy Germany, the modern world
was faced with one of the great rivalries of our day—France
versus Germany. Had Rome occupied both areas, perhaps
they could have developed in ways that would have
prevented World War I and World War II.
So what is my point? We need to examine if this Roman
defeat after an era of continuous victories and expansion
was a matter of accidental coincidence, or the result of
systemic factors. I think that it was certainly the latter.
In this illustration, there are both operational and
interoperability issues. First, among the former is the fact
that the Romans were too devoted to old, proven doctrine
that had worked for hundreds of years. Once denied the use
of familiar battle techniques, Roman soldiers could not
adapt. They had no contingency plans to deviate from their
accepted practices. Long reliance on victorious doctrine led
to inflexibility and a neglect of alternative approaches.
There were other operational reasons the legions failed
in the Teutoberger Wald. Continuous victorious wars with
vague aims and mediocre enemies, where national survival
was not at stake, led to a “dulling” of the aggressiveness of
the Roman soldiers. They were not enthusiastic about
tackling another peacekeeping mission.
Their leadership also failed them. Varus did not make a
proper reconnaissance of the unfamiliar route of advance,
neglected to organize security on the march, was
overconfident, and had no plan for counterintelligence. His
ignorance of basic security procedures suggests that Roman
generals had begun to believe too much in their own
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invincibility, and too little in the ability of an enemy ever to
challenge them seriously.
Despite having materiel interoperability with their
German guides, Roman ignorance of human factors negated
that advantage. Due to overconfidence, the Romans never
questioned the loyalty of their allies. The Romans had faith
in their technology and doctrine, assuming that no one could
beat them. They also assumed that their allies had no other
motive but to support Rome. Instead of shaping relations
with an ally to create an effective force multiplier, the
Romans ended up being guided by traitors.
The Dominance Trap.
We can draw many useful insights from the Roman
disaster in the Teutoberger Wald. The name of this Strategy
Conference—Transforming Defense in an Era of Peace and
Prosperity—itself suggests parallels between 9 AD and the
possible future of the U.S. Army in 2030-50. In my
judgment, this current “Era of Peace and Prosperity”
presents the same dangers for America as 100 years of
victory did for the Romans. Let’s call this similarity the
“dominance trap.”
History teaches that every military superpower at the
peak of its strength appears to be forever unbeatable to its
citizens and many outsiders. Yet sooner or later, its power
declines. This usually occurs not principally because of
technological backwardness, but mainly because of a
decline in the morale and determination of the army and the
people, as well as a deterioration in the quality of national
and military leadership. There is evidence, I believe, which
su g g ests th at the c onsequenc es of U.S. Ar my
transformation might in the worst case make technological
superiority irrelevant. I don’t think that your future
adversaries will try to match U.S. arms. They will work to
undermine American combat potential in asymmetric ways.
Operationally and tactically, for example, the U.S. plan in
the Gulf War was brilliant. But the Iraqis fought
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symmetrically. What if you are fighting an infantry-based,
highly motivated Army of a very large and populous nation
instead? What if that enemy simply issues each man a rock
and tells him to hit the nearest American on the head? Even
if your intelligence and information superiority is so good
that you know where each man and each rock is located, can
you kill enough of them fast enough to avoid heavy
casualties? I wonder whether the transformation
envisioned increases the vulnerabilities of U.S. military
forces to asymmetric enemies and if it risks ignoring human
(or other than “materiel”) factors.
The Army is a product of its nation-state, but the
fundamental strengths of nation-states are under attack
from many sources. Drugs and corruption can undermine
morality and leadership. Casualty sensitivity might lower
soldiers’ morale and reduce the support of the population,
which can be influenced more quickly in the Information
Age. I would suggest that peace and prosperity are in
themselves a kind of threat to American and Ukrainian
defen se. F rom a d ef ense p er sp ec ti ve, ther e ar e
disadvantages to living in such a quiet period, since there is
a risk of losing the support of the people for defense
transformation if they see no immediate threat.
In the next 20-30 years, the United States will probably
enjoy unchallenged dominance in military affairs. However,
this could lead to a situation where, despite unparalleled
high-tech capabilities, the absence of a real peer competitor
could make the human dimensions of U.S. military strength
vulnerable.
Issues of Interoperability.
The Roman story suggests that American military
contact programs and peacetime engagement may be a very
good way for the United States to understand its friends and
allies and determine whether they are “really on your side,”
as well as to shape interoperability in terms of human and
materiel factors.
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U.S. doctrin e r ec ogni zes that ther e ar e
other-than-materiel aspects to warfighting. Joint Vision
2020 includes such factors as doctrine, organization,
training, and personnel, for example. There may be some
materiel solutions to interoperability (such as the United
States giving or selling radios to an ally so they can
communicate, for example). However, it may make better
sense to provide the ally with American liaison officers who
have the proper radios to talk to the U.S. force. But if you
must rely on liaison officers, other factors grow in
importance. Those selected for this important duty must be
properly trained to work with foreign forces, and educated
in their language and culture.
Trying to “put the shoe on the other foot” raises a host of
questions. Could the allied nation provide liaison officers
with the right qualities to the U.S. force? Should nations
considering operating with American forces be training
these kinds of liaison officers now, rather than waiting for
the United States to provide them when there is a crisis? If
such a capability existed with a potential partner, would it
make the United States more willing or more able to help?
Would this be a “force multiplier” and perhaps a deterrent
for the partner country versus an adversary nation? Could
this idea be linked to the use of current American military
contact/engagement programs and language training
offered to other countries, to build such a capability starting
today? Should this be a higher priority for U.S. military
cooperation and engagement with potential partners?
U.S.-Ukrainian Relations.
Now let’s look at how current U.S./Ukrainian military
cooperation falls into the framework described above.
Ukrainians always were regarded as good soldiers and
good fighters on the tactical level, but they were not always
properly led and motivated. This was evident in the last
days of the Soviet Army, when Ukrainians comprised the
largest proportion of field grade and senior officers as well
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as noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The troops of an
independent Ukraine inherited the reputation for being a
capable force, and they have maintained it. For example,
the Ukrainian engineer battalion performing peacekeeping
in Lebanon disarmed several thousand explosive devices in
less than 1 year, while during the 22 previous years of the
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission in that
country, only 56 devices had been destroyed.
In the area of international military cooperation,
Ukraine interacts especially actively and fruitfully with the
United States. We highly appreciate the American financial
contribution to this relationship. Since 1994, Ukraine’s
military has obtained over $30 million from the United
States under international military cooperation programs
to fund bilateral events, Ukraine’s participation in the
NA T O P artn ershi p f or Peac e Pr ogr am, and the
maintenance of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Kosovo. With
U.S. assistance, Ukraine has commissioned several
military English language training facilities. The United
States has worked with us to create a program to train
professional NCOs for Ukraine’s armed forces. More than
$8 million has been allocated for the training of some 300
Ukrainian officers, NCOs, and civilians in the United States
under the International Military Education and Training
Program. In terms of the amount of financing and the
number of events, Ukraine’s cooperation program with the
United States matches its participation with all other
partners combined.
As a result of this cooperation, U.S.-Ukraine
interoperability for exercises or contingency operations
improved. Ukrainian troops are working directly with U.S.
forces in Kosovo today. Ukraine’s military is now more
familiar with U.S. and Western doctrine because of
exercises, exchanges, and cooperation in the Balkans.
I will tell you another story which happened on February
13, 2001, in Kosovo. Ukrainian peacekeepers escorted a
convoy of Serbian civilians through the mountains to the
181

municipal center of Strpce. A sniper (allegedly Albanian)
opened fire, apparently aiming at one of the bus drivers, but
shot an elderly Serb instead. Ukrainian peacekeepers
immediately deployed and searched the nearby slopes,
where they found several Albanian males and detained
them. Later in the evening a Serbian crowd of up to 1000
gathered around the local U.N. police station as a
“spontaneous protest against the killing of the elderly Serb.”
The situation became tense as Ukrainian peacekeepers
formed a circle around the station, with the U.N. police
contingent (including U.S. military police) inside, while the
crowd tried to break in. At some point the U.N. police station
chief started firing in the air and aiming his gun at the
crowd. This move ignited the mob—molotov cocktails were
thrown at the station, stones were hurled at Ukrainian
peacekeepers, and five police cars were burned or destroyed.
The crowd was growing when the Ukrainian company
commander, Captain Brezgounov, entered the station with
four soldiers and suggested the policemen evacuate. They
hesitated when they learned that the Ukrainians were in
small numbers. When the policemen were finally in
Ukrainian vehicles, the crowd blocked their movement.
Then suddenly support came from outside—American
vehicles rammed through hastily erected Serbian
barricades on the outskirts of Strpce and raced to the aid of
the Ukrainians. The senior American officer present
decided to address the crowd. As he approached, the crowd
seized him. God knows what could have happened to him if
the Ukrainian peacekeepers led by the same Captain
Brezgounov had not pulled the U.S. officer out and saved his
life. Within 24 hours, the KFOR Brigade East commander, a
U.S. brigadier general, awarded Captain Brezgounov with a
medal for “outstanding performance.”
This is how the Ukrainian media reported the incident. I
hoped to find some more details from NATO and the
Americans, but have failed so far. The Stars and Stripes of
February 21 touched on the incident, but said nothing about
the role of Ukrainian peacekeepers that day, except
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mentioning someone’s proposal to assign U.S. troops as
convoy escorts instead of “unnamed KFOR troops.” I could
find no other references to the event in American
newspapers.
This absence of coverage in the West might have to do
with American political leadership not wishing to publicize
a danger to their troops, even though the U.S. forces on the
scene recognized the action for what it was. This could be an
example of trying to avoid the “CNN factor”—the story of
U.S. soldiers being surrounded and having to be rescued by
anybody could produce public or political backlash. I must
say, however, that this lack of publicity is perceived by some
Ukrainians as a reluctance to note their important role.
Additionally, there was evidently a reluctance on the
part of the U.N. police to cooperate with the Ukrainian
KFOR troops, and some evidence of the lack of coordination
between the U.S. and Ukrainian troops once the action
began.
Was this due to the American troops failing to appreciate
the possible contribution of their Ukrainian ally, or a lack of
trust in their capability? Or was it simply a lack of advanced
planning? I will leave the first possibility open to
speculation. But if there was a failure to plan ahead of time
as a multinational unit for possible courses of action, that
raises a new set of questions. We might ask whether the
troops (and the U.N. police) involved simply lacked a
common doctrine? This could contribute to the failure to
plan properly. A lack of leadership appreciation for each
other’s doctrine and culture could also lead to misunderstandings of intent.
Again, I think that doctrine (and training in that
doctrine) is a more important “glue” to hold different types
of forces together than “bringing them both to the same
level” in material-technical terms. In this regard, NATO
efforts to build a “hierarchy” of Allied Joint Doctrine are
important. I am told, however, that one major gap in the
NATO doctrine so far approved is in Peace Support
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Operations. If it had been available before the incident I just
described, it might have improved the KFOR response.
Conclusion.
To conclude, I want to emphasize that America should
not become complacent about or too dependent upon either
superior technology or “victorious doctrine” as it faces the
challenge of transformation. The ability of the United
States to maintain a technological edge over potential
adversaries appears assured at the moment, but whether it
can continue to do so will depend upon how future leaders,
allies, doctrine, and training will evolve. These factors
should be constantly harmonized with materiel factors,
which is a much more difficult process than merely
constructing a continual series of new and better weapons
systems.
We in Ukraine hope that the United States does not lose
its perspective on other-than-materiel factors as it
transforms its military. Otherwise, there are risks for your
future forces and for our potential interoperability. We
should work together now to identify interoperability
problems, in the human as well as the technical dimension,
in order to maximize both our capabilities in the future.
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